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How one must first distinguish between artworks.-All that 
is thought, written, painted, composed, even built and 
sculpted, belongs either to monological art or to art 
before witnesses. Among the latter is also to be 
reckoned even that illusory monologue art which 
includes belief in God, the entire lyric of prayer: 
because for a pious person there is no solitude-we 
were the first to make this discovery, we the godless. I 
know no deeper distinction in the entire optics of the 
artist than this: whether he looks toward the emerging 
artwork (toward "himself"-) from the standpoint of 
the witness or "has forgotten the world": as is the 
essence of every monological artwork-it rests on 
forgetting, it is the music of forgetting. 
-FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Die frohliche Wissenschaft 
Preface 
Genius is the intellectual obsession of our time, and monologue is 
one symptom of the disorder. Monologues of solitude and madness 
have reached epidemic proportions. This book confronts modernity 
by reviewing Western traditions of genius and monologue, inspiration 
and individuality, from a rhetorical standpoint. A person no longer 
has a genius, a guardian spirit; twentieth-century myth suggests that 
an especially creative person is a genius. Ancient mythology has not 
disappeared but has been turned inward. 
From biblical narratives to modem literature, as the prophet be-
comes the man of genius, invention displaces divine inspiration. Yet 
transcendent ideas continue to guide the modem genius, whose cre-
ative exertions never secure autonomy. Although the contemporary 
persona of the genius rings hollow, no original figure can be severed 
from the masks it has successively worn: the guise of the prophet, 
the poetry of imagination, the rhetoric of consciousness. These are 
not movements in a continuous historical narrative, but turning points 
that disrupt an elusive continuity. 
Despite my disclaimers, some readers will misunderstand Genius 
and Monologue as a history of ideas. The opening chapters on Greek 
and Hebrew traditions are not gestures toward comprehensiveness; 
I have merely focused on certain recurrent configurations in the West-
em rhetoric of inspiration and individuality. I employ the methods 
of rhetorical, not historical, criticism. Without intending to narrate an 
7 
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intellectual history, I interpret emblematic linguistic and literary forms 
that are linked to the philosophy of genius and the literature of mono-
logue. Intertextual relationships make this a drama in which words 
are the central characters. 
Part One, Philosophy of Genius, begins with Socrates' "divine sign," 
a precursor of the Latin guardian genius. Biblical and midrashic tra-
ditions supplement the Greco-Roman context through their repre-
sentations of angels and satan as divine emissaries. Eighteenth-century 
aestheticians such as Shaftesbury, Addison, Young, and Kant revive 
and transform these ancient origins. The classical conception of a 
supernatural guardian spirit is gradually supplanted by modern ideas 
of an individual extraordinary mind. Following Husserl's phenome-
nology, which may represent the last possible struggle to maintain a 
monadic consciousness, monological subjectivity is deconstructed by 
Heidegger and Derrida. 
Part Two, Literature of Monologue, examines paradigmatic literary 
monologues in drama, lyric, and narrative. For pre-Shakespearean 
soliloquists, solitary speech is linked to prayer and guilt. Shake-
speare's soliloquists, after they lose the communicative relation to 
God, encounter radical psychological anomalies at the threshold of 
reason . Coleridge's conversation poems transform the contemplative 
voice into an independent, lyrical form, but his visionary poems dis-
rupt this apparent continuity. Poe's mad narrators extend the range 
of first-person fiction-toward the abyss . Diverse conventions of in-
ternal monologue culminate with Joyce's Mollylogue, in which stream 
of consciousness cedes to stream of text: "Language speaks." 
Quotations are central to this intertextual study. In a rhetorical 
analysis, however, the distinction between "use" and "mention" of 
words is sometimes difficult to maintain . Literary motifs combine 
themes and the words that embody them. Textual analysis has the 
appearance of a mosaic in which every tile is a word, a tessera from 
previous contexts. The mortar of quotation marks is everywhere es-
sential, yet not always perceptible . 
All translations in this book are my own except where otherwise 
indicated: I have chosen to perform this first interpretive act myself. 
In responding to the uniqueness of each original text, my translations 
and commentaries are intended to return the reader to the sources, 
cited in the footnotes. I also mention existing translations when they 
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are especially useful, and offer page references to those translations 
even when the English version quoted here is my own. 
Work on Genius and Monologue began with the help of a Special 
Humanities Fellowship at the University of Chicago (1977-79), con-
tinued through the support of a German Academic Exchange Grant 
at the Univ.ersities of Freiburg and Berlin (1979-81), and was com-
pleted during a Yale University Fellowship (1981-84). I am grateful 
for this generous assistance . 
Of the many teachers and friends who have made this book pos-
sible, I especially thank: James Adler, Harold Bloom, Jane Bottner, 
Leslie Brisman, Thomas Cole, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Howard 
Felperin, Steven Fraade, Janina Frankel, Thomas Gould, Karsten Har-
ries, Geoffrey Hartman, Lewis Klausner, Paul Miklowitz, J. Hillis 
Miller, Maurice Natanson, Fred Oscanyan, Elana Ponet, James Ponet, 
Paul Ricoeur, Michael Theunissen, Ernst Tugendhat, Heinrich Weid-
mann, and Dolora Wojciehowski. Thanks also go to the students in 
my Yale College seminar "Literary Monologue from Shakespeare to 
Joyce," who continued the dialogue while this book was in the final 
stages of revision. 
To my family I owe the profoundest debt. 
K.F. 
New Haven , Connecticut 
Abbreviations of 
Classical Works 
A pol. 
De Cher. 
De Civ. Dei 
De Conf. Ling. 
De Dec. 
De Fug. 
De Gig. 
De Migr. Abr. 
De Opif. 
De Somn . 
Diss . 
Il. 
Od. 
Plato, Apology 
Philo, De cherubim 
St. Augustine, De civitate dei 
Philo, De confusione linguarum 
Philo, De decalogo 
Philo, De fuga et inventione 
Philo, De gigan tibus 
Philo, De migratione Abrahami 
Philo, De opificio mundi 
Philo, De somniis 
Maximus of Tyre, Dissertations 
Homer, Iliad 
Homer, Odyssey 
Philo, Quis rerum divinarum Heres Quis. Rer. Div. 
Quod Det . Philo, Quod Deterius potiori insidiari solet 
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Genius and Monologue 
Introduction 
English "genius" retains traces of an intertextual history that trans-
forms and introjects the archaic, mythological daimon. Following Greek 
sources, Roman religion posits that every man has a genius, a familiar 
spirit; eighteenth-century aesthetics maintains that a great poet has 
genius; and today an extraordinarily creative person is a genius. The 
mythological past has been covered over by an exaggerated faith in 
subjectivity, individual speech, "monologue." While no pure genius 
can be quarried from buried strata, research may discern residues of 
opposing rhetorical systems that have generated particular surface 
formations. Analysis of literary and philosophic texts suggests, for 
example, that subjective monologue is a transformation of theological 
genius. 
Ancient religions characteristically refer to frequent communica-
tions between divine and human realms. In the Greek context, He-
siodic daimones are essentially spirits, mediators between gods and 
men. Homer employs the singular daimon more abstractly, implying 
an indefinite notion of divinity or fate. Distinct versions of the daimon 
conflict within Plato's dialogues, and Socrates' daimonion is a nodal 
point at which Plato revises the prevailing traditions of Hellenic spir-
ituality. The daimonion, Socrates' customary divine sign or voice, hov-
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ers between divinity and subjectivity, inspiration and internal speech. 
Ever since Plato's philosophical biography, literary texts have con-
fronted the tensions between monologue as prayer (dialogue with 
God) and as solitary contemplation (dialogue with oneself) . 
Ancient Hebrew texts refer to malachim, angels or divine messen-
gers, mediators between God and men. In a monotheistic framework, 
angels take the place of pagan minor deities, and Philo explicitly 
identifies Greek daimones and logoi with Hebrew malachim. Whereas 
Plato's texts displace plural daimones by singular daimon or daimonion , 
Hellenized Judaism drifts in the opposite direction: postbiblical com-
mentaries and legends expand the role of angels and demons, as in 
the stories of Abraham, Isaac, and satan . 
Angels and demons permeate the Judaic and Christian traditions, 
until the Enlightenment contests all figures of manifest divinity. En-
lightened philosophers propose an ideal of the rational, self-contained 
subject that dispenses with transcendent assumptions, while English 
aesthetics specifically displaces the theological dimension of genius. 
Joseph Addison appropriates the ancient word at the same time that 
he modifies its use, while Lord Shaftesbury equates the experience 
of a daimon, or genius, with soliloquy. To the extent that eighteenth-
century aestheticians retain religious concerns, they characteristically 
introject the divine: Edward Young, for example, writes of genius as 
"that god within." In the associationist tradition that revises and 
radicalizes Young's conjectures, William Duff and Alexander Gerard 
understand genius as a psychological faculty . Mythical ideas of genius 
as mediator between gods and men cede to the popular call for original 
artistic creation through genius. 
Seminal works of twentieth-century philosophy implicitly approach 
the new genius-subjectivity in language-through a dialectic of 
"transcendence" and "immanence." Edmund Husser! explicates the 
monadic or immanent sphere of consciousness by excluding the tran-
scendent, such that only the transcendental ego remains. Based on 
Husserl's phenomenological method that grounds consciousness by 
limiting transcendent perception, existentialism briefly recasts genius 
in the guise of the authentic self before language merges with this 
last divinity. While Heidegger's early work interprets the transcen-
dence of Dasein, his later writings move toward a nostalgic rediscov-
ery of the divine Logos. 
Transformations of genius have replaced divine selection by indi-
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vidual speech, but monologue has also eroded as a basis of subjec-
tivity. Following the brief ascendancy of internal monologue, 
contemporary fiction and literary theory question the traditions that 
rely on this phenomenon. Modern thought thus attains its current 
impasse, defiant of transcendent genius and skeptical of the imma-
nent monologue that remains. The monological subject has been un-
settled or decentered by a world purged of all possible foundations. 
Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida respond to this aporia through 
modified notions of transcendence in language. 
I I 
Mono-logos means "solitary speech." 
Monologue is not primarily a fact of human solitude but rather a 
mode of linguistic individuality. Ordinary, externalized discourse is 
the background for deviant, internalized discourse that may perform 
a semantically isolated idiolect. 1 On the level of discourse, monologue 
is a turn away from dialogue . The language of an individual is mono-
logical to the extent that it deviates from dialogical conventions of 
speech. Such swerves are essential to formal innovation, but our task 
is to understand, not to evaluate, literary monologues. 
The monadic subject has developed together with a monological 
conception of thought. No longer divine, logos grounds the speaking 
subject as an originator of propositions and narratives, meanings and 
illusions. The isolated self does not exist first in order to create its 
individuality afterward, however, because the "I" comes into con-
scious existence through languages of inwardness . The modern self 
strives for autonomy, although the speaking subject never exists in 
isolation: however insular a monologue may appear to be, it depends 
on interaction with communicative dialogue. 
Extraordinary language philosophy comes into being when, unable 
to secure its authenticity, the singular subject allies itself with phe-
nomena of linguistic deviance . Radical mono-logos arises as a diver-
gence from norms of ordinary dialogical language; internal speech is 
only the most familiar form of solitary language, distinct from and 
yet associated with semantically isolated modes. While internal speech 
'In this book, "deviant" and related terms are used descriptively, without pejorative 
connotations. The norms themselves are in flux and are not entirely insulated from 
what is perceived as abnormal. 
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is not necessarily deviant, literary monologues are typically bound 
up with difference, as if the monologist had an inherent tendency to 
deviate. 2 At the same time that monological swerves produce illusions 
of individuality, the achieved individual expressions threaten com-
munal norms and tend toward meaninglessness . 
European literary traditions of monologue, linked to the represen-
tation of thought, recapitulate philosophical and theological expla-
nations of genius. In the beginning only God is capable of monologue, 
but sin and satan generate new possibilities for monological speech 
at a distance from God. The monologist steers a course between di-
vinity and madness through English literary works from pre-Shake-
spearean drama to modernist fiction . While medieval and Renaissance 
plays retain the link between solitary speech and prayer, Shake-
speare's schemers and meditators introduce diverse modes of deviant 
monologue. Marlowe and Shakespeare imply both the metaphysical 
and the psychological forms of soliloquy, but dialogue with God drifts 
toward an internal dialogue. S. T. Coleridge's conversational poetry 
responds to Hamlet's soliloquies and exemplifies the Romantic dis-
course of a speaking subject. Hints of the transcendent remain, how-
ever, and the sober conversational pretense begins to dissolve when 
supernatural and unconscious worlds threaten to take control. E. A. 
Poe's tales represent extremes of the determined villain and mad 
monologist, yet the subjective certainty of his speakers is disarmed 
by a perverse reflex . 
The development of narrative internal monologue also moves be-
tween the poles of genius and monologue, the transcendent and the 
immanent, external forces and the independence of the subject. Ar-
thur Schnitzler in particular shows that internal speech cannot escape 
implicit dialogues . Stream of consciousness in works by James Joyce 
flows into the stream of language as a transcendent muse. Even the 
postmodernist scene of writing, in which a text appears as its own 
monologue, derives from this line of development: discourse cannot 
secure a realm of isolated subjectivity. These readings are in no way 
comprehensive but represent a limited number of intertextual rela-
2Compare Victor Erlich, "Notes on the Uses of Monologue in Artistic Prose, " Inter-
national Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics, ed. Paul B6ckmann, 112 (1959), 223-31; 
and "Some Uses of Monologue in Prose-Fiction: Narrative Manner and World-View," 
in Stil- und Formprobleme in der Literatur (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), 371-78. 
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tionships in which literary monologue reveals a monological history 
of creative deviations . 
In the critical tradition starting with Hedelin d' Aubignac, dramatic 
soliloquy is considered problematic from the standpoint of realism . 
Denis Diderot questions whether unrealistic soliloquies are acceptable 
in drama, while others defend and redefine dramatic soliloquy. 3 The 
aside is a further form of staged self-address, often linked with au-
dience address . Dramatic soliloquies frequently approach a relation-
ship to divinity, if not to deviance and madness. The conversation 
poem transforms the conventions of dramatic soliloquy, and first-
person narrative may assume similar monological forms . 
To varying degrees, literature of monologue purports to represent 
internal speech, but modernism tends to undermine mimetic illusions 
in favor of a writing that recognizes itself as such. While most mono-
logues imply a first-person speaker, first-person narrators in particular 
tend to merge self-reflectively with their texts. On one level, internal 
monologue fictionally represents internal speech, the linguistic aspect 
of consciousness.4 Stream-of-consciousness technique reproduces a 
fictional stream of consciousness, including internal speech and pre-
3Hedelin d' Aubignac, La pratique du theatre (Amsterdam: Jean Frederic Bernard, 1715), 
230. Denis Diderot, Discours de Ia poesie dramatique, ed . Jean-Pol Caput (Paris: Librairie 
Larousse, 1970), 91. See also Friedrich Diisel, Der dramatische Monolog in der Poetik des 
17. und 18. Jahrhunderts und in den Dramen Lessings (Hamburg: Leopold Voss, 1897), 2-
4; and H . M. Paull , " Dramatic Convention with Special Reference to the Soliloquy," 
in Fortnightly Review, 71 (1899), 863- 70. J. J. Engel, "Uber Handlung, Gesprach, und 
Erzahlung," in Schriften (Berlin: Mylius, 1802), vol. 4, pp. 190-94; and Hans Sitten-
berger, "Der Monolog, " in Das litterarische Echo, 15 (May 1, 1900), IOJJ-41. The seminal 
work of Friedrich Leo, Der Monolog im Drama: Ein Beitrag zu r griechisch-romischen Poetik 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1908), differs from most in that it distinguishes between soliloquy, 
self-address, and monologue. Modern English does not preserve this distinction, but 
we may wish to differentiate between soliloquy as physically isola ted speech, retaining 
self-address and monologue for more radical forms of semantic solitude. Leo notes 
that, in Greek d rama, self-address develops later than soliloquy. In The Soliloquy in 
German Drama (New York: Columbia University Press, 1915), J, Erwin W. Roessler 
unders tands dramatic soliloquy as "a passage in a drama in which a character is alone 
u pon the stage and speaks to himself, be lieving himself to be alone." He emphasizes 
the d ifference between dramatic forms that represent "solitude as a condition" and 
those that depict "aloneness as a fact ." See also Wolfga ng Schadewaldt, Monolog und 
Selbstgespriich: Untersuchungen zur Formgeschichte der griechischen Tragodie (Berlin: Weid-
mann, 1926), 29 . 
•see Lawrence Ed ward Bowling, "What Is the Stream of Consciousness Technique?" 
in PMLA, 65 Qune 1950), 345; Francis Scarfe, The Art of Paul Valery (Melbourne: William 
Heinemann, 1954), n1; and Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Na ture of Narrative 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 177. But compare Melvin Freedman, Stream 
of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method (London: Oxford University Press, 1955). 
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linguistic elements. Both internal monologue and stream of con-
sciousness tend to merge with the stream of textuality, however, to 
the point of renouncing mimetic pretenses . 
Definitions begin to erode as we approach particular literary works. 
"Monologue" remains a general term denoting physically or se-
mantically solitary speech acts that deviate from dialogical norms . 
III 
Genius and monologue initially appear to constitute a simple an-
tithesis on the order of inspiration and individuality, divinity and 
subjectivity, God and man, or spirit and language. But both genius 
and monologue contain internal tensions, and the two do not signify 
on the same level of discourse. Genius is both transcendent and im-
manent spirit by virtue of the introjection that transforms a Roman 
mythological figure into a category of modern psychology. Mono-
logue may be understood either as a static opposition to communi-
cative dialogue or as a dynamic swerve away from prior conventions 
of discourse. In the first case, monologue is the factual solitude of 
isolated speech that is not addressed to another. More significantly, 
monologue signals the active break from norms of ordinary language 
and is thus allied with innovation, deviant discourse, and creativity. 
Monologues often strive to evade norms, although pure monologue, 
in the sense of a linguistic mode that has entirely freed itself from 
otherness, is an impossibility. 
Monologue is, then, a set of literary and rhetorical forms that rep-
resent and accomplish individuality. As individuality is both a lin-
guistic and a subjective phenomenon, individual language is not merely 
"the language of an individual." Before assuming anything about 
speaking individuals, we must understand how speech itself can be 
individualized, and how texts produce the appearance of individuality. 
Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique generale, based on the 
terminological categories of "language" (langue) and " speech" (parole), 
facilitates an understanding of individual language, deviance, and 
originality. Saussure never wrote a linguistics of speech, which would 
have been relevant to the problematics of monologue, but the bound-
aries of his research provide direction for further exploration. He 
characterizes speech most broadly as an act of discourse and further 
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explains the physical utterance by reference to individual thoughts 
that occasionally permit verbal freedom. For Saussure, then, speech 
is primarily a physical and psychological act of expression. If Saus-
sure' s general description of speech links the speech act to individual 
acts of will, then individual language appears to occur in conjunction 
with a personal or individual thought. 5 Post-Saussurian linguists for 
the most part begin from this psychological premise, yet the exclusive 
association of speech with individual thought leads away from anal-
ysis of linguistic individuality. 
In recognition of the subsystems of language, post-Saussurian lin-
guists often refer to "individual language," formed by specialized 
conventions and systems that govern an individual's speech. This 
individual language is an intermediary term in the discussion of col-
lective language and specific speech acts. In one sense, the individual 
language may be only a selection from existing forms of discourse. 
From the standpoint of psychological theory, Sigmund Freud writes 
of cliches that repeat themselves throughout our lives, and not only 
"a lover's discourse" follows predictable patterns. 6 To view individual 
language as either an unchanging norm or as a discrete psychological 
capacity is analogous to conceiving language as a single essence. An 
individual's speech follows predictable patterns, but this network of 
linguistic strategies does not constitute a closed system. In contrast 
to the traditional and fully formed locutions, original combinations 
of speech deviate from systems or conventions of usage. An individual 
language may be understood as a repertoire of common or uncommon 
discourse types; individual speech depends on a break from estab-
lished repertoires. A deviant speech act may become a fashionable 
communal norm or dialect variation, when an innovative swerve from 
previous standards is repeated and stabilized. 
Dramatic, poetic, and narrative forms of monologue are closely 
associated with the use of deviant literary techniques, at the boundary 
5Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de lingu istique generale, ed. Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye in 1916, newly edited by Tullio de Mauro (Paris: Payot, 1972), 31. In English, 
see Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1966). See also Robert Godel, Les sources manuscrites du "Cours de 
linguistique generale" (Geneva: E. Droz, 1957), 66. The students' notes show Saussure's 
inconclusive effort to understand the freedom or individuality of speech without ref-
erence to the psychology of speakers . .. 
"Sigmund Freud, "Zur Dynamik der Ubertragung," in the Studienausgabe, supp. vol. 
(Frankfurt am Main: 5. Fischer, 1975), 159; Roland Barthes, Fragments d'un disceurs 
amoureux (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1977). 
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between socially accepted and socially censored discourse. The po-
tential for constituting an original discourse type structured around 
an unfamiliar code is evident in the development of internal mono-
logue and stream of consciousness in twentieth-century literature. 
IV 
Writers on genius have always feared that personal limitations may 
make their subject inaccessible . Can only an ingenious subject know 
genius as an object of analysis? Does genius only express itself in-
directly, without revealing its essence? 
"Genius" is first of all a word, and these pages approach an inter-
textual history of inspiration and individuality by working from lin-
guistic clues. Modern genius is a nebulous construction over unstable 
foundations . How must we understand the linguistic mechanisms 
that have generated modern philosophy of genius and literature of 
monologue? No attempt has been made here to provide a linear in-
tellectual history or even to trace direct lines of influence in the trans-
formations of genius and monologue, for contrasts are often more 
significant than continuities. 
"Unit idea," "key word," and "master trope" seek to name what 
they themselves are, in diverse intellectual traditions. Much depends 
on the different ways of conceiving thought that they imply. In con-
trast to the methods of conventional history of ideas, Genius and Mono-
logue examines Western inspiration and individuality by uncovering 
key words and rhetorical mechanisms that give rise to dominant ide-
ology. If the unit idea presupposes an essentialist conception, the key 
word is connected with a functionalist approach to meaning in relation 
to linguistic usage, and the master trope forms part of a rhetoricist 
method. 
Traditional intellectual history, typified by the writings of Arthur 
Lovejoy, relies on the assumption that essential ideas can be distin-
guished and defined. Despite changing forms of expression, the Chain 
of Being, the Good, and the Just are taken to provide solid ground 
for the inquiry into unit ideas. Central human experiences, we like 
to believe, have not changed substantially during the course of cul-
tural development. Conventional history of ideas, then, presumes 
access to immutable signified conceptions beyond the configuration 
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of signifying expressions. Based on essentialist notions of stable mean-
ing, intellectual history sometimes quests for unifying ideas . 
A more pragmatic type of research, suggested by the work of Ray-
mond Williams, focuses on key words that predictably recur in con-
nection with ideology. According to the modified assumptions, 
signified conceptions must be understood in terms of shifting means 
of signification. Like keys, words function to open up ways of en-
countering the world. Ideas cannot remain stable, as our worldview 
is created and revised by a kaleidoscope of changing word configu-
rations. This functionalist conception of meaning emphasizes the 
manifestations of thought. Genius and Monologue examines key terms--
"genius," "monologue," daimon, daimones, daimonion, malachim, logoi, 
satan, "transcendence," and "immanence"-that reveal much about 
diverse theological and philosophical systems. Because these key words 
are discussed from a linguistic standpoint, they stand in implicit quo-
tation marks throughout the present book. 
The new rhetorical criticism, practiced by critics as different as Ken-
neth Burke and Paul de Man, dispenses with essentialist presuppo-
sitions by emphasizing the efficacy of master tropes, figures of speech 
that engender and dominate meaning. Beyond the control of subjec-
tive ideas or intentions, tropes determine signification. In view of this 
rhetorical power, essential ideas and functional keys fade into posi-
tions of subsidiary importance: tropes give rise to tropes, generating 
the appearance of structures and systems of thought. From a rhetor-
icist standpoint, Genius and Monologue deals with the introjection of 
genius and the prosopopoeia that creates illusions of monologue. An 
inward turn represents God within man, while the trope of masks 
gives a voice and a face to internal speech. 
This book does not present a conventional history of ideas, but 
considers key words and literary forms associated with inspiration 
and individuality. Rather than seek to conquer some paradise of stable 
meanings, I offer a guided tour through pathways of the Western tra-
dition, with only one certain end: a review of rhetorical landscapes or 
textual topoi with interested fellow travelers. Because these revision-
ary routes demand an agile guide, specialists may resent the wanderer 
who declines to linger in their chosen domain, while other people wish 
the pace were faster. The reader need not start at the beginning and 
may prefer to skip from chapter to chapter in accordance with personal 
preference. The relationships between texts are essential. 
Part One 
PHILOSOPHY OF GENIUS 
The scraps of paper which have been worn away and 
dirtied by a thousand fingers, and which we must 
accept as bad money, are repugnant to every tidy 
person. And the used-up, washed-out everyday words 
are no less repulsive to friends of mental tidiness, 
because they take on a different sense in each mouth, 
and thus, as currency of a higher kind, only simulate 
an illusory credit. So much more unpleasant does this 
devaluation of words become when one feels that they 
formerly numbered among the aristocrats of language. 
Such a degraded aristocrat, still betraying its noble 
lineage through its external appearance, is the word 
"genius." 
-GEORG WITKOWSKI, Miniaturen 
1 Greek Gods, daimon, 
and Socrates' daimonion 
There is some truth in the popular notion that Plato leads Greek 
thought away from polytheism, yet the exact character of his turn 
remains mysterious. Neither Plato's philosophy of ideas nor Socrates' 
skepticism fully accounts for the theological impetus of the Platonic 
dialogues, because their explicit statements about the gods reach no 
univocal conclusion. A theological development shows itself indi-
rectly: Plato performs one answer to established religion by repre-
senting the life and death of Socrates, who continues to affirm his 
unique encounters with divinity even when accused and tried for 
impiety . This biography had no need to be historically accurate in 
order to influence Western theology profoundly. At the end of a long 
line of revisions, modern European philosophers reconceive Socrates 
as a determined rationalist whose individual certainty does not pre-
clude religious experience. 1 
In the Platonic drama that transforms Greek religion, one key term 
is the Socratic daimonion, which is variously described as something 
divine, a customary divine voice or sign. Socrates' daimonion has, 
however, always eluded definitive interpretation. The "something 
divine" (or daemonic) is already enigmatic when it first appears in 
'On Socrates as a prototype of modern man, see Benno Bohm, Sokrates im achtzehnten 
Jahrhundert: Studien zum Werdegange des modernen Persiinlichkeitsbewusstseins (Neumiin-
ster: Karl Wachholtz, 1966), 11-19. Bohm also briefly discusses the functions of the 
daimonion (p. 16). 
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texts by Plato and Xenophon, and in subsequent tradition the ascribed 
meanings and functions only proliferate. With reason, the configu-
ration of Greek daimon, Latin genius, and French genie has been called 
"a wonderful confusion" (cine wunderliche wirrnis). 2 
The present discussion neither surveys the vast literature on Soc-
rates' daimonion nor strives to recover the original form of this divine 
mystery. Daimonia will continue to lurk amid a multiplicity of textual 
topoi despite all efforts to curtail their operations and to deny their 
efficacy. If the attempt to entrap this trope is abandoned, how can 
one approach the active power of the daimonion? What are the dy-
namics of the daimonion in Plato's dialogues? Although Plato's Apology 
vividly depicts the trial and condemnation of Socrates, the significance 
of the Athenian decision remains controversial. Modern scholarship 
tends to view the accusations against Socrates as the consequence of 
long-standing prejudices rather than as a reaction to his alleged im-
piety. But the hostile response to Socrates' theological leanings is the 
surest indication of their importance. 
Hegel provides an incisive point of departure from which to un-
derstand Socrates' "genius" as a religious innovation. Because his 
Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophic construe Socrates alle-
gorically, as a turning point in the development of spirit, Hegel reveals 
the strategic significance of Socrates' references to divinity in oppo-
sition to established Greek religion . According to Hegel, the daimonion 
turns Socrates inward, away from Athenian norms, and makes Soc-
rates a forerunner of modern subjectivity . 
Following Xenophon, Hegel associates Socrates' daimonion with the 
charge that he recognizes or imports novel divinities (kaina daimonia), 
although in fact Socrates introduces a novel form of divinity. The 
dispute over the grounds for Socrates' conviction rests on shades of 
meaning, however, and the significance of Socrates' theology emerges 
only in light of its context. If Socrates was charged with impiety as a 
consequence of his daimonion, then this figure must have been incom-
patible with the established religious language. In order to understand 
how this may have been the case, it is necessary to examine the 
traditional theological terminology. 
Daimonion is a key word that cannot be firmly grasped apart from 
25. v. "Genie," by R. Hildebrandt, in Deutsches Worterbuch, ed. Jakob Grimm and 
Wilhelm Grimm (Leipzig, 1854). This translation is my own, as are all translations 
hereafter, except where otherwise indicated. 
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the ancient vault it unlocks: daimon and theos are basic terms in Greek 
piety. The complexity of Socrates' daimonion derives in part from am-
biguous links to the evolving tradition of daimones, guardian spirits. 
Horner and Hesiod are necessarily the ground of Platonic theology, 
and yet no map of this ground can master the turn that Plato gives 
to his precursors. 
A first analytic gesture returns to the daimonion of Socrates by way 
of Hegel's allegorical reading. Subsequently, an approach to the clas-
sical daimon prepares for a strategic reading of Socrates' defense against 
his Athenian accusers, as presented in Plato's Apology. Against the 
background of daimones and daimon, the Socratic daimonion revises the 
polytheistic tradition and moves toward a form of abstract monotheism. 
Hegel's "Socrates" 
For Hegel, spirit is essentially related to language, 3 and thus Soc-
rates, a turning point in spirit, appears as a decisive moment in the 
historical text of philosophy. According to the Vorlesungen iiber die 
Geschichte der Philosophie, Socrates is "not only a most important figure 
in the history of philosophy-the most interesting in the philosophy 
of antiquity-but also a world-historical person."4 Emblem of a phil-
osophic Aufhebung, Socrates does not merely oppose Greek custom 
but retains both sides of the dialectic in himself. Hegel's Socrates 
allegorizes the development of spirit toward self-certain, self-deter-
minative subjectivity: his destiny is a double movement of "turning 
back into himself" (Riickkehr in sich) and "decision out of himself" 
(Entscheidung aus sich) . To the extent that Socrates represents the de-
cision of subjectivity against Greek law, Hegel believes that he was 
necessarily an enemy of the state and rightly convicted. 
The daimonion appears to confirm Socrates' position as an outsider 
3See, for example, Hegel's Phiinomenologie des Geistes, ed . Johannes Hoffmeister (Ham-
burg: Felix Meiner, 1952): " We again see language as the existence of spirit. It is the 
self-consciousness existing for others, which is immediately present as such, and as this 
is universal" (p . 458). 
4Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, in 
Werke in zwanzig Biinden (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), vol. 18, p. 441 (hence-
forth cited as VGP). A translation by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, first 
published in 1894, has been reprinted under the title Hegel's Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, 3 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1974). 
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in relation to Athenian norms. Hegel asserts that the first accusation, 
"that Socrates did not hold to be gods, those which the Athenian 
people held to be, did not have the old gods, but rather imported 
new ones," is connected with the daimonion (VGP 498). 5 In short, the 
daim6n of Socrates was "a different mode [eine andere Weise] from that 
which was valid in the Greek religion." Religious innovation makes 
Socrates an enemy of the Athenians at the same time that he is "the 
hero who, in place of the Delphic god, established the principle: man 
knows in himself what the true is; he must look into himself" (VGP 
502-3). Socrates is thus both a hero in the development of spirit and 
an enemy of his contemporaries. 
Skeptical of the prophetic powers that some readers attribute to 
Socrates' daimonion, Hegel finds a similarity between Socrates' trances 
and abnormal states of consciousness. He writes that the daimonion, 
or "genius" of Socrates, "is not Socrates himself, not his opinion, 
conviction, rather something unconscious [ein Bewusstloses]; Socrates 
is driven" (VGP 491). The "something divine" at once becomes some-
thing unconscious, external (das Ausserliche) and yet subjective (ein 
Subjektives). 6 Socrates' oracle takes on "the form of a knowing, that 
at the same time is bound up with an unconsciousness,-a knowing, 
that can also occur in other circumstances as a magnetic condition [of 
mesmerism]" (VGP 491). While Hegel never explicitly rejects the 
5As evidence of this connection, Hegel repeats the account given by Xenophon at 
the start of his Memorabilia. He approves Xenophon's version, but where Xenophon 
reports that Socrates believed that " the daimonion gave a sign to him [eaut6i semainein]" 
(Mem. !.1.2), Hegel mistranslates daimonion as " the voice of God" (die Stimme Gottes) 
(p. 499). In Xenophon's Memorabilia, Socrates defends himself by noting that his dai-
monion is not so different from innocent forms of prophecy. But Hegel repeats Xeno-
phon's account only to show that Socrates was in fact guilty. A. E. Taylor, in his Varia 
Socratica (Oxford: James Parker, 1911), questions the association of the daimonion with 
Socrates' indictment: "If Socrates believed that 'heaven' gave him revelations by means 
of the semeion, he believed neither more nor less than any of his neighbors who put 
their faith in omens, or consulted a soothsayer about their dreams. And it follows at 
once that if Socrates could be charged with impiety for believing in the prophetic 
significance of his 'sign,' Anytus and Meletus could equally have brought a successful 
graphe asebeias against any Athenian who believed in dreams and omens, that is, against 
the great majority of the demos" (pp. 10-11). But Taylor attributes greater rationality 
and consistency to Athenian jurors than they need have possessed . And since Hegel 
treats the life of Socrates as an allegory of spirit, rather than as a literal history, Taylor' s 
reasoning does not disqualify Hegel's reading of Xenophon. 
6Neither the ordinary language nor the psychology of Hegel's time distinguished 
between bewusstlos and vorbewusst, "consciousless" (or "unconscious") and " precon-
scious." Hegel' s coinage plays on a second meaning of bewusstlos as " senseless" and 
leads to an extended discussion of abnormal psychological sta tes. 
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prophetic image of Socrates, he makes the supposedly pathological 
manifestation of the daimonion appear far more compelling than its 
divinity. 
Hegel bases his theory that the Socratic daimonion is "something 
unconscious" on the Symposium 22ocd.7 Plato's Alcibiades associates 
Socrates' motionlessness with the depth of his meditations, and Hegel 
takes this anecdote as evidence of the profundity of his spirit. But 
Hegel is not satisfied with the trance as a sign of Socrates' reflective 
depths and calls it a cataleptic state in which Socrates is "completely 
dead as a sentient consciousness"; this is "a physical tearing away of 
the inner abstraction from the concrete bodily being, a tearing away, 
in which the individual separates himself from his inner self" (VGP 
449) . While Socrates' thought represents a particular level of world-
historical consciousness, his trances are pathological (krankhaft), and 
Hegel later argues with increasing urgency that Socrates' daimonion 
is linked to cataleptic trances (VGP 495). Neither Plato nor Xenophon 
associates the daimonion with Socrates' trancelike states. Hegel makes 
this connection in order that the pathological Socrates may function 
as an allegory of his relationship to the Athenian people: Socrates is 
like a sleepwalker, and Athens is like a waking person. Hegel's al-
legory directly contrasts Socrates' self-interpretation as a gadfly that 
rouses the sleeping horse, Athens (Apol. 30e-3ta).8 Despite Socrates' 
own references to the Delphic exhortation "Know thyself," Hegel 
suggests that Socrates himself was incapable of self-knowledge in 
relation to his experience of the daimonion. 
From the start of his exposition on Socrates' daimonion, Hegel main-
7 According to Alcibiades, "On one occasion some idea came to him [synnoesas] early 
in the morning, and he stood there contemplating [skopon] it. When he made no 
progress, he wouldn' t give up, but went on inquiring [zeton]. At noon he was still 
there; men were noticing him and saying to each other in marvel that Socrates had 
been standing there considering [phrontiwn] since sunrise. Finally, in the evening some 
of the Ionians took their meal, brought out their mats and lay down in the cooling 
air-this was in the summer, of course-to see whether he would also stand through 
the night. He stood there until morning, and then at sunrise he said his prayers to 
the sun and went away. " The words used to describe Socrates' thought process are 
incompatible with a dysfunctional, pathological condition. I have consulted and mod-
ified the translations from Plato that appear in the Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Ham-
ilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963). 
"Compare Heraklitus' use of the sleeping/waking opposition, in Hermann Diels and 
Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (which I shall henceforth cite as Diels 
and Kranz), 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1954) 81, 821, 826, 873, 888, 889; and see also 
the discussion of divination in the Timaeus 71de. 
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tains a cautious distance: "In connection with this famous Genius of 
Socrates, as a so much talked-about bizarrerie of his imagining, neither 
the idea of guardian spirit or angel, nor that of conscience, should 
occur to us" (VGP 490-91). The daimonion, or "genius," is a "bizar-
rerie" of his imagination, and we must guard against conceiving it as 
a guardian spirit or angel. Although Socrates is characterized as "one 
who is certain in himself," his daimonion does not represent anything 
universal, such as conscience (Gewissen). The daimonion stands op-
posite the universality of Socratic reason: the revelations of the dai-
monion concern mere particulars and are thus "less significant than 
those of his spirit, of his thinking" (VGP 501). But even if the daimonion 
proves inferior to intellectual self-determination or conscience, what 
convinces Hegel that it is not to be imagined as a guardian spirit 
(Schutzgeist) or angel (Engel)? 
Hegel relies in part, no doubt, on the opinion Schleiermacher ex-
presses in his contemporary edition of Plato's dialogues. Schleier-
macher's note to the Apology 27c argues that neither Socrates nor 
Meletus understood the daimonion as "a particular being [Wesen] of a 
higher kind." Rather the daimonion is "only a special effect [Wirkung] 
or revelation of the, or of an indefinite, higher being."9 Hegel's tone 
is significant, however, when he denies all argument its place and 
asserts that "the idea of a guardian spirit, angel," should not even 
occur to us. Hegel claims that Socrates believed himself to possess 
what we should not seriously consider. 
Hegel ultimately evades any direct confrontation with questions of 
the divinity of the daimonion . Although he opts for an allegorical 
reading of Socrates as a moment in the development of spirit, Hegel 
reduces the occurrence of the daimonion to a psychological aberra-
tion. 10 Furthermore, Hegel preserves for the daimonion a middle ground 
9Plato, Werke, 2d ed., trans. F. Schleiermacher (Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 1818/ 
18o4), pt. 1, vol. 2, pp. 432-33. 
10Hegel's psychological reading of Socrates is exaggerated and literalized by L. F. 
Lelut's Du demon de Socrate, 2d ed. (Paris: J.J.B. Balliere, 1856): "Socrates was a Theo-
sophist, a visionary, and, to say the word, a madman; this opinion is the only true one" 
(p . 93). S0ren Kierkegaard responds with hostility to the 1836 edition of Lelut's book 
in The Concept of Irony, trans. Lee M. Capel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1968): "There has also been considerable difficulty with this daimon quite recently, 
and I see from a publication by Heinsius that a psychiatrist in Paris, F. Lelut, has been 
so self-wise as to claim: 'Socrates was afflicted with that madness which in technical 
language is called hallucination' " (p. 186n). Yet Kierkegaard does not take issue with 
Hegel as regards the daimonion. 
Greek Gods, daim6n, and Socrates' daimonion 33 
"between the exteriority of the oracle and the pure interiority of spirit" 
(VGP 495) . Socrates appears to Hegel as prophet of internal certainty 
(innere Gewissheit), but to Socrates' contemporaries, this certainty ap-
pears as a new god. From the standpoint of the Athenians, then, 
Hegel considers the accusation against Socrates as completely correct, 
and Hegel ratifies their condemnation of him. 
Like many other post-Enlightenment thinkers, Hegel recognizes 
Socrates' significance as a self-determinative consciousness and yet 
cannot accept his theological innovation. The meaning of the daimon-
ion remains a problem for modern thought, because this mysterious 
agency can neither be identified with a guardian spirit nor reduced 
to the voice of conscience. Hegel chooses to understand the activity 
of the daimonion as an expression of a pathological condition in which 
Socrates loses rational awareness and submits himself to "something 
unconscious." Although modern interpreters acknowledge the sig-
nificance of Socrates as an individual, they deny the divine influence 
of the daimonion . 
Hesiodic daimones and Homeric daimon 
Daimones and daim6n are precursors of the Socratic daimonion . Dai-
mones appear influentially in Hesiod as minor deities, guardians over 
men; daimon occurs often in Homer and reveals a plenitude of mean-
ings close to the omnipresent theos. The moment of Socratic subjec-
tivity depends on its opposition to the shadowy terminology it 
displaces. 
Hesiod narrates the history and activity of daimones in two central 
passages of the Works and Days. In a double narrative of decline, 
Pandora first exposes men to all the ills of life; afterward the golden 
race is followed by silver, bronze, semidivine, and iron generations. 
The first two generations transmigrate and become spirits, epichthonioi 
and hypochthonioi: 
But after earth covered over this generation, 
They are called the earth-dwelling spirits, 
Noble warders-off of evil, protectors of mortal men, 
Who keep watch over judgments and wicked deeds, 
Clad in mist wandering everywhere over the earth .. .. 
But after earth covered over this generation, 
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They are called by men the blessed dwellers under the earth, 
Second in order, but nevertheless honor attends upon these also. 11 
Echoes of the Hesiodic daemonology in expressions attributed to 
Thales, Theognis, Heraklitus, and Empedocles attest to its preva-
lence.12 In most instances, the guardian spirits are souls of the dead. 
Passages in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Plato, 13 Xenocrates, 
Plutarch, Maxim us of Tyre, and Apuleius, 14 further repeat and revise 
the image of daimones. The tension between daimones and daimon recurs 
in Socrates' life: just as the traditional daimones precondition the charge 
that Socrates recognizes novel divinities (kaina daimonia), so also is 
Homeric daimon the precondition for Socrates' peculiar daimonion. The 
charge thus stands in the tradition of Hesiod, while Plato's account 
continues the tradition of Homer. 
The plurality of Hesiodic daimones contrasts the characteristically 
singular Homeric daimon. Literary histories often begin with Homer, 
yet Hesiod's writings most likely represent earlier religious beliefs. 
Thus the plural Hesiodic daimones probably preceded the singular 
Homeric daimon, and Homer anticipates Plato's turn away from the 
polytheistic divine apparatus . While daimones are spiritual entities, 
" Hesiod, The Works and Days, in The Homeric Hymns and Homerica (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1982), II. 121-25 and 140-42. For help with translations from 
Greek texts, I am indebted to Thomas Cole and Thomas Gould. References in the 
following two notes are based on current editions of the Oxford Classical Texts. 
12Thales as cited by Aristotle, De anima A2, 405a19 and 411a7, and by Aetius !.7.11; 
Theognis, II. 381-82. Although Heraklitus may have opposed the myth of daimon when 
he asserted that "a man's character is his daimon" (Diels and Kranz B119), he also 
affirmed of daimones that "they rise up and become the wakeful guardians of the Jiving 
and dead" (Diels and Kranz B63; cp. B79); Empedocles, Diels and Kranz Bn2 and 
esp,ecially Bus. 
3Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes, II . 523, 812; The Persians, II. 601-22, 825; andes-
pecially Agamemnon, II. 1175, 1342, 1468, 1482, 1569, 1667. Sophocles, Ajax, I. 1215; 
Oedipus Rex, I. 828; Oedipus at Co/onus, I. 76. See also Thomas Gould's note to I. 34 in 
his edition of Oedipus the King (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Euripides, Hip-
polytus, I. 832; Alcestis, I. 1003; Rhesus, I. 971; Plato, Symposium 202e, Cratylus 397e-
398c, Laws passim. At the end of the Republic, Plato's myth indicates that souls choose 
their daimones. The myth thus supports a loose association of the Socratic daimonion 
with Platonic daimones , both reinterpreted to the extent that they are related to indi-
vidual choice. But the Socratic daimonion transcends individual deliberation . 
14See Richard Heinze, Xenokrates: Darstellung der Lehre (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1892); 
Plutarch, Isis and Osiris 361C, The Obsolescence of Oracles 415B. See also Guy Soury, La 
demonologie de Plutarque (Paris: Societe d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres, " 1942); Maximus 
of Tyre, Diss. in Philosophumena, ed. H. Hobein (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1910), chaps. 
14-15; Apuleius, De deo Socratis, in Opuscu/es Phi/osophiques (Paris: Societe d'Edition 
" Les Belles Lettres," 1973), chaps. 3, 6-9. 
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guardians over men, daim6n only exceptionally refers to a definite 
spiritual entity. Homer' s indefinite mode of expressing divinity is, 
perhaps inadvertently, a step toward monotheism. 
Many classical scholars seek to define the elusive daimon in Homer's 
poetry by fixing it according to a stable rule of meaning. Others rec-
ognize the instability of the daim6n as a kind of "floating signifier" 
(signifiant flottant) .15 For convenience, these may be labeled the "es-
sentialist" and the " rhetorical" approaches .16 The essentialist view 
seeks to delimit meanings as if they adhered to words; the rhetorical 
view emphasizes that meaning extends beyond isolated words to the 
functional mechanisms that govern their use . Specifically, the essen-
tialist approach attempts to establish the core meaning of Homeric 
daim6n as a spiritual being, power, or essence; the rhetorical approach 
conceives daim6n in connection with its distinct uses, strategic force, 
or function. Whereas the essentialist view understands daim6n as a 
simple name, the rhetorical view understands daim6n in terms of the 
narrative configurations that represent it. 17 
The meaning of daim6n has always been considered in conjunction 
with that of theos, but modern scholarship has increasingly rejected 
the essentialist notion that daim6n must name a definite divine being. 
Nineteenth-century classicists generally view daim6n either as a syn-
onym for theos or as the name for some inexplicable divine power. 
One early classicist distinguishes between three Homeric uses of the 
word daim6n: a) as an equivalent of theos; b) as a name for "the divine 
efficacy [Wirken] in general"; and c) as "the dark, wonderful reigning 
[Walten] of a higher power. " 18 Other classical scholars compare the 
15Compare M. Detienne, LA notion de dai"m6n dans le pythagorisme ancien (Paris: Societe 
d 'Edition " Les Belles Lettres," 1963), 13. 
16Rhetorical reading attends closely to the workings of perfo rmative language, but 
it stands apart from the tradition that views rhetoric merely as language of persuasion . 
17What is the extent of Plato's irony when, in the Cratylus 397-98, he depicts Socrates 
as an essentialist who traces false etymologies of theoi and da imones? Focusing on the 
act of naming, Socrates attempts to localize the meaning of theoi in terms of their 
" running" (thein) nature and explains that daimones are wise and knowing (daemones). 
Since Socrates, many interpreters have attempted to specify the etymological associ-
ations of daimiin. Yet the search for etymologies generally discovers only what it hopes 
to find . F. G. Welcker, fo r example, writes in his Griechische Giitterlehre (Giittingen: 
Dieterich, 1857): " According to the basic meaning of daiii, divide, separate, is also to 
order and to know; for we know only that which we d ivide, as Schiller writes to 
Goethe" (p . 138). Thus da imiin becomes a kind of guardian over efforts to discriminate 
among meanings, encouraging us to believe that to separate is to know. 
18G. W. Nitzsch , Erkliirende Anmerku ngen zu Homer's Odyssee (Hannover: Hahn, 1826-
40), vol. 1, pp. 89- 90, and vol. 3, p . 391. 
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relationship between daimon and theos to that of divine essence (numen) 
and divine persona (persona divina) in Latin texts. 19 At the end of the 
nineteenth century, Hermann Usener takes the first major step toward 
a rhetorical understanding when he observes that "what suddenly 
comes to us like a sending from above, what makes us happy, what 
depresses and bends us, appears to the exalted perception as a divine 
being. To the extent that we understand the Greeks, they possess for 
this the species notion daimon." 20 The word daimon is no longer con-
ceived as Homer's name for a divine reality; rather, daimon charac-
terizes the vocabulary of men, who speak with limited comprehension 
of providence. Any occurrence that "comes to us like a sending from 
above" may be associated with daimon, divinity or fate as it "appears 
to the exalted perception." 
Twentieth-century scholars radicalize the rhetorical approach, for 
they tend to attribute different narrative roles to daimon and theos. 
Rather than name indistinct or distinct divine beings, then, these 
words appear to characterize different modes of expression. By con-
trasting the speeches of Homer's characters with the Homeric nar-
rative, recent classicists argue that while the narrator refers to the 
gods by their names, his epic characters express themselves more 
vaguely: "The poet thus distinguishes between himself and the per-
sonages that he brings in as speaking, in that these ordinarily do not 
recognize the personality of the intermingling divinity, while he him-
self constantly knows exactly whether Athena or Hera performed the 
miracle concerned."21 The choice of words is determined not by an 
abstract difference in meaning but by differences in the speakers. 
Narrative principles determine whether gods are called by their proper 
names or by the words daimon and theos . 22 Twentieth-century authors 
19Carl Friedrich Nagelsbach, Die homerische Theologie in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt 
(Nuremberg: Johann Adam Stein, 1840), 68; and Eduard Gerhard, "Uber Wesen, Ver-
wandtschaft, und Ursprung der Damonen und Genien," in Abhandlungen der Kiiniglichen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin: Besser, 1852), 238. While daimon in some 
cases functions as the name of a divine essence, we cannot logically conclude that this 
function is the essence of the word. 
20Hermann Usener, Giitternamen: Versuch einer Lehre von der religiiisen Begriffsbildung 
(Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1896), 291-92. 
210ve Jorgensen, "Das Auftreten der Cotter in den Buchern i-m der Odyssee," 
Hermes, 39 (1904), 364. 
22Erland Ehnmark, in The Idea of God in Homer (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksell, 1935), 
takes the rhetorical approach further when he suggests that daimon is a "special stylistic 
device" (p. 65). As Ehnmark observes, " the vague terms employed by the ordinary 
man in attempting to describe the gods are due to his limited knowledge of their real 
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thus decline to limit daimon to definite meanings and instead concen-
trate on its force . Daimon operates like natural forces, both within the 
narrative world and as a narrative practice: "An essential characteristic 
of daimon is, on the whole, the actual power, the power being exerted, 
the dynamic power." 23 Daimon and theos suggest two different con-
ceptions of power. The initial distinction between daimon and theos as 
the "divine efficacy" and the "divine persona" turns into a distinction 
of mechanisms in two disparate rhetorical modes. 24 
One specialized rhetorical function of daimon pertains to the inter-
pretation of Socrates' daimonion from the standpoint of the Latin ge-
nius: "The hypothesis that daimon might signify a spirit or a genie ... 
appears acceptable in II. XV, 468, Od. V, 421 and XIX, 201; it even 
imposes itself in Od. XI, 587, where we see a supernatural power that 
nature" (p. 70). In contrast, it was Homer's "right and duty as a poet to supply definite 
information on those points that were left vague and indefinite in the popular con-
ception of the gods" (ibid .). But Ehnmark does not explain the different uses of daimon 
and theos. Gerald F. Else's "God and Gods in Early Greek Thought," in Proceedings of 
the American Philological Association, So (1949), also refers to "differences in usage" 
between theos and theoi: "They arise not from differing opinions as to the basic as-
sumption, but from different kinds and degrees of knowledge in the speaker. The gods 
know each other and each other's names and activities and have no occasion for the 
indefinite theos or theon tis except when talking to men . Neither does the poet, whose 
knowledge is accredited as coming from the gods. Both the gods and the poet, then, 
are correctly polytheistic in their language. And so are men when they have the 
guidance of cult or prophecy. But they are not always so precise. Not only do they 
not always know what god or gods they are dealing with, and whether it is one or 
more; it does not always matter very much" (p. 28) . Indefinite expressions may thus 
arise from the ignorance of men as to what divinity influences their lives. Represented 
characters refer to mysterious powers as daimon; gods and Homer, whose knowledge 
is supposed to be divine, do so only rarely. Else argues, furthermore, that the use of 
daimon instead of theos may be determined by metrical considerations (p. 30) . Indeed, 
daimon does frequently occur either at the end of a line or in fixed phrases such as 
daimoni isos. Greek theology apparently develops in conjunction with stylistic com-
pulsions, including the demands of oral composition. 
23Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson, DAIMONIE: An Inquiry into a Mode of Apostrophe in Old 
Greek Literature (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksell, 1955), 133. Brunius-Nilsson lists the 
number of occurrences of daimon in Homer, as follows: nom. sing., 40; gen. sing., 3; 
dat. sing., n; ace. sing., 3; nom. pl. , o; gen. plur., o; dat. plur., 2; ace. plur., 1. Daimon 
is thus clearly linked to the singular form, unlike theos, which occurs more frequently 
in the plural. 
24More comprehensive accounts of Greek daimon are: Friedrich August Ukert, "Uber 
Damonen, Heroen, und Genien," in Abhandlungen der Kiiniglichen Siichsischen Gesellschaft 
der Wissenschaften, 2, Philologische-Historische Klasse 1 (Leipzig, 1850), 137-219; Gerhard, 
"Uber Wesen, Verwandtschaft, und Ursprung," 237-66; Georg Wissowa et al., "Dai-
mon," in Paulys Realencyclopiidie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, supp. vol. 3 (Stutt-
gart: Alfred Druckenmiiller, 1918). See also Martin P. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen 
Religion, 2d ed. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1955), Vol. 1, pp. 216-21. 
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applies itself to drying up the lake in which Tantalus wishes to quench 
his thirst."25 Several Homeric passages, including those that involve 
the agency of Athena, constitute prototypes for the guardian spirits 
that attend to men in later literature. 26 Yet Socrates' daimonion should 
not be equated with a familiar spirit, for it has no stable identity and 
only acts to oppose certain false steps . 
The relationship between Hesiodic and Homeric daemonology is 
in part that of the plural to the singular. In Hesiod's writings, daimones 
are guardians (phylakes), like Athena in the Odyssey, but they number 
in the thousands. These protecting spirits recur significantly both in 
Heraklitus' fragments and in the account of daimones ascribed to Dio-
tima in the Symposium 202e. Homer's sixty-odd uses of daimon include 
only three instances in the plural. 
By what transformation does daimon displace daimones? Twentieth-
century secondary literature encourages the view that through rhe-
torical change, the plural form cedes to the singular. No critic has yet 
pressed the point to its logical conclusion and asserted that Greek 
polytheism was displaced by abstract monotheism by means of trans-
formations in the use of narrative modes. 
Socrates' New daimonia 
Like Homer in his narratives of daimon, Plato swerves from the 
Greek polytheistic tradition through his representations of the Socratic 
daimonion. But while daimonion is the singular form of the divinities 
(daimonia) that Socrates is accused of importing, both this "something 
divine" and these "divine things" remain obscure. 
Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Apuleius project current Roman 
beliefs onto Socrates and regard his daimonion as a kind of guardian 
25Gilbert Fran«;ois, La polytheisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots "theos," "dai'mon ," 
dans Ia litterature grecque d'Homere a Platon (Paris: Societe d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 
1957), 333-34. Compare Walter Otto's "I uno," in Philologus, 64, 18 (1905): "A remarkable 
circle of ideas ascribes a genius to every Roman man, a semi-divine spiritual being 
which ... stands in such a close connection to the visible human being, as only the 
soul is thought in connection with the body" (pp. 178-79). See also A. Brelich, Die 
geheime Schutzgottheit von Rom, trans. V. von Gonzenbach (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1949), 
and Thaddeus Zielinski's "Marginalien," in Philolo~us, 64, n.s. 18 (1905), 20. 
26See, for example, the encounter in book 13, esp. II . 296-99; and compare Aeschylus' 
Eumenides, passim. 
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spirit. 27 Christian interpreters follow their example . The decisive battle 
between theological and psychological interpreta tions takes place in 
the eighteenth century, when critics increasingly view the daimonion 
as Socrates' innate genius, according to the modern usage of this 
term. In his Sokratische Denkwiirdigkeiten, for example, Hamann ex-
plicitly links theological Genius with aesthetic or psychological Genie. 28 
Responding to this introjective tendency in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, Robert Nares writes a monograph in defense of the daimonion 
as a form of divination. 29 But Edward Young's epithet describing 
genius as "that god within"30 apparently satisfied most readers. 
What is Socrates' daimonion? A rhetorical approach raises the more 
exact question: how does the word daimonion operate in Plato's dia-
logues? Since Schleiermacher's commentary, modern interpreters 
doubt that the daimonion is rightly conceived as a guardian genius. 31 
What must the daimonion be if it is linked to Meletus' charge that 
Socrates is guilty of "not believing in the gods whom the state sup-
ports, but in other new divinities" (kaina daimonia) (Apol. 24b)?32 Ac-
cording to Plato's account, contemporary Athenians thought that 
Socrates held novel theological beliefs. Thus Meletus' condemnatory 
mention of "new divinities" (kaina daimonia) is of central importance 
even if the accusation against Socrates is not directly based on ac-
27Plutarch, "On the Sign of Socrates," in the Moralia, vol. 7, trans. Phillip H . Lacy 
and Benedict Einarson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), chaps. 10-12, 20; 
Maxim us ofTyre, Diss., chaps. 14-15; Apuleius, De deo Socratis, chaps. 17-19. Compare 
Jane Chance Nitzsche's The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1975), 36. 
28ln Hamanns Schriften, vol. 2, ed. Friedrich Roth (Berlin: Reimer, 1821), 38. 
29Robert Nares, An Essay on the Demon or Divination of Socrates (London: T. Payne, 
1782). Nares opposes a contemporary translation of daimonion as " internal conscious-
ness" (p. 42). 
30"Conjectures on Original Composition" (1759), in The Works of Edward Young (Edin-
burgh: C. Elliot, 1774). 
31See Plato, Werke, pt. 1, vol. 2, pp. 432-JJ . As Eduard Zeller argues in Die Philosophie 
der Griechen , 4th ed. (Leipzig: Fues, 1889), vol. II, pt. 1, the daimonion of Socrates was 
"no Genius, no personal being, but rather only indefinitely a daemonic voice, a higher 
revelation" (p. 78). 
32Plato's version of the charge is slightly milder than that given by Xenophon in the 
Memorabilia l.1.i and by Favorinus (Diog . Laert. ii.5-40). According to Plato, the graphe 
reads: "Socrates is guilty of corrupting the youth, and of believing not in the gods 
whom the sta te supports but in other new divinities [ka ina daimonia]" (Apol. 24b). 
Xenophon and Favorinus report that the Athenians accused Socrates of publicly im-
porting (eispheron) or introducing (eisagoumenos) novel "divine things"; Plato's version 
mentions only a private belief in or observance of (nomizein) these daimonia. Much rests 
on this subtle difference, because the guilt of Socrates derives from public action, not 
from the private occurrence of the daimonion . 
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counts of the daimonion. How does Plato present the relationship 
between Socrates' daimonion and its plural form, daimonia? To what 
extent does the accusation against Socrates mistake his conceptions? 
The daimonion occurs in only six Platonic dialogues and in one 
pseudo-Platonic work, the Theages. Two of the most extensive dis-
cussions, in the Apology, are the basis for any rigorous interpretation. 
The other instances show that Socrates' experience of the daimonion 
is distinct from contemporary forms of prophecy and that it can serve 
a narrative function in Plato's dialogues. 
Euthyphro, in the Platonic dialogue that bears his name, encourages 
an association of Socrates' daimonion with the "new divinities" of the 
indictment. When Socrates refers to the writ against him, however, 
he apparently misquotes: Meletus "says that I am maker of gods 
[poieten einai theon] and so he prosecutes me, he says, for making new 
gods [kainous poiounta theous] and for not believing in the old ones" 
(Euthyphro 3b). Perhaps to make the claim against him appear even 
more atopos, Socrates replaces the vague new "divinities" (daimonia) 
by new "gods" (theoi). In any case, Euthyphro understands the in-
dictment as referring to Socrates' daimonion and responds, "It is be-
cause you say that your daimonion always occurs to you" (ibid.). The 
implication is, then, that Socrates is to be prosecuted for novelties 
concerning divinity (peri ta theia). Furthermore, Euthyphro notes that 
the multitude is unreceptive to all talk of the gods, even when Eu-
thyphro himself tells of them and prophesies. For Euthyphro, then, 
the Socratic daimonion is indistinguishable from his own experiences 
of prophecy. But Plato does not represent Socrates as a prophet like 
contemporary prophets, and Socrates' daimonion probably has little in 
common with the prevailing daemonic beliefs and practices. In the 
Republic 496c, for example, Socrates considers that his daimonion (to 
daimonion semeion) has occurred to few others. 
The Euthydemus and Theaetetus briefly refer to the daimonion in con-
nection with Socrates' activities as educator. In the Euthydemus 272e, 
"as I was standing up, there came the customary divine sign [to eiothos 
semeion to daimonion], so I sat down." As a result, he remains and 
discourses with a group of students. In the Theaetetus 151a, Socrates 
describes the daimonion as forbidding him to accept certain students: 
"These, when they come back requesting association with me and 
behaving in an incredible fashion, with some of these the daimonion 
that comes to me forbids [me] to associate." The Theages, a pseudo-
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Platonic work, exaggerates this aspect of the daimonion. When Socrates 
explains the grounds of his competence as a teacher, he includes the 
fact that his daimonion helps him to prevent his acquaintances from 
acting wrongly. But this positive approach to the daimonion denies 
Socrates his characteristic irony. 33 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates again refers to the daimonion as something 
that prevents him from making a false step. While delivering his 
speech, Socrates had already sensed something wrong, and he as-
cribes this sense to the power of prophecy (mantikon) of the soul. But 
when he is about to leave the place, "crossing the river, the daimonion, 
that is, the sign that customarily comes to me [to daimonion te kai to 
eiothos semeion moi gignes thai] occurred" (Phaedrus 242b) . This daimon-
ion, the customary sign, manifests itself to Socrates as a voice: "On 
any occasion it holds me back from what I am about to do, and I 
seemed to hear a certain voice thence, which now does not allow me 
to depart before I purify myself." As the reason for this manifestation, 
Socrates suggests that he has "committed some fault toward the god 
[eis to theion]" (242c). Although the soul's prophetic power had already 
disturbed Socrates, his uneasy sense of having erred is not identical 
with the voice of the daimonion. As Hegel asserts, then, the daimonion 
is not simply "the voice of conscience." The daimonion operates as 
something beyond Socrates' awareness and shows itself within the 
represented setting of the dialogue as a voice that warns. There re-
mains a subtle interaction between the external activity of the dai-
monion and the soul's interpretive efforts. 34 
These passages suggest two preliminary observations concerning 
the daimonion. First, contrary to Hegel's belief, there is no explicit 
connection between the daimonion and Socrates' trancelike states de-
scribed in the Symposium. One might interpret Socrates' crossing of 
the river in the Phaedrus as a symbolic passage to something rational, 
away from the enchanted spot in which the dialogue takes place and 
to which his daimonion calls him back, but there is no compelling 
reason to associate the daimonion with accounts of his trances. Second, 
33Compare Hermann Gundert's " Platon und das Daimonion des Sokrates," in Gym-
nasium: Zeitschrift fiir Kultur der Antike und humanistische Bildung, 61 (1954), 522. Gundert 
emphasizes the ironic component of Socrates' discussions of the daimonion. Far from 
prompting us to dismiss the figure of the daimonion, however, this irony may only 
suggest Socrates' or Plato's doubts about the limited notion of divinity they accept. 
34See Gundert, pp. 519-20. 
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the daimonion is neither determinately adjectival nor substantive in 
form. 35 Resisting grammatical fixity, daimonion can function either as 
an adjective or as a noun. Euthyphro mentions to daimonion without 
any qualification, but generally it is called "customary" (eiothos) and 
is linked to a sign (semeion). Furthermore, it can be like a voice when 
it occurs to Socrates. S0ren Kierkegaard describes the elusive gram-
matical form of the "something divine": 
The word to daimonion . . . is not simply adjectival so that one might 
render it complete by implying function, deed (ergon), or sign (semeion), 
or something of the kind; nor is it substantive in the sense that it 
describes a particular or unique being .. .. this word signifies something 
abstract, something divine, which by its very abstractness is elevated 
above every determination, unutterable and without predicates, since 
it admits of no vocalization. 36 
If not even the grammar of daimonion can be firmly established, we 
should not expect to be able to localize its "essential" meaning. Aware 
of the impossibility of establishing the essence of the daimonion, Kier-
kegaard identifies it with the unutterable Hebrew name of God 
(YHWH). But how does the daimonion function in Socrates' life, and 
what is the strategic place of the word daimonion in Plato's theology? 
While passages in Plato's Laws, written in a less philosophical vein, 
repeat the Hesiodic tradition of daimones, Socrates characteristically 
reverts to the singular form. As he states in conversation with Eu-
thyphro, he is being prosecuted "because I find it hard to accept such 
stories people tell about the gods" (Euthyphro 6a). Yet Socrates is not 
simply an atheist, and the daimonion represents some part of his own 
religious conviction, even if this is suffused with irony. For the po-
lytheism of anthropomorphized gods, Socrates substitutes a vague 
divine power that acts only to warn him against errors. 
Socrates refers to his religious innovation in the context of his trial. 
He offers diverse arguments, but against the religious accusation he 
ultimately has no defense: "The Platonic Apology vindicates Socrates 
35Following Schleiermacher, who notes that Socrates did not conceive the daimonion 
substantially, as "a particular being of a higher kind," Paul Friedlander writes in Platon 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1954), vol. 1: "One already obstructs access for oneself, if 
one says, 'the daemonion,' as if it were a thing, instead of naming it in the neutral 
mode of the Greek expression, ' the daemonic' " (p. 35). 
36The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates, trans. Lee M. Capel (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 186. 
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triumphantly on the scores of 'atheism,' but silently owns that he was 
guilty on the real charge of unlicensed innovation in religion." 37 One 
should not hastily deny all importance to the daimonion in Socrates' 
trial, for the problem remains: how does the accusation misconceive 
the innovation it names? 
The decisive moment occurs in chapter fifteen of the Apology, when 
Socrates calls upon Meletus to explain his graphe. At this point Socrates 
shifts the burden of his defense to the irrelevant demonstration that 
he is not an atheist . Socrates asks: "Do you mean that I teach the 
young to believe in some gods, but not in the gods of the state? . . . Or 
do you mean that I do not believe in the gods at all myself, and that 
I teach other people not to believe in them either?" (Apol. 27bc) . 
Socrates may be guilty of the first charge, but Meletus exaggerates 
his claim and responds, "I mean that you do not believe in the gods 
in any way whatever" (Apol. 27c) . After this overhasty assertion, 
Socrates easily shows that Meletus' charge is self-contradictory. 38 Soc-
rates' refutation runs as follows: whoever believes in "divine things" 
(daimonia) must also believe in daimones, and whoever believes in 
daimones also believes in gods. If, therefore, as claimed in the indict-
ment, Socrates believes in new "divine things," he also believes in 
gods (Apol. 27ce) .39 
Thus free of the charge of atheism, Socrates does not confront the 
problematic novelty of the "divine things" he acknowledges. Even to 
the Athenians, the relationship between Socrates' daimonion, Hesiodic 
daimones, and Homeric daimon was unclear. Like daimon in the Iliad 
and Odyssey, daimonion appears as an "indefinite mode of expression," 
with a vague divine referent. How, then, can the daimonion be labeled 
an " innovation"? 
The daimonion is one decisive source of trouble, at least to the fic-
tional Socrates in Plato's narratives. Euthyphro's opinion supports 
this view; and when Socrates first refers to the daimonion in the Apol-
ogy, he says that it is what Meletus "satirized" (epikomodon) in his 
indictment (Apol. 31c). This passage is Socrates' most extensive dis-
37 A. E. Taylor, Varia Socratica (Oxford: James Parker, 1911), 9· 
38Compare Antonio Camarero, Socrates y las creencias dem6nicas griegas (Bahia Blanca: 
Cuadernos del Sur, 1968): " It is quite clear that in the Socratic defense, Plato did not 
consider the daimonion a personal being, when in an ironic manner Socrates makes the 
accuser Meletus recognize that whoever believes in ' the daemonic' by force believes 
in 'daemons' and, therefore, in the gods" (p. 27). 
39Compare Aristotle, Rhetoric 1398a. 
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cussion of the daimonion. Whereas Socrates elsewhere only mentions 
it in passing, here he gives an explanation: "Something godly [theion], 
that is divine [ti kai daimonion], comes to me . . .. this is a kind of voice 
[phone] that came to me beginning when I was a child, which when-
ever it comes, always turns me away [apotrepei] from what I am about 
to do but never turns me toward [protrepei]. This is what stands in 
the way of my participating in public life" (Apol. 31cd). Overtly, Soc-
rates is here concerned to justify his abstention from politics. But at 
the same time, he suggests his theological and political convictions. 
He generalizes the importance of avoiding politics in a way that threat-
ens the "democratic" foundations of Athens: "It is necessary for him 
who is really going to fight on behalf of what is right, if he is going 
to survive for even a short period of time, to act privately [idioteuein] 
and not publicly [demosieuein]" (Apol . 32a). This is a strong expression 
of the individualistic origins that Hegel finds in Socrates. The modern 
quest for an "idiolect" may also originate in an interpretation of Soc-
rates' wish to concern himself with private things [idia] rather than 
with things political [demosia] (Apol. 31c). 
Throughout the Apology, Socrates emphasizes his theological com-
mitments. Not only is he in great poverty as a result of his skeptical 
"service to the god" (23c); he is concerned with what is "pleasing to 
the godly" (to theoi philon) and acts according to the god's interest (to 
tau theou) (21e). He asserts that only the god is wise (23a). He considers 
himself as a "gift of the god" (3od), "stationed by the god" (28a) to 
preserve Athens; for the good of Athens, "the god attached me to 
the state" (3oe). Christian interpreters have observed that Socrates' 
statements concerning "the god" may suggest a monotheistic tend-
ency. But Socrates' singular "god" (theos) resists personification and 
instead points to a vague divine power, or an indefinite way of re-
ferring to the divine, like daimon and daimonion . Following the com-
mand of "the god," then, Socrates claims that it is his duty to act as 
a gadfly and arouse Athens, a sluggish horse (Apol. 30e-3ta). In con-
trast to Hegel's conception of the daimonion as "something uncon-
scious," Socrates conceives of a god that leads him to awaken 
heightened consciousness in others. 
Some commentators believe that Plato represents a Socrates who 
exaggerates his piety in order to defend himself. More likely, Plato 
includes this strong theological dimension to vindicate Socrates, who 
may or may not have held the views that Plato attributes to him. 
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Whether or not Socrates actually spoke of the daimonion as he does 
in Plato's Apology, the theological turns of phrase ascribed to Socrates 
are literary constructs. To achieve its vast influence, the Platonic turn 
did not require a real Socrates at all . 
Socrates' final words in the Apology are not part of his legal defense. 
Already condemned to death, Socrates addresses his judges. To those 
who voted to acquit him, Socrates explains "an amazing thing" that 
has occurred. Now Socrates takes the absence of the daimonion to be 
significant: 
The customary prophecy of the daimonion was quite frequent through-
out my entire life until now, and has opposed me even on very minor 
matters, if I was on the point of doing something improperly. And 
now, as you yourselves perceive, there have befallen me these things 
which a man would think to be, and which are reckoned, the most 
extreme of evils. But neither as I was going out in the morning from 
my home did the god's sign oppose me, nor when I came up here to 
the court, nor at any point in my speech when I was on the point of 
saying something. In other speeches in other places, however, it would 
hold me back in the midst of speaking. But as it is, at no point concerning 
this matter, in no deed or word has it opposed me. [Apol. 4oab] 
For the first time, the daimonion appears to offer positive information, 
yet only by virtue of its absence: "The chances are that this thing that 
has befallen me has come as something good . . . , because it is not 
possible that the customary sign would have failed to oppose me, 
were I not about to do something good" (4obc). Does the daimonion's 
failure to occur mean that Socrates' death is not an evil? Socrates is 
aware that the daimonion has diverted him from evils, but he cannot 
reason with any certainty that the daimonion will warn him whenever 
anything evil is about to happen . Socrates knows that, if the daimonion 
occurs, he is endangered, but it does not follow that whenever he is 
endangered, the daimonion will occur. In connection with the daimon-
ion, Socrates' beliefs reveal illogic. 
We can neither stabilize nor even identify the divine nature of the 
daimonion, which never advises a course of action . For Socrates, the 
meaning of the daimonion is that he must establish his own principles 
of self-determination while acknowledging that rational ideas of the 
good and of oneself are ultimately insufficient for this purpose. Rea-
son may retrospectively confirm the validity of what the daimonion 
PHILOSOPHY OF GENIUS 
motivates; where self-determination falls short, the daimonion takes 
its place, or acts as its corrective. 40 
Modern thought strives to reduce this extrarational "voice" to the 
workings of conscience or of the superego, but for Socrates the dai-
monion is indeed "something divine." Socrates' piety involves a mo-
ment of rectification from beyond the immanence of reason, a turn 
that, reinterpreted as the call of conscience, profoundly influences 
the Christian tradition of self-correction. If the subject is unable to 
decide adequately, something divine, manifesting itself as voice or 
sign, may give negative counsel. For Plato, reason becomes the basis 
of subjectivity, but Socrates denies that he is master of himself, and 
his daimonion transcends the workings of conscience. 
The daimonion has no substantial existence, yet it acts as a double-
edged turn in the life of Socrates as Plato represents it. When Socrates 
is on the verge of error, the daimonion turns him away (apotrepei). For 
the later history of genius, this turn is a decisive trope: Socrates, 
despite extreme rationalism, cannot master all situations. The dai-
monion is a mysterious, extrarational force that opposes false steps. 
For Socrates, politics appears as one such false step, and so the dai-
monion acts to turn Socrates inward. What Hegel terms a "turning back 
of consciousness into itself" is the decisive meaning of Socrates as 
moment in the development of subjective self-determination. To the 
extent that the daimonion is Socrates' own customary sign (eiothos 
semeion), it also represents his individuality as a swerve from customs 
of the demos. Socrates' daimonion makes his life a prototype of mystical 
transcendence and of a modern master trope, the idiolect. Daimonion 
is a trope that turns inward; Hegel exaggerates this turn and makes 
it appear pathological. 
The daimonion also acts as Plato's turn away from his precursors' 
daimones. While the daimonion does not explicitly stand at the center 
of Plato's theological statements, it performs a decisive revision of 
previous daemonology. Hovering between grammatical forms, the 
40Even Socratic reason is unable to guide all action. See Edward Zilsel, Die Entstehung 
des Geniebegriffs (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1926): "The completely irrational way in 
which, for the otherwise so rational philosopher, the daemonic voice separates itself 
from all rational considerations, easily became a point of contact when the advancing 
Renaissance went about emphasizing the irrational nature of poetic production, even 
exalting it into the supernatural" (p. 12). According to Thomas Meyer, in Platons Apologie 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1962), the daimonion stands "in exact logical opposition to 
Socratic self-discovery" (p. 73). 
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daimonion eludes all hierarchy of divine beings and suggests a theo-
logical belief based either on vague divine power or on vague intui-
tions. Plato's Socratic allegory suggests that this innovation threatens 
contemporary Athenians and contributes weight to Meletus' accu-
sation, which associates his daimonion with "new divinities" (kaina 
daimonia). 
If the daimonion subverts coherent theological systems, how can 
Socrates be so certain that, when the customary sign does not occur, 
his death is not an evil? And what convinces him that "no evil can 
happen to a good man" (Apol. 41d)? Socrates' conception of fate, 
developed elsewhere in Plato's dialogues, excludes the elements of 
irrationality and futile destruction that characterize the Homeric uni-
verse. The absence of the daimonion during the trial cannot, however, 
secure the positive assurance Plato sought. When there is no certainty 
that divinity governs the world, the execution of Socrates is as po-
tentially threatening to theology as Job's suffering or the command 
that Abraham sacrifice his son. 
Plato's Socrates is the victim of an inevitable conflict between the-
ological systems. In general terms, the figure of Socrates is the place 
in Plato's work where competing beliefs vie for domination. Greek 
myth depends on the plurality of gods, while Socrates' daimonion 
enhances the monotheistic tendencies at which the Iliad and Odyssey 
have already hinted. Abstract daimon displaces plural daimones; the 
Socratic daimonion unsettles any recourse to the established divinities. 
The Athenians condemn Socrates for "importing new gods" only 
because they do not grasp his more radical challenge that questions 
the plurality of the gods. 
2 Hebrew Angels, satan, 
and Philo's logoi 
If Greek theology develops from the plural to the singular, Hellen-
ized and Babylonian Judaism move in the opposite direction . For 
whereas the abstract Socratic piety challenges Greek polytheism, the 
Hebrew traditions of angels (malachim) drift away from radical mon-
otheism. 1 The Book of Genesis represents angels as God's messen-
gers, existing only in their fulfillment of this function, but the Book 
of Job, apocryphal writings, and various commentaries all multiply 
the manifest forms of divinity and give increasing independence to 
satan , an adversary or opposing angel. This intertextual development 
exposes conflicts within the diverse Hebrew traditions, conflicts that 
find expression in dualistic tensions at virtually every stage of Jewish 
thought. 
Philo of Alexandria's writings exemplify the confrontation between 
theological systems that are based on radically monotheistic belief 
and those that refer to divine intermediaries . The Greek logoi char-
acterize Philo's revision at the margins of rabbinic tradition. Despite 
strict prohibitions against representing the ineffable Tetragrammaton 
(YHWH), Talmudic commentaries on biblical narratives also slip to-
ward hypostases of secondary divine beings . Postbiblical versions of 
1Yehezkel Kaufmann, in The Religion of Israel: From It s Beginnings to the Babylonian 
Exile, trans. and ed. Moshe Greenberg (Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press, 1960), 
convincingly argues-against Julius Wellhausen and nineteenth-century biblical criti-
cism-that monotheism is the earliest stage of Israelite belief. 
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the akedah, the binding of Isaac, exemplify modes of expansion that 
turn mysterious passages of Scripture into more comprehensible nar-
ratives of divine intervention. The images of angels and satan may 
indicate literal polytheistic tendencies or only an enhanced meta-
phorical element. 
At the same time that Hellenized Jewish thought magnifies the role 
of divine intermediaries in versions of scriptural narrative, a Stoic 
distinction affirms God's dual transcendence and immanence. Re-
taining the notion of an inexpressed thought (logos endiathetos) that is 
analogous to divine mind, Philo adds instances of externalized lan-
guage (logos prophorikos) to representations of the heavenly court. 
Christian scholars have demonstrated that Philo's wisdom has affin-
ities to the Gospel of John; Jewish mystics have been reluctant to 
acknowledge Philo as a forerunner. 
The malach YHWH and satan 
Malach, the Hebrew word for "angel," apparently derives from the 
root, to send (lach). 2 Like Greek angelos, Hebrew malach is primarily 
a "messenger" and can refer to human messengers (as in Gen. 32A). 
But God's malachim are essentially linked to the divine Word, or Logos, 
and are inseparable from the messages they bear from God to men. 
God speaks with individuals through the mediation of angeloi, or logoi . 
The biblical Genesis and Exodus grant no independent existence to 
these divine emissaries. 3 
The angel of God (malach YHWH) first appears in Genesis 16:7-12. 
God has already promised Abraham an heir, but the childless Sarah 
offers him her servant girl, Hagar. After Hagar conceives, Sarah treats 
her harshly, and she flees. At this point, God's angel finds Hagar in 
the wilderness and echoes God's promise to Abraham: "The angel of 
YHWH said to her, 'I will greatly multiply your seed .. .. Behold, you 
are with child and will bear a son, and you will call his name Ishmael, 
because YHWH has heard your affliction' " (Gen. 16:10-11). God's 
2See Solomon Mandelkern's Veferis Tes fam en fi Concordantiae Hebraicae atque Cha/daicae 
(Berlin: F. Margolin, 1925), 625-26. 
' Compare Alexander Kohut, Uber die jiidische Angelologie und Oiimonologie in ihrer 
Abhiingigkeif vom Parsismus (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1866), 1-2. See also J. B. Frey's 
"L'angelologie juive au temps de Jesus-Chris t," in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques ef 
Theologiques, 5 (1911), 75-76. 
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angel is primarily the bearer of His message; Ishmael's name derives 
from the fact of God's having heard (shama) through the angel. When 
Hagar and Ishmael are turned out into the wilderness together, God 
hears Ishmael's cry and again announces, through the voice of His 
angel, "I will make him a great nation" (Gen. 21:18). The first-person 
form indicates that, as in the previous passage, the angel is in some 
way identified with God; when the angel hears and blesses, God 
hears and blesses. The angel exists primarily to convey God's Word . 
Genesis 22 also suggests a conflation of God with His angel. Ini-
tiating the command to sacrifice Isaac, God calls "Abraham" (Gen . 
22:1); when He annuls the command, His angel calls, "Abraham, 
Abraham" (Gen . 22:11). The angel serves to communicate God's bless-
ing: "The angel of YHWH called to Abraham a second time out of 
the heavens, and said, By Myself I have sworn, says YHWH, because 
you have done this thing, and have not withheld your son, your only 
son, that in blessing I will bless you and in multiplying I will multiply 
your seed as the stars of the heavens ... because you have listened 
to My voice" (Gen. 22:15-18). Later interpreters find a problem in the 
shift from God's initial command to the angel's subsequent retraction. 
But as the angel of God exists in order to express God's Word, there 
is no discrepancy. 
Jacob's dream (Gen. 28:12-15) further implies the significance of 
angels as divine words (logoi). Rather than describe malachim inde-
pendently, as Hesiod describes daimones, this passage makes God's 
words the essence of their manifestation: "He dreamed, and behold 
a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to the heavens; 
and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it. And 
behold, YHWH stood beside him and said, 'I am YHWH, the God of 
Abraham your father, and the God of Isaac. I will give the land on 
which you lie to you and to your seed' "(Gen. 28:13-14). The dreamed 
vision of angels is essentially linked to God's revelation. Following 
the Septuagint, Philo suggests that God's angeloi are analogous to 
logoi. 
In Genesis, then, the angel of God is inseparable from God's Word, 
speech, or message. 4 The angels in Exodus are similarly subordinate 
to God: if the angel of God appears to Moses in the burning bush 
(Ex. y2), it is God who calls "Moses, Moses" (Ex. 3:4) and who reveals 
4Difficult passages in Gen. 18-19 and 32 lie beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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the future of "My people." Furthermore, concerning the angel of 
God's presence that accompanies the Jews out of Egypt (Ex. 14:9 and 
Ex. 2y2o), God announces, "My name is in him." Philo's Greek usage 
indicates, then, that angeloi may be understood as representations of 
God's logoi. 
Later versions and commentaries hypostatize the communicative 
agency of God . Rather than conceive malachim as figures for the send-
ings of ineffable divinity, some postbiblical commentators literally 
conceive them to be semidivine beings in an elaborate cosmology. 
Acute tensions result from increasingly dualistic explanations of evil 
in terms of fallen angels. 
The word satan5 probably derives from the verb meaning, "to act 
as an adversary," though some scholars trace it to shut, "to go about 
or deviate"; satan, an adversary or force of opposition, deviates and 
causes others to deviate. 6 In the Pentateuch, the word satan occurs 
only once. When Balaam departs to speak against Israel, "the angel 
of YHWH placed himself in the way as an adversary [l'satan] against 
him" (Num. 22:22). To express God's anger and to correct Salaam's 
course, the angel appears to block Balaam' s path. Far from opposing 
God's will, this satan is an angel that directly fulfills God's Word. 
In the Book of Job, satan becomes an explicit heavenly adversary. 7 
The opening chapters represent a heavenly court to which "the sons 
of God [b'nai Elohim] came to present themselves before YHWH" Gob 
1:6). This representation raises the classical problem of theodicy, the 
existence of evil in God's world, along with other insoluble problems 
of interpretation. The visual aspect of God's court is reminiscent of 
1 Kings 22:19: "I saw YHWH sitting on His throne, and all the host 
of heaven standing beside Him on His right and on His left." But the 
reference to "the sons of God" ultimately echoes Genesis 6:2 and the 
associated accounts of "fallen angels." 
'The italicized satan refers to the ancient Hebrew word, and is thus differentiated 
from the English Satan. 
OSee N. H. Tur-Sinai (H. Torczyner), The Book of fob: A New Commentary Oerusalem: 
Kiryath Sepher, 1957), 38-45. Other works associate sa tan more closely with a power 
of accusation, as does Rivkah Scharf Kluger's Satan in the Old Testament, trans. Hildegard 
Nagel (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 25-34. 
71 Chronicles 21:1 and Zechariah y1-2 also show that sa tan has assumed a new role 
but with less drastic consequences for men. See Edward Langton' s Satan: A Portrait 
(London: Sheffington, 1945). For a general overview, see Jeffrey Burton Russell, The 
Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977). 
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At the start of the story of Job, God speaks with satan. The adver-
sary's first words explain his name in terms of his activity: "Where 
do you come from?" God asks, and satan responds: "From going about 
[m'shut] on the earth" Gob 1:7). Like Hesiodic daimones, satan wanders 
the earth and weighs the actions of men . To some extent, satan already 
takes on a more independent function than that of angels. More than 
the vehicle of God's communications, satan retains an identity as a 
heavenly being that searches out evil. 8 In a sense, the explicit adver-
sary of men shifts the problem of evil away from God, taking the 
blame for the ills of life . But in this biblical narrative, satan is only 
able to act insofar as God permits his action. 
The "outside books" of Enoch and of the Jubilees (the Little Genesis) 
exemplify later additions to the canonized image of satan. 9 In 1 Enoch 
6-11 there appears a seminal account of angelic origins in the form 
of an expanded retelling of Genesis 6:1-4. Fallen angels have inter-
course with the daughters of men, who give birth to giants. The Book 
of Jubilees substantially agrees with this version. 10 
The Manual of Discipline, recovered from the Qumran caves, sub-
stantiates the traditional view that Jewish angelology shows traces of 
Persian influence. According to Edward Langton, the Persian dualism 
is first expressed in Yasna: originally "there were two primeval spirits, 
also called principles or things, a better and a worse."11 Similarly, the 
Manual of Discipline informs that God "created man to rule the world, 
and appointed for him two spirits after whose direction he was to 
walk until the final inquisition. They are the spirits of truth and of 
perversity."12 While this document clearly expresses a dualistic con-
8Yet satan may only represent human doubts that result from the human inclination 
toward evil. As the Babylonian Talmud, Baba Batra 15b, suggests, satan is the evil 
impulse (yetzer hara) of men. 
9Edward Langton discusses the apocryphal literature regarding angels and sa tan in 
his Essentials of Demonology (London: Epworth, 1949), 107-44. 
10Compare Bernard J. Bamberger's Fallen Angels (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1952), 26-30, and Michel Testuz's Les idees religieuses du "Livre des fubiles" (Paris: 
Librairie Minard, 1960), 75-86. But in the Book of Jubilees, God sends the angels to 
earth, where they are corrupted, while in 1 Enoch they already lust in heaven and 
descend in order to mate with women . Both versions clearly threaten the more abstract 
Mosaic representations of God and heaven . 
11 Essentials of Demonology (London: Epworth, 1949), 65 . 
12The Dead Sea Scriptures, trans. Theodor H . Gaster (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 
43· Compare Jacob Licht, "An Analysis of the Treatise on the Two Spirits in DSD," in 
Scripta Hierosolymitana, vol. 14 Oerusalem: Magnes Press, 1958), 88-100. If, as Licht 
maintains, one of the " two spirits" is assigned to each individual at birth, then this 
dualism closely parallels the Roman doctrine of good and evil guardian geniuses. 
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ception of good and evil, and gives them the name of "spirits," God 
creates this opposition. The Manual of Discipline, often attributed to 
the Essenes, appears to synthesize Persian and Jewish sources . 
As several scholars have written detailed accounts of the Talmudic 
angelology, there is no need to reproduce their findings. 13 Versions 
of biblical narratives supply many instances in which Talmudic and 
Midrashic legends develop toward increasingly dualistic expressions. 
The Divine logoi 
The Greek tradition of daimones, the Stoic tradition of logoi, and the 
Hebrew tradition of malachim come together in Philo's writings; al-
though Philo never profoundly influences Jewish orthodoxy, his syn-
thesis parallels the transformations that occur elsewhere in the 
diaspora. While the Pentateuch refers to malachim as mere extensions 
of God, the later traditions develop toward dualistic beliefs in the evil 
agency of satan and demons (mazziqim, shedim). Within early Chris-
tianity, which rejects such hints at polytheistic belief, daimones irre-
versibly become demons. 14 Philo stands in a more complex relationship 
to both Judaic and Hellenic sources. 
Logos, mediating between the transcendent God and immanent world 
appearances, is one key word in Philo's scriptural interpretations. 
Following Stoic terminology, Philo also refers to intermediary logoi, 
similar to the daimones of Plato's Symposium 202e. In fact, Philo ex-
plicitly identifies biblical angeloi with daimones and logoi . 
But while logos is the term that links transcendence and immanence, 
it also gives rise to dualistic antitheses. The singular Logos stands 
opposite plural logoi; divine Logos contrasts human speech; God's 
reason is distinct from though associated with human reason; God's 
abstract Logos contrasts the more concrete forms of God's angelos. For 
13See Ferdinand Weber, fiidische TheologieaufGrund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften 
gemeinfasslich dargestellt, ed. Franz Delitzsch and George Schnedermann (Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms, 1975), sec. 54; Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports 
about Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977); Peter Schafer, Studien zur 
Geschichte und Theologie des rabbinischen judentums (Lei den: E. J. Brill, 1978). In his Rivalitiit 
zwischen Engeln und Menschen (Berlin : Walter de Gruyter, 1975), Schafer writes of a 
"constantly expanding angel-conception" (sich immer weiter entfaltende Engelvorstellung) 
(p. 73). 
14See, for example, Augustine's De civ. dei VIII, 14 and X, 9· 
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the tradition of Christian interpretations of Philo, dispute centers 
around the question: is God's Logos impersonal or personal?15 
In connection with Socrates' daimonion , a more central question 
concerns the relationship between Logos, angelos, and conscience.16 
But as some interpreters recognize, the crux of Philo's synthesis is 
his use of the Stoic opposition between logos endiathetos and logos 
prophorikos. 17 Rather than rigorously define these terms, Philo employs 
them loosely, in ways that can only be translated inadequately into 
the English-language oppositions of "internalized thought" and "ex-
pressed word," meaning and utterance. The dualistic tensions within 
logos derive from this most basic opposition. 
Jordan Bucher, one of Philo's most decisive interpreters, takes the 
antithesis within the logos as his starting point. In the context of 
nineteenth-century German scholarship, his work entitled Philonische 
Studien inevitably considers the tension between impersonal and per-
sonal meanings of logos. He seeks a resolution, however, by estab-
lishing both sides of the logos together. 18 
Bucher recognizes, furthermore, that the dispute does not revolve 
around two different meanings of the word logos but rather results 
from two different types of linguistic expression. His concise work 
thus begins by asking "whether Philo's logos be merely personification 
or actual hypostasis" (PS 1). Rhetorically, the question is whether 
logos takes part in a mode of naming or functions as a personifying 
trope. Rather than decide in favor of either alternative, Bucher follows 
a "historical-pragmatic path," pointing to the necessity of both rhe-
torical aspects of the logos. After reviewing the critical literature on 
15See August Gfrorer, Philo und die alexandrinische Theosophie (Stuttgart: Schweizerbart, 
1831), pt. 1, chap. 8; Edward Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Jd ed . (Leipzig: Fues, 
1881), vol. lll, pt. 2 , pp. 378-81; and Joseph Buschmann, Die Persiinlichkeit des philonischen 
Logos (Aachen: M. Ulrichs Sohn, 1873). This last inquiry is obviously, and at times 
explicitly, motivated by the wish to find an analogue to the Gospel of John . 
16See Gfrorer, pp. 2 11- 12; Friedrich Keferstein, Philo's Lehre von den giittlichen Mitte/-
wesen (Leipzig: Wilhelm Juranz, 1846), 70; and Max Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der 
griechischen Philosophie (Oldenburg: Ferdinand Schmidt, 1872): " Here the Logos plays 
the role of conscience, is also called precisely an examiner [elengchos], and is as such 
the divine angel that leads us" (p . 275). 
17See Emile Brehier, Les idees phi/osophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Aiexandrie (Paris: 
Vrin, 1925), bk. 2, chap. 2; and see also Austryn Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1947), vol. 1, chap. 4· 
18Jordan Bucher, Philonische Studien (Tiibingen: Zu-Guttenberg, 1848), 5 (henceforth 
cited as PS). According to its subtitle, this monograph is an "effort to resolve the 
question concerning the personal hypostasis of the Logos in Philo's wri tings in a his-
torical-pragmatic way. " 
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Philo, Bucher comments that, despite a general recognition that Phi-
lo's speculation moves within the categories of thinking and speaking, 
no previous interpretation of Philo adequately grasps the logos in these 
terms (PS ·19). 
Bucher thus begins anew by noting a linguistic distinction: 'The 
external word (whether it be spoken or written) carries a doubleness 
in itself: on the one hand, something internal, the thought, which 
shall come to expression and representation; but on the other hand, 
also an external and sensuous form, in which every inner thought 
sees the light of day" (PS 19-20). In order to achieve a reinterpretation 
of Philo's thought, Bucher sets theological and cosmological beliefs 
aside, concentrating instead on a basic dichotomy in language. The 
realm of the internal thought is that of sense; the external form is an 
audible or visible sign. This verbal antithesis becomes the model of 
Philo's cosmology: "Completely analogous are also the appearances 
of the visible world, external signs, so to speak a grand sequence of 
letters, behind which a secret sense, the divine world of ideas, is 
concealed" (PS 20). Because the visible world is analogous to a se-
quence of letters (Buchstaben), an education in reading these signs is 
required for the recognition of the divine world of ideas behind ex-
ternal appearances. The externalized forms of word and world reveal 
and conceal the divine Word and world of ideas. Logos permeates the 
opposition. Like kabbalistic authors, Bucher writes, Philo understands 
the world as "a divine expression" (ein gottlicher Ausspruch) (PS 21). 
Thus the dialectics of logos must be realized, not simply reconciled. 
Sense (Sinn) and written sign (Schriftzeichen) correspond to interi-
ority and exteriority, thought and sensuous form, ideas and appear-
ances, divine speaking and the divinely spoken. In other words, logos 
is the mediating unity of active and enacted speech, God's legon and 
legomenon (PS 24-26). While logos is the mediating term between divine 
and worldly spheres, it is identified with both poles of the opposition. 
Philo's central dialectic consists of logos endiathetos and logos pro-
phorikos. Just as men may precede speech by thought, so God's speech, 
the world, is preceded by God's thought, the ideas. Bucher recognizes 
no essential difference between these two aspects of logos: "What a 
person speaks aloud, he has previously spoken inwardly .... But a 
distinction between external and internal speaking is grounded on the 
observation that thinking is an inner speaking, an inward-turned 
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speaking; for we do not think without words, and there is no clear, 
complete thought without word" (PS 29). Bucher observes that think-
ing is basically an inner speech, or an "inwardly turned speaking" 
(ein inwendiges Sprechen ). Philo and Bucher follow the Platonic defi-
nition of thinking as "the internal dialogue of the mind with itself" 
(Sophist 263e). One might speculate on relationships between this 
inward dialogue and Socrates' daimonion. 
Bucher opposes the view that a conception of the doubled divine 
Logos gave rise to the belief in a doubled human logos (PS 30). Ac-
cording to Bucher, the distinction is originally present in human lan-
guages such as Greek, which employs logos in contexts referring to 
both "thinking" and "speaking." Philo allegorizes the opposition of 
logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos and infers a distinction in the 
"sphere of the absolute" (PS 32). Personifications of the divine Logos 
should thus be understood allegorically; for Philo, angeloi synthesize 
Stoic forces and Platonic ideas (PS 42). 
Because Philo's works are structured primarily as scriptural inter-
pretations, not as theoretical treatises, his thought has a fragmentary 
character. Yet he returns often to certain biblical figures: Adam and Eve, 
Cain and Abel, the Nephilim, Abraham and Isaac, Hagar, Jacob, Jo-
seph, Moses and Aaron, Balaam. Philo conceives these diverse per-
sonalities as externalizations of God's activity and hints at systematic 
meanings through allegorical interpretations. Similarly, the word of 
God (rhema theou) contains a tension between logos endiathetos and logos 
prophorikos. While Philo presents himself as an interpreter of texts, he 
seeks to demonstrate that God's transcendence and immanence are 
equivalent to mind and appearance, divine thought and letter. 
But logos does not always appear in the singular form. In connection 
with the biblical account of Jacob's dream, Philo associates logoi with 
the angels that ascend and descend; logoi are like ambassadors to 
God . In turn, Philo notes that logoi and angeloi are different names 
for what "other philosophers call daimones ." 19 De gigantibus 6 similarly 
19De Somn. I, 141-42. I have consulted and modified translations of Philo's works 
that appear in F. H. Colson's and G. H. Whitaker's Philo, 10 vols. (London: William 
Heinemann, 1929-42). Philo is one of Heidegger's most striking unacknowledged pre-
decessors. Not only does Philo base his work on a distinction between onto-theological 
and ontic-existentiallogos; he asserts that logos is " the house of God" (De Mig. Abr. 2-
4) and discusses God's Lichtung as the archetype of visible light. As Bucher (PS 21) 
and others have recognized, Philo's teaching shares images of light with kabbalistic 
mysticism. Furthermore, like the later kabbalistic sources, Philo writes that "a garment 
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explains that "those which other philosophers call daimones, Moses 
customarily calls angels." Philo both follows the tradition of Hesiodic 
daimones and suggests the Platonic myth of the Symposium 202e, when 
he adds that God has given to the logos "the chosen right to stand 
on the boundary and distinguish the Creator from the created. This 
same logos both acts as suppliant to the immortal for afflicted mortality 
and as ambassador of the ruler to the subject" (Quis Rer. Div. 205). 
Philo moves in the direction of visual representation when he de-
scribes the role of the logos as an ambassador. 20 At the same time, 
Philo insists on the final unity of God's Logos with the logoi that are 
active as divine power, God's emanations. Though he returns to the 
Hesiodic and Platonic daimones, Philo gives them a new allegorical 
form in scriptural contexts. 
God's relationship to his Logos and logoi thus parallels the opposition 
between logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos. Ethical questions arise 
when Philo illustrates this dialectic by means of biblical types: Abel 
and Cain, Moses and Aaron, Adam and Eve (Quod Det. 35-37, 126-
27). Philo associates greater perfection with the logos endiathetos, which 
explains his special interest in ascetic Jewish sects. The two modes 
of logos correspond to two human types: "Many reason [logizontai] 
flawlessly but are betrayed by bad interpretation, that is, by bad 
logos .... Others, however, have been most formidable in interpre-
tation but most foul in giving advice, such as the so-called sophists" 
(De Mig. Abr. 72). Sophistry accounts for Abel's defeat by Cain: Abel, 
"though he had the advantage of a faultless understanding, yet through 
lack of training in speaking is worsted by Cain" (ibid., 74). 21 
The doubleness of logos thus suggests an inevitable conflict between 
perfection and imperfection, good and evil. To account for the exis-
tence of worldly evil, Philo has recourse to a sharper separation of 
Logos from logoi, and of God's angelos from angeloi. When God creates 
is a symbol of logos" (De Somn. i.Io2). God is like an architect whose blueprint, the 
logos, informs the world (De Opif. 17-20). Compare Genesis Rabbah on Gen. 1:1. 
2°Conceived abstractly, this boundary logos is analogous to Heidegger's "ontological 
difference" between Being and beings. 
2 10utward expression is not merely an evil. Other passages insist that, just as Cain 
and Abel are brothers, so the body is brother of the soul; expressed language (prophorikos 
logos) is "closest kin to mind [nous]" (De Fug. 90). Moses requires the assistance of 
Aaron to express the perfect Logos . For the sake of human understanding, there must 
occur a kind of fall from divine mind to logos prophorikos. 
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man, His work is partially performed by angels; scripture states, "Let 
us make man" (Gen. 1:26) in order that "man's right actions might 
be attributed to God, but his sin to others" (De Conf. Ling. 179). Philo 
simplifies his analysis, however, by avoiding discussion of evil angels. 
Instead, he focuses on the work of God's angel as an elengchos, an 
examiner, appearing to oppose Balaam. 
What does it mean for the divine Logos to enter a human soul? Philo 
wavers between the tradition of Mosaic revelation on Mount Sinai 
and the Platonic tradition of abstract revelation through wisdom (so-
phia). A logos comes to Philo at difficult moments of interpretation: 
"But I have sometimes heard an even more authoritative logos, from 
my own [eiothuias] soul, which is often god-possessed and gives 
prophetic utterance concerning things of which it can have no knowl-
edge" (De Cher. 27). The god-possessed (theolepteisthai) soul is at the 
origin of inspiration, en-thusiasm. Philo insists that God "speaks" 
without voice; personifications of God are falsifications that only heu-
ristic ends justify: "the logos [ = hieros Logos?], longing to educate those 
whose lives are without knowledge, likened Him to man .... For this 
reason it has ascribed to Him face, hands, feet, mouth, voice, anger 
and indignation, and even armour, arrivals and departures, move-
ments up and down" (De Somn. 1.234-35). Representations are useful 
only to dull people who are "not able to conceive of God at all without 
a body, people whom it is impossible to instruct otherwise than in 
this way, saying that as a man does so, God arrives and departs, goes 
down and comes up, makes use of a voice" (ibid ., 236). Such com-
ments imply that the educated could entirely avoid the metaphorical 
praphorikos, and thus Philo allies himself with an asceticism of language. 
But Philo constantly reverts to the deceptive illusions he condemns. 
For instance, when God gave the ten commandments (logous, chre-
mous), He expressed Himself without the medium of voice: "I think 
that on this occasion God created a miracle most appropriate to the 
holy by summoning an invisible sound to be constructed [demiurges-
thenai] in the air, more marvelous than all the instruments [organon] 
and fitted with perfect harmonies . . . , a rational soul [psychen logiken] 
full of clearness and distinctness" (De Dec. 33) . A new personification 
enters the description: 'The power [dynameis] of God drove forth the 
newly created voice [phone] , breathing on it [epipneusa], kindling it, 
and spreading it far and wide, and made it more luminous at the end 
[telos] by placing another hearing far better than that which works 
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through the ears in the souls of every man" (ibid., 35). The figure of 
an "invisible sound" carries Philo's account beyond the range of the 
senses, creating for the reader a novel kind of hearing. Prototype of 
the ordinary logos, the ten commandments are expressed by divine 
mind and impressed on human reason without undergoing the dis-
torting effects of air. God's Logos appears to communicate directly 
with the internal logos endiathetos of men. 
Philo writes as an enemy of figuration and of the logos prophorikos 
in general. His writings abound in visual imagery and are grounded 
on methods of allegorical interpretation, however, and he cannot 
maintain his distance from the ways in which language bears (pro-
phero) meaning. If "inappropriate" figuration is inescapable, Philo can 
only encourage a strict distinction between allegorical and literal inter-
pretation. Writing errs, and reading can only seek to swerve again 
and again from error. Philo ultimately succumbs to the logos that 
carries his words beyond the asceticism he wishes to proffer. 
Encounters with satan 
Postbiblical retellings of the story of Abraham and Isaac also move 
beyond the univocal divine call to representations of diverse angelic 
and satanic interventions. The increasing predominance of satan in 
later accounts suggests that, as Blake commented concerning Milton, 
many an exegete "wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels and God, 
and at liberty when of Devils.'m We need not draw Blake's conclusion 
that they were "of the Devil's party without knowing it," but the 
question remains: How did satan penetrate the canonical tale of Abra-
ham's last trial? 
The akedah, the story of the binding of Isaac, is "fraught with back-
ground [hintergrundig],"23 and postbiblical commentators repeatedly 
add to the minimal details of the original. Because these additions 
take the form of aggadah, or legend, they are not bound to the stricter 
constraints of halakhah, normative law. 24 Retellings that date from 
22William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell." 
23Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, trans. Willard Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1953), 12. 
24Alexander Kohut, Uber die jiidische Angelologie und Daemonologie in ihrer Abhiingigkeit 
vom Parsismus (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1866), 15. On the complex relationship between 
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about 200 B.C.E. to 700 C.E. reveal the changing attitudes of their 
distinct contexts. The interpreters obviously rely on preexisting no-
tions of the heavenly court and revise the narrative according to their 
angelological assumptions. These versions of the akedah also respond 
directly to each other and embody a complex tradition of intertextual 
relations. 
Three versions of the binding of Isaac illustrate the developing 
traditions of Jewish angelology and demonology: the Book of Jubilees 
17-18, Sanhedrin 89b, and Midrash Tanchuma, Vayirah 22-23.25 With 
the exception of the early Book of Jubilees, these works are central 
to the rabbinic canon. 
The Book of Jubilees suggests some of the earliest major additions 
to Genesis 22. This pseudepigraphic work claims to be an angel's 
revelation to Moses on Mount Sinai; as a result, the retelling of Genesis 
occurs in the first-person form. Genesis 22 thus becomes part of the 
angel's narrative, as when "I called to him from the heavens, saying: 
Abraham, Abraham" (chap. 18). 
The shift to an angel's narrative is accompanied by additions to the 
role of an accusing spirit. According to the the Book of Jubilees, the 
Prince of Mastema26 inspires Abraham's last trial: "the Prince Mas-
tema came and said before God: Behold, Abraham loves Isaac his 
son, and delights in him above all things else . Bid him offer him 
halakhah and aggadah, see also: Leo Baeck, "Der alte Widerspruch gegen die Haggada, " 
in Aus drei Jahrtausenden (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1958), 176-85; and Abraham Joshua 
Hesche!, God in Search of Man (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1955), 322-47. 
For a fuller bibliography on Midrash, see the notes to David Stern's "Rhetoric and 
Midrash: The Case of the Mashal," Prooftexts, 1 (1981), 261-91. 
25I will also refer to the parallel passages in Genesis Rabbah 55-56 and Midrash 
Vayosha. Citations are modified from the following translations: The Book of Jubilees or, 
The Little Genesis, trans. R. H. Charles (New York: Macmillan, 1917); Sanhedrin, in The 
Babylonian Talmud, Seder Nezikin, vol. 3, trans. H. Freedman and ed. I. Epstein (London: 
Soncino Press, 1961) (henceforth, "Sanh."); Midrash Rabbah, 1, trans . H. Freedman and 
Maurice Simon (London: Soncino Press, 1939). For help with the translations of Midrash 
Tanchuma (henceforth cited as "Tanch.") and Midrash Vayosha, I am indebted to 
James Ponet and Michael Lozenik. I have also consulted the translations of Vayosha 
contained in the collections: Bet ha-Midrasch: Sammlung kleiner Midraschim, ed. Adolph 
Jellinek Oerusalem: Wahrmann, 1967); and Aus Israe/s Lehrhallen, trans. August Wiinsche, 
vol. 1 (Leipzig: Eduard Pfeiffer, 1907). 
26In the Ethiopian text, this evil spirit is at various points called the "Prince Mastema," 
the " Prince of Mastema," and the "Prince of the Mastema." The name derives from 
the Hebrew root meaning "to accuse." The dark prince is thus a prince of accusation, 
or prince of the accusations, perhaps leader of a group of evil spirits. 
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as a burnt offering on the altar, and You will see if he will do this 
command, and You will know if he is faithful in everything wherein 
You try him" (chap. 17). In Genesis 22, only God is named as initiator 
of the command; here Mastema follows the satan of the Book of Job 
and provokes the test. This alteration makes God's action more com-
prehensible: in response to evil powers that doubt Abraham, God 
resolves to demonstrate Abraham's piety by means of a test. Yet as 
in the Book of Job, the acknowledgment of evil powers has a sub-
versive tendency to relativize God's mastery over the world. 
In this early revision, the Prince of Mastema is clearly subordinate 
to God. He can only propose the test and later suffer humiliation 
when Abraham is strong: :'And the Prince of the Mastema was put 
to shame" (chap. 18). Mastema's "shame" indicates the presence of 
an extensive heavenly court. 
Sanhedrin, one of the sixty-three tractates of the Babylonian Tal-
mud, retells the story of Abraham and Isaac in the traditions of the 
Book of Jubilees and the Book of Job: "Satan spoke before the Holy 
One, blessed be He: Master of the Universe! You graced this old man 
with the fruit of the womb at the age of a hundred, yet of all the 
banquet he prepared, he did not have one turtle-dove or pigeon to 
sacrifice before You" (Sanh. 89b). Satan's intervention appears as an 
explanation of Genesis 22:1. 27 Its purported origin is an oral tradition 
based on the words of Rabbis Johanan and Jose b. Zimra, but the 
Book of Job and the Book of Jubilees are written precedents. 
Sanhedrin adds a further event that significantly extends satan's 
range of activity. Previously, the evil instigator had appeared before 
God's assembly, as in the Book of Job: "Now there was a day when 
the sons of God came to present themselves before YHWH, and satan 
also came among them" (Job 1:6). In the second part of Sanhedrin's 
revision, satan comes to earth and speaks directly to Abraham. Many 
of satan' s words are citations from the speech of Eliphaz in Job 4, and 
as a result, the human or superhuman nature of this accuser remains 
ambiguous: 
Satan anticipated him on the way and said to him, " If one attempts a 
word [davar] with you, will you be weary? [ ... ] Behold, you have 
instructed many, and you have strengthened weak hands. Your words 
27Compare Genesis Rabbah 5S:4, where the accusation is alternatively attributed 
either to Abraham himself or to God' s ministering angels. 
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have upheld a stumbler.[ ... ] But now it has come upon you, and you 
are weary" [Job 4:2-5]. 
He [Abraham] said to him, "I will walk in my integrity" [Ps. 26:1]. 
He said to him, "Is not your fear of God your foolishness [kislatecha ]?" 
[Job 4:6]. 
He said to him, "Remember, who that was innocent ever perished?" 
[Job 47]. [Sanh. 89b] 
In this contest of scriptural citations, the accuser could be a false friend 
like Eliphaz, or a satanic manifestation, or both. The satan ultimately 
claims to possess inside information, "from beyond the partition," 
God's inner secrets, but Abraham repulses him with the rejoinder: 
"It is the penalty of a liar, that even if he tells the truth, he is not 
listened to" (ibid.). The Talmudic account brings satan down to earth 
and places him in direct confrontation with Abraham. Transformed 
from an accuser within God's court into a tempter among men, satan 
is on the way to becoming an independent force of worldly evil. Of 
course, the interpreters introduce satan to emphasize his spectacular 
failure: despite all efforts to spoil the fulfillment of God's command, 
Abraham remains unmoved. 28 
Quotation is the primary rhetorical device of Sanhedrin's revision. 
In the new context, words from Job and Psalms become satan's ac-
cusations and temptations. Satan undermines Abraham by revealing 
hidden meanings, as in the question, "Is not your fear of God your 
foolishness?" In Job 4:6, this question signifies, "Is not your fear of 
God your strength?" Satan uncovers and exploits a further meaning 
of the Hebrew kislatecha. 
The satan of Tanchuma, a fuller expansion of the akedah, frees him-
self from his subservient origins in the divine assembly. This account 
does not mention the initial accusation against Abraham; instead, it 
represents satan's independent work as deceiver and tempter. Tan-
chuma follows the pattern of Sanhedrin, but without the scriptural 
allusions: 
Satan anticipated him on the way and appeared to him [Abraham] in 
the form of an old man. 
He said to him, Where are you going? 
He said to him, To pray. 
28ln Genesis Rabbah 56:4, however, sa mae/ (another name for satan) succeeds in partly 
unsettling Isaac. Here the demonic agency oversteps the purported goal, to test Abra-
ham's piety. 
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He said to him, And someone who is going to pray, why does he 
[carry] fire and a knife in his hand and wood on his shoulder? 
He said to him, In case we stay a day or two and we slaughter, cook, 
and eat. [Tanch., Vayirah 22] 
Whereas Sanhedrin leaves satan's form mysterious, Tanchuma spec-
ifies that sa tan appears "in the form of an old man." To Abraham, 
then, the tempter seems to be merely another human being. 
Tanchuma's sa tan plays a devious trick of disparate voices, in order 
to suggest that the trial has been commanded, and not merely pro-
voked, by the tempter: "He [satan] said to him [Abraham]: Old Man, 
wasn't I there when the Holy One, blessed be He, said to you, 'Take 
your son'? And an old man like you will go and lose a son that was 
given to him at the age of a hundred! Haven't you heard the parable 
of one who lost what he had in his hand, and begged from others? 
And if you answer, I will have another son, then listen to the tempter 
[masteen], destroy a soul, and you will be guilty" (ibid.). Abraham is 
aware of the deception and responds: "Not the tempter, but rather 
the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself, said to me, 'Take now your 
son.' " But while Abraham thus affirms the authenticity of God's 
command, his encounter with the tempter (masteen) suggests dualistic 
tendencies. 29 
The sequence of satanic interventions outlines a development to-
ward increasingly dualistic speculation. Not only do the later inter-
preters give special importance to satan's efforts; they also hint that 
satan may not be entirely subordinate to God. At the same time that 
stories about demons flourished, suspicions also increased. When 
God's angel calls from heaven to annul the command, Tanchuma 
represents Abraham in the position of demanding a dialogue with 
God . The mediated call now appears insufficient: 
An angel of YHWH called to him from the heavens, saying: 
Abraham, Abraham! 
Why twice? Because he was hurrying and was going to kill him. 
And he said to him: 
29In a moment of supreme deception, the sa tan of Vayosha also ascribes the trial, not 
to God, but to the tempter: "Unfortunate one! Wasn't I there when the tempter [mas teen ] 
said to you, 'Take your son, your only one, whom you love, and offer him up to me 
as a burnt offering'? And an old man like you will lose such a sweet son, a youth 
whom the Holy One, blessed be He, gave you at one hundred years of age?" At the 
same time that he conceals his identity, satan maintains that he commanded the sacrifice. 
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Do not stretch forth your hand to the lad. 
He said to him, Who are you? 
He said to him, An angel. 
He said to him, When He said to me, "Take now your son," the 
Holy One, blessed be He, Himself, spoke to me. And now, if He wishes, 
let Him speak to me. [Tanch. , Vayirah 23] 
At this late stage of Midrashic development, the distinction between 
God and His angel has been established; Abraham no longer recog-
nizes God's will in an angel's call. The terrible fear is, of course, that 
Abraham may confuse the voice of God with the voice of satan . This 
latter-day Abraham was perhaps the first to express dissatisfaction 
with God's angel and to demand an audience with God Himself. 
The mystery and "background" of Genesis 22 reflect the theology 
of the Hebrew Bible. "After these things, God tested Abraham": de-
spite all efforts of later interpreters, the reason for the test eludes our 
understanding. The true YHWH cannot be known, and no divine 
motives can be established as the reason for Abraham's last trial. Later 
aggadic versions of Genesis 22 remove aspects of its mystery, when 
"after these things" comes to mean "after the words of satan," who 
accuses Abraham before God, and the three days' journey include 
satan's temptations. 
The successive expansions of the akedah thus manifest increasing 
modifications of the initial, radically monotheistic account. The in-
effable God becomes more accessible when represented in form sim-
ilar to a Persian king who sits enthroned before his court. Instead of 
attributing the test to a negative aspect of God, of course, postbiblical 
retellings introduce satan to take the blame. At first Mastema must 
present his accusations before God and must receive approval in order 
for the trial to begin; later, satan appears to achieve virtual indepen-
dence and is capable of entering into subversive dialogue with Abra-
ham and Isaac. To some extent, the expanded akedah reflects the 
demonology that had developed during the time of its successive 
revisions. Postbiblical versions of the akedah justify their existence 
through their vivid representation of scenes, but they also drift away 
from the strictest monotheism of YHWH. 
The propensity to believe in "two powers in heaven" has always 
been perceived as a threat to rabbinic Judaism. Thus Philo's double 
logos and the legends of angels and satan have never been comfortably 
accepted by the rationalistic strands of Jewish religious thought. Yet 
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the ascetic practices of the Essenes and Therapeutai found expression 
in Christianity, and the logos endiathetos, a figure of inward-turned 
language and prototype of confession, is the distant forerunner of 
modern mono-logos. Skeptical of proffered speech and inclined to sol-
itary study of Scripture, the ascetic Jewish sects developed belief in 
the God within, a logos partaking of the divine. 
The representation of angels as God's messengers, to the extent 
that it gives concrete forms to aspects of God, is unacceptable from 
the standpoint of the most literal interpretation of Jewish law. An 
ascetic component of Judaism consequently turns theological lan-
guage "inward" toward logos endiathetos . The radical expression of 
Philo's linguistic asceticism is his neo-Platonic polemic against the 
sophists; the conflict with dualistic tendencies centers around the 
anthropomorphic views of satan and angels. Like Socrates' daimonion, 
satan is a figure of turning, deviation. The daimonion turns Socrates 
away from false steps; the satan turns men away from God by causing 
them to deviate from the strictest monotheism. But the real error is 
to read satan literally, as a metaphysically existing evil angel, rather 
than as a figure for the worldly evil that confronts men. Avodah zarah, 
idol worship, thus appears as a problem of mistakenly literal inter-
pretation. Postbiblical commentaries containing the word satan are 
not intrinsically suspect; rather, overliteral interpretations of this satan 
(and of God's manifestations) lead men astray. 
Despite ascetic leanings, then, Philo and many Hebrew sources 
show a double interest in stories of angels and satan. The logos of 
Judaism is at war within itself, retaining its secrets while concealing 
its concealment by pretending to proffer what it cannot give. 30 
""The decision of modernity has been to read angeloi and satan in an allegory that 
empties these words of spiritual content. Eighteenth-century English aesthetics illus-
trates the displacement of spiritual daim6n and radical monotheism by psychological 
genius and radical monologue. 
3 The Eighteenth-Century 
Introjection of Genius 
"Genius" has a spectacular history, and eighteenth-century Eng-
land is the scene of its most dramatic metamorphoses. In the writings 
of Anthony Shaftesbury, and until mid-century, "genius" runs roughly 
parallel to the German Geist, and retains traces of its Latin heritage; 
all individuals have a genius (spirit or mind) of some sort. Afterward, 
despite occasional efforts to recover classical meanings, a new range 
of signification takes control. While Joseph Addison anticipates this 
result as early as 1711, the eighteenth century fully appropriates Ad-
dison's use of the word only after Edward Young's conjectures of 
1759. Beginning in the 1750s, a craze of theoretical writings urges that 
the inspired need not have a genius; instead an inspired author has 
genius or is a genius. 
English usage has never shaken off this powerful introjection. The 
gods have fled, or we have buried them within ourselves by means 
of a verbal turn. The eighteenth century is both the meeting ground 
of genius and monologue and the scene of a decisive battle between 
the languages of theology and psychology. When Young writes of 
genius as "that god within," theological genius symbolically cedes to 
subjective monologue. 
In retracing certain pathways in the eighteenth-century discussions 
of genius, this chapter is suggestive rather than comprehensive, and 
the present context excludes all analysis of the related theories of wit 
and imagination. Lord Shaftesbury and Joseph Addison sketch the 
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early model for modern genius. Henry Fielding, Alexander Gerard, 
Edward Young, and William Duff propose improvements, often in 
the form of elaborate scenarios. Immanuel Kant, by importing their 
invention, reveals limitations in the English product. Viewed collec-
tively, these authors' expressions of "genius" exemplify ways in which 
verbal transformations predetermine intellectual history. 
Characteristics and Authors of Genius 
The modern turn to subjectivity and monologue is signaled by 
Shaftesbury' s identification of Greek daimon and Latin genius with 
soliloquy: the influence of an externalized guardian spirit becomes 
indistinguishable from effects of individual intelligence. In Shaftes-
bury's usage, "genius" is a vague term like the German Geist and 
roughly equivalent to "spirit," "mind," or "intellect." If individuals 
have genius to varying degrees, Shaftesbury's "Miscellaneous Re-
flections" can refer without redundancy to "the free Spirits and for-
ward Genius's of Mankind."1 As a spirit may be free, so a genius 
may be forward. Comfortable with applying the word "genius" to 
individuals, Shaftesbury writes of what modernity calls geniuses as 
"the better Genius's" (Char. III, 273). Shaftesbury also refers to "divine 
Men of a transcending Genius" (Char. III, 136). Because "genius" no 
longer names a transcendent being or power, certain men may be 
said to possess "a transcending Genius"; another may be only a "pop-
ular Genius" (Char. III, 4). As an individual has a personality, so 
individuals are characterized by a certain kind of genius. 
"Genius" does not refer only to the mind of men in general; it also 
denotes a special capacity. Shaftesbury anticipates Addison's discus-
sion when he writes of authors "who have a Genius for Writing" (Char. 
III, 272). Like Addison after him, he censures authors who "wou'd 
be all Genius" (Char. III, 258). Every man and woman has a genius of 
some kind, and only rare authors have genius of the forward variety; 
yet "genius" can also signify a particular quality of writing that should 
not be exaggerated. 
In his "Soliloquy; or, Advice to an Author" (1710), Shaftesbury 
'Anthony Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men , Manners, Opinions, Times (London, 
1711), vol. 3, p. 2 (henceforth cited as Char.). I have italicized words originally printed 
all in capital letters. 
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further revises the notion of genius. When Shaftesbury explicitly as-
sociates soliloquy with the notions of "Daemon, Genius, Angel or 
Guardian-Spirit," the transcendent genius vanishes and is replaced 
by monologue as a kind of internal dialogue. If such "beings" did in 
fact accompany us, their existence would support his argument, "for 
it wou' d be infallibly prov' d a kind of Sacrilege or Impiety to slight 
the Company of so Divine a Guest, and in a manner banish him our 
Breast, by refusing to enter with him into those secret Conferences 
by which alone he cou' d be enabled to become our Adviser and Guide" 
(Char. I, 168-69). But Shaftesbury disputes the belief that these spirits 
were ever independent of men and prefers to read them figuratively. 
The ancient authors meant that, through soliloquy, "we could dis-
cover a certain Duplicity of Soul, and divide our-selves into two Partys" 
(Char. I, 169). A genius is no supernatural agency but rather our "self-
dissecting" partner in "this Home-Dialect of Soliloquy" (Char. I, 170). 
On September 2, 1711, a long and productive Sunday, "genius" 
was transformed . The printers rested from their labors on The Spec-
tator, and readers were at leisure to contemplate the mysterious fiction 
of the day before. In Saturday's issue, number 159, Addison had 
pretended to translate the "first Vision" of an obscure "Oriental Man-
uscript" entitled The Visions of Mirzah .2 The narrator of this extended 
allegory approaches "the Haunt of a Genius": "I drew near with that 
Reverence which is due to a superior Nature; and as my Heart was 
entirely subdued by the captivating Strains I had heard, I fell down 
at his Feet and wept. The Genius smiled upon me with a Look of 
Compassion and Affability that familiarized him to my Imagination, 
and at once dispelled all the Fears and Apprehensions with which I 
approached him" (Spec. 323). This is both a fictional tale of encounter 
with a divine being and Addison's account of his own approach to 
the classical term genius. The narrator first approaches fearfully, but 
his reverence is soon replaced by familiarity. (In the following paper, 
Addison shows how familiar genius has become to his imagination.) 
Addison's narrator has apparently read Shaftesbury's "Soliloquy," 
and thus his guide "lifted me from the Ground, and taking me by 
the Hand, Mirzah, said he, I have heard thee in thy Soliloquies, follow 
2The Spectator (henceforth Spec.), nos. 159-60, is quoted from Selected Essays from "The 
Tatler," "The Spectator," and "The Guardian ," ed. Daniel McDonald (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1973). There are interesting echoes of Addison in Alexander Pope's "Preface 
to the Iliad." 
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me" (ibid.). As the allegory proceeds, the Genius shows a vision of 
human life as a bridge and reveals islands of eternity reserved for 
men after death. "Despite the immense popularity of this Mirzah 
paper," a modern editor notes, "no others were published" (Spec . 
326n): the allegorical bridge stretches, not only from mundane life to 
eternity, but also from the classical to the modern genius. A Genius 
fades from view at the close of number 159, and when the following 
number appears on Monday, "genius" makes its debut under a new 
guise . 
Addison's decisive statement on genius, in The Spectator, number 
160, opens with an epigraph from Horace: 
-Cui mens divinior, atque os 
Magna sonaturum, des nominis hujus honorem. 
(Satires I. iv. 43-44] 
-Honor him with this name [of poet], 
Who has a divine mind and a great voice. 
This citation from the Satires is aptly ambiguous, for the mens divinior 
signals both divine intervention and introjected divinity. But the ab-
sence of the opening words of the excerpted lines is especially sugges-
tive. The passage from Horace reads: Ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior, 
atque os I Magna sonaturum, des nominis hujus honorem, which may be 
translated: "To whom there is genius [ingenium], who has a divine 
mind and a great voice, I Honor him with this name [of poet]." Ad-
dison omits the crucial word ingenium from the passage he cites. He 
will discuss a form of genius that derives from nature and chooses 
not to acknowledge that Horace employs the difficult word ingenium, 
rather than the familiar genius. Addison's innovation depends on his 
simultaneous usurpation of both ranges of meaning and denial of 
their difference. Addison makes English "genius" signify as does the 
Latin ingenium, at the same time displacing the spiritual notion of a 
guardian genius. 3 He conceals the Latin origins of "genius" and shifts 
the emphasis to mental capacity without acknowledging its separate 
origins in ingenium. The guardian spirit steals away in silence. 
'To this day the German language preserves the difference between Genius (from 
the Latin genius) and Genie (from seventeenth-century French genie, which bears traces 
of both the Latin genius and ingenium). After Addison's rather French usage, this 
distinction has remained unclear in English. Compare "Genie" in Diderot's Encyclopedie 
(1751) and "Genie" in the Grimm brothers' Worterbuch (1854). 
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In the opening words of his article in The Spectator, number 160, 
Addison soberly maligns the genius of his contemporaries: "There is 
no Character more frequently given to a Writer, than that of being a 
Genius . I have heard many a little Sonneteer called a fine Genius. 
There is not an Heroick Scribler in the Nation, that has not his Ad-
mirers who think him a great Genius; and as for your Smatterers in 
Tragedy, there is scarce a Man among them who is not cried up by 
one or other for a prodigious Genius" (Spec. 327). By fusing two notions 
of genius, Addison innovates (with a French accent) and at the same 
time gives his invention the appearance of age. Genius is indeed 
ascribed to all people, in the sense that every individual has a mind 
or mental capacity; by means of an implicit synecdoche, Addison 
pretends that "genius" must mean "great Genius." Addison exerts 
control over linguistic development by shifting the application of "ge-
nius" while retaining the fact of its frequent, former usage. Shaftes-
bury repeatedly refers to diverse types of "genius"; Addison moves 
toward the modern sense of "genius" as an extraordinary mind . Yet 
Addison also writes of "great Genius's," which is not redundant if 
"genius" retains the older sense of mental faculty in general. In his 
discussion of "great natural Genius's," then, Addison both retains 
an established sense and innovates, along the lines of contemporary 
French genie. 
Solomon, Homer, Pindar, and Shakespeare are Addison's examples 
of "great natural Genius's, that were never disciplined and broken 
by Rules of Art" (Spec. 328). A second class consists of "those that 
have formed themselves by Rules and submitted the Greatness of 
their natural Talents to the Corrections and Restraints of Art" (Spec . 
329-30). Addison discerns a "great Danger in these latter kind of 
Genius's," for they may "cramp their own Abilities too much by 
Imitation, and form themselves altogether upon Models, without giv-
ing full Play to their own natural Parts" (Spec. 330). According to 
Addison, genius is a natural gift; the forces of genius have precedence 
over the forces of art, so that a genius is endangered by following 
rules and models. Despite an explicit denial, in other words, Addison 
prefers geniuses of the first, natural class: "An imitation of the best 
Authors, is not to compare with a good Original; and I believe we 
may observe that very few Writers make an extraordinary Figure in 
the World, who have not something in their Way of thinking or 
expressing themselves that is peculiar to them and entirely their own" 
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(ibid.). Addison's Spectator essay unveils a fully formed mythology of 
an "extraordinary Figure," the "original Genius." At the same time 
that he expresses hostility toward convention, Addison favors pe-
culiarity in a manner that is decisive for later expositions. 
Fielding revives Addison's "genius" and may have provoked 
Young's formulations. The narrator of Tom Jones mentions characters 
of "great Genius," of a "great Genius," and of "the greatest Genius."4 
If it is still possible to refer to a person's "vast Strength of Genius" 
(TJ 159) without redundancy, then "genius" does not yet carry its 
modem signification. To speak of a "great Genius" is like speaking 
of a great mind or, in German, like speaking of a grossen Geist. 
Whereas Addison's narrator tacitly takes leave of the archaic and 
exotic Genius in Visions of Mirzah, Fielding explicitly renounces all 
spiritual guidance. He notes, "The Arabians and Persians had an equal 
Advantage in writing their Tales from the Genii and Fairies, which 
they believe in as an Article of their Faith," yet adds: "We have none 
of these Helps. To natural Means alone are we confined" (TJ 676). 
Nevertheless, Fielding is not beyond referring to genius in mock epic 
invocation. In his skeptical age, Fielding asks for the assistance of 
"Genius; thou Gift of Heaven; without whose Aid, in vain we struggle 
against the Stream of Nature" (TJ 525). Here genius is a gift and not 
a "Geist" of heaven, for heaven gives a mental capacity, not a mythical 
attendant. Thus genius requires an education: "And thou, 0 Learn-
ing, (for without thy Assistance nothing pure, nothing correct, can 
Genius produce) do thou guide my Pen" (TJ 526). Although this 
passage is fraught with irony, Fielding apparently does believe that 
genius is a "Gift of Nature." His empirical definition of genius is a 
forerunner of Gerard's theories: "By Genius I would understand that 
Power, or rather those Powers of the Mind, which are capable of 
penetrating into all Things within our Reach and Knowledge, and of 
distinguishing their essential Differences. These are no other than 
Invention and Judgment; and they are both called by the collective 
Name of Genius, as they are of those Gifts of Nature which we bring 
with us into the World" (TJ 372).5 Fielding disputes the notion that 
4Henry Fielding, Tom Jones, ed . Sheridan Baker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 
86, 160, 249 (henceforth cited as Tf) . 
' Compare John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London, 17o6/ 
1690), bk. 2, chap . 11, on " the difference of wit and judgment." See also Addison' s 
article in Spec., no. 62. 
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invention is "a creative Faculty," instead arguing that it involves "a 
quick and sagacious Penetration into the true Essence of all the Objects 
of our Contemplation." Consistently opposed to mystification, Field-
ing anticipates the cautious theoreticians of the following decades 
when he adds that invention "can rarely exist without the Concom-
itancy of Judgment" (TJ 372-73). Hence Fielding follows Addison, 
although he does not support the trope that equates "genius" with 
"a great Genius." At the same time, Fielding disputes the less ra-
tionalistic hints contained in The Spectator, number 62. The discussion 
of genius in terms of invention and judgment recurs in the writings 
of Gerard and thus indirectly influences the entire tradition after Kant . 
Following Addison's prodigious leap from September 1 to Septem-
ber 3, 1711, almost fifty years pass before expressions of the new 
genius advance further . By synecdoche, Addison writes "genius" and 
signifies "a great Genius ." When this trope comes into its own, it 
captures the theoretical imagination of the 1760s. 
Alexander Gerard's Essay on Taste appears in the same year as Ed-
ward Young's "Conjectures on Original Composition," and although 
they represent opposing traditions, both rely on elaborate images to 
represent the workings of genius. Gerard is especially indebted to the 
associationism of Locke, whereas Young's reputation is founded on 
his poem entitled "Night Thoughts." 
Gerard concurs with Fielding when he asserts that " the first and 
leading quality of genius is invention," but he conceives this as "a 
readiness of associating the remotest ideas that are any way related ." 6 
Like a magnet, invention first collects materials and then "by its mag-
ical force ranges them into different species. " Genius distinguishes 
itself by its design of "a regular and well-proportioned whole" (ET 
164)· 
6Aiexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste (1759), 3d ed . (London: T. Cadell , 1780), 163 
(henceforth cited as ET). In his Dissertation on Genius (London, 1755), William Sharpe 
tersely expresses Gerard's associationist assumptions. If a tabula rasa theory of the 
mind is assumed, what explains the difference between one person's mind and an-
other's? Considering a hypothetical pair of brothers, Sharpe asks: " why is Richard's 
Genius brighter than Bill's? You answer, because the tabula rasa of Richard's Genius is 
more susceptible of ideas than that of Bill's is: allowed indeed that his Genius is, but 
this superiority of it is not found ed upon any innate difference between the tabula rasa 
of his and that of his brother's understanding; rather upon the diffe rent means and 
opportunities he has had of arriving at ideas between this period of his age, and the 
minute of his birth" (p. 11). Furthermore, Sharpe explicitly rejects all inspiration the-
ories of genius; no "divine energy" impinges on the mind (pp. 16-17). 
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Gerard's characterization emphasizes classical order and makes ge-
nius into "the grand architect which not only chuses the materials, 
but disposes them into a regular structure" (ibid.) . For the perfection 
of its structure, however, genius requires the assistance of taste. The 
greatest tragic poets combined genius and taste: "The vigour of their 
imaginations led them into unexplored tracks; and they had such 
light and discernment, as, without danger of error, directed their 
course in this untrodden wilderness" (ET 168). Landscape imagery 
reappears throughout the tradition, for genius is typically in danger 
of straying into forests of wild figuration and of eluding the rigorous 
systematization Gerard seeks. 
Meanwhile, some "forward Genius's" attempt to impose order. 
Samuel Johnson's Dictionary (1755) provides the clearest summary of 
previous applications of the word "genius." Johnson lists five senses: 
1. The protecting or ruling power of men, places, or things 
2 . A man endowed with superior faculties 
3· Mental power or faculties 
4· Disposition of nature by which any one is qualified for some peculiar 
employment 
5· Nature; disposition . 
The first sense corresponds roughly to the archaic usage (still present 
in Shakespeare's Macbeth III.i) . The second sense derives from Ad-
dison's article of 1711. Senses 3, 4, and 5 chronologically precede 
Addison's usage and are the basis on which he can write of geniuses 
of diverse types. Johnson's Dictionary entry expresses the eighteenth-
century tensions between theological and psychological interpreta-
tions; the writings of Young and Duff exemplify two distinct paths 
of speculation within the new humanistic traditions . 
Landscapes of Genius 
Edward Young's "Conjectures on Original Composition" (1759) and 
William Duff's Essay on Original Genius (1767) both emphasize the 
originality or peculiarity of genius. At the same time, they blur the 
origins of originality, for how can original genius originate in men? 
If Addison demonstrates that a genius is a man of great "natural 
Parts," does it follow that original genius is really original nature? 
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Although Young explicitly discusses Addison, his essay conceals the 
link between their "original" conceptions. 
The "Conjectures on Original Composition" are framed by an e-
pistolary convention. Subtitled "a letter to the Author of Sir Charles 
Grandison," referring to the novel published by Samuel Richardson 
in 1753-54, Young's essay is initially concerned with age, and the 
tone is apologetic. 7 Young's immediate concern is to justify the pro-
duction of his text. Because he values original composition, Young 
fears that a writer who is old may have no justification for his activity 
of writing. An elderly author, Young implicitly writes his essay to 
explain how, by virtue of genius, his mind may "enjoy a perpetual 
Spring." 
The predominant imagery of the "Conjectures" is that of landscape. 
After describing his letter as "miscellaneous" and "somewhat licen-
tious in its conduct," he notes that he has "endeavoured to make 
some amends, by digressing into subjects more important." Digression 
takes on special significance, both in the progress of the essay and 
in the content of Young's aesthetic theory. Young compares the move-
ment of his essay to an extended scenario: "A serious thought stand-
ing single among many of a lighter nature, will sometimes strike the 
careless wanderer after amusement only, with useful awe: as mon-
umental marbles scattered in a wide pleasure-garden (and such there 
are) will call to recollection those who would never have sought in a 
church-yard walk of mournful yews" (Conj. 67). The reader of Young's 
letter is, then, like a "careless wanderer after amusement only" who 
will be affected by "useful awe" in confrontation with scattered, se-
rious thoughts. Landscapes are central to the figuration of the essay, 
and at this point the entire essay is figured as "a wide pleasure-
garden" in which "monumental marbles" are scattered . Genius and 
originality, like monuments in a garden, are the more serious thoughts 
to which Young wanders. Young continues his landscape imagery 
when he describes the "Conjectures" as a kind of voyage leading to 
a "hidden lustre." This natural scene provides the ground for Young's 
essay; Addison is the luminary he uncovers, but in fact the true goal 
of the "Conjectures" is Young's own revision of Addison's "genius." 
In terms of genius and originality, the remainder of the essay con-
7"Conjectures on Original Composition" (henceforth cited as " Conj. " ), in The Works 
of Edward Young (Edinburgh: C. Elliot, 1774), 67. 
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siders the difference between compositions that shine brightly and 
those that are extinguished. 
Young further develops his version of genius by means of a series 
of natural images . He connects problems of linguistic originality and 
genius with processes of natural aging, for example, when he states 
that "it is with thoughts as it is with words, and with both as with 
men; they may grow old, and die" (Conj. 72) . In contrast to this 
process of decay, Young writes that "the mind of a man of genius is 
a fertile and pleasant field; pleasant as Elysium, and fertile as Tempe; 
it enjoys a perpetual spring" (Conj . 70). References to Elysium and 
Tempe gesture in the direction of an explicit paradise myth of genius, 
associated with a supernatural nature. Defying the processes of de-
terioration that would make him imaginatively old, Young finds a 
way to defeat time by positing that genius is endowed with "a per-
petual spring." Two kinds of growth, originals and imitations, arise 
from that spring; if not all fruits of genius are originals, an aging man 
of genius may have reason to doubt the merits of his writing. This 
complication leads to a more aggressive turn in the figuration. 
With a hint at the world of exploration, Young shifts from the figure 
of natural growth to that of territorial conquest: originals "are great 
benefactors: they extend the republic of letters, and add a new prov-
ince to its dominion" (ibid.) . Behind this presentation stands a pow-
erful myth that writing can (dis)cover new ground. On the other hand, 
an imitator is ultimately weak because he always "builds on another's 
foundation" (Conj . 71) . When genius appears as conqueror, the artist 
begins to stand at a distance from the art he masters. Young leaves 
ambiguous whether the original author is nature or only has special 
powers like those of nature. Insisting on natural imagery, Young 
conceives genius as a spontaneous growth: "an original may be said 
to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root 
of genius; it grows, it is not made" (ibid.) . "Genius" names the mag-
ical place of creation ex nihilo, or rather, "out of a barren waste." 
This mystification does not long retain its full force. After all, even 
a "barren waste" may have to be wrested from previous settlers, and 
a "new province" is not so easily annexed. "Why are originals so 
few?" Young asks . According to the previous account, a dearth of 
originals should result from a lack of genius or of new terrain, but 
Young explains that in fact "illustrious examples engross, prejudice, 
and intimidate" (Conj. 73). Obstructive presences, not a scarcity of 
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genius, impede the creation of originals. Poetic originality demands 
both the natural power called "genius" and an avoidance of excessive 
exposure to previous examples. Overwhelmed by prior authors, we 
are inclined to "bury our strength." 
Before acknowledging that a more radical move is necessary, Young 
returns to a naturalistic solution in answer to the problem, "Must we 
then (you say) not imitate ancient authors?" He responds: "Imitate 
them, by all means, but imitate aright. He that imitates the divine 
Iliad, does not imitate Homer; but he who takes the same method 
which Homer took, for arriving at a capacity of accomplishing a work 
so great. Tread in his steps to the sole fountain of immortality; drink 
where he drank, at the true Helicon, that is, at the breast of nature" 
(Conj. 74-75). But it is not enough to insist that the original author 
must drink "at the breast of nature." Young supplements this natural 
myth by suggesting that an author must turn away from his prede-
cessors: "As far as a regard to nature and sound sense will permit a 
departure from your great predecessors; so far, ambitiously, depart 
from them: the farther from them in similitude, the nearer are you 
to them in excellence: you rise by it into an original" (Conj. 75). At 
this crossroad, the departure from predecessors, rather than spon-
taneous growth, appears to constitute originality: "All eminence, and 
distinction, lyes out of the beaten road; excursion and deviation are 
necessary to find it, and the more remote your path from the highway, 
the more reputable" (ibid.). Deviation replaces natural growth as the 
determining mark of the original. Images of travel or errancy undo 
the initial, natural myth and necessitate deviation rather than straight-
forward growth. 
After the publications of Young and others, William Duff's situation 
is far more difficult . Although he does not refer to contemporary 
writers, in an "Advertisement" to the Essay on Original Genius, Duff 
shows his awareness that the field is already crowded. Speaking of 
himself in the third person, Duff writes that "he is at the same time 
well aware, that in an Essay on Original Genius, Originality of Senti-
ment will naturally, and may, no doubt, justly be expected; and where 
this is altogether wanting, no other excellence can supply the defect. " 8 
Whereas Young displaces his fears to the problems associated with 
"William Duff, An Essay on Original Genius and Its Various Modes of Exertion in Philosophy 
and the Fine Arts, particularly in Poetry (London: Edward and Charles Dilly, 1767), x 
(henceforth cited as EOG). 
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old age, Duff directly confronts the necessity of justifying his text, 
recognizing that his Essay on Original Genius must itself proceed in 
the manner of original genius. Duff is "not a little apprehensive of 
the issue of a strict examination" (EOG x-xi) when readers employ 
originality as their criterion of merit. 9 
Duff's landscapes resemble Young's figures for imaginative activity I 
although he dispenses with the "perpetual spring." Instead of con-
ceiving original genius as a natural growth, Duff immediately iden-
tifies it as an errant traveler: "To explore unbeaten tracks, and make 
new discoveries in the regions of Science; to invent the designs, and 
perfect the productions of Art, is the province of Genius alone" (EOG 
5). Again, "it is the peculiar character of original Genius to strike out 
a path for itself whatever sphere it attempts to occupy" (EOG 90). In 
Duff's treatise, literary landscapes are the only sites of divergences 
and divagations by genius. Later, however, Duff admits that precur-
sors may represent serious obstacles: "A Poet of real Genius, who 
lives in a distant uncultivated age, possesses great and peculiar ad-
vantages for original composition." Like Young, Duff prefers new 
imaginative ground. The genius in an "uncultivated age" is free to 
uncover treasures without restraint, "the mines of Fancy not having 
been opened before his time" (EOG 265). 
Duff emphasizes that deviation characterizes original genius by not-
ing that imagination, left to itself, has a tendency to deviate: "Imag-
ination . . . perpetually attempting to soar, is apt to deviate into the 
mazes of error" (EOG 9). As if to excuse the aberrations of genius, 
Duff carefully transforms these deviations into positive effects: "The 
objects he has, or ought to have in view, are, to bring into open light 
those truths that are wrapped in the shades of obscurity, or involved 
in the mazes of error, and to apply them to the purpose of promoting 
the happiness of mankind" (EOG 92) . Duff's subsequent turn away 
from the errant conception of genius occurs by mediation of "mazes 
of error": those mazes by which the genius was endangered become 
those that genius illuminates for the benefit of all. 
9Duff's apology revolves around a distinction between what he calls " derived" and 
"original sentiments" (EOG xi). No sooner does Duff set up this opposition, however, 
than he calls it into question. Again the problem of justice arises, and Duff is perhaps 
too quick to allow certain claims of originality "where not the least imitation was 
intended. " Writing after Young, Duff attempts to separate himself from the class of 
blameworthy, intentional imitators, and he implies that "a casual coincidence" will 
sometimes occur, although he does not " intend" to imitate Young. 
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As Duff would have it, then, the brightness of original genius serves 
to illuminate obscure paths. Yet he cannot fail to acknowledge that 
genius is at times the source of confusions. Duff discusses imagery 
as a distinctive mark, an elevated style that corresponds to the flights 
characteristic of genius (EOG 143-45). Elevated above "ordinary modes 
of speech," a poet's language attains "a peculiar dignity." Images, 
however, do not always shed light, or rather may blind by shedding 
too much light at once: "An original Author indeed will frequently 
be apt to exceed in the use of this ornament, by pouring forth such 
a blaze of imagery, as to dazzle and overpower the mental sight; the 
effect of which is, that his Writings become obscure, if not unintel-
ligible to common Readers; just as the eye is for some time rendered 
incapable of distinguishing the objects that are presented to it, after 
having stedfastly [sic] contemplated the sun" (EOG 145-46). As ex-
cessive light produces darkness, an excess of metaphor obscures. If 
writings of an original genius are too extreme in their figuration, they 
overpower readers' abilities and cause pseudoblindness. Duff prefers 
to dose his eyes to the danger that must consequently attach to cre-
ations of original genius. 
Both Young and Duff acknowledge that original genius is known, 
not simply for what it is, but for what it is not; the lights of genius 
shine in contrast to other lights, and flights of genius astound in 
contrast to the motions of those who crawl. When Young considers 
the subject of words old and new, he returns to the theme that opens 
the "Conjectures": "It is with thoughts as it is with words, and with 
both as with men; they may grow old, and die. Words tarnished, by 
passing through the mouths of the vulgar, are laid aside as inelegant 
and obsolete; so thoughts, when become too common, should lose 
their currency; and we should send new metal to the mint; that is, 
new meaning to the press" (Conj. 72). Genius must take care to select 
proper currency, for the original genius is known by its "new metal. " 
Young does not wish to lose the ground of original composition by 
undermining its supposed origins in genius, yet the subsequent pas-
sage suggests a need for new schemes: "So few are originals, that, if 
all other books were to be burnt, the lettered world would resemble 
some metropolis in flames, where a few incombustible buildings, a 
fortress, temple, or tower, lift their heads, in melancholy grandeur, 
amid the mighty ruin" (Conj . 73). The ambitious author might per-
haps wish for such a conflagration; the blaze of genius returns as a 
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burning of previous authors' works. Is the success of an original 
genius akin to the "melancholy grandeur" of ruins amid a charred 
city? What is the temple Young imagines still standing after the de-
struction of a city? 
Genius, Introjected Divinity 
Young and Duff elaborate myths of genius because, without this 
figure, originality could threaten to subvert all grounds. To justify 
and explain innovations, genius must supply the ground and the new 
harvest of literary creation: as Young writes, "an original may be said 
to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root 
of genius; it grows, it is not made" (Conj. 71) . Similarly, Duff con-
ceives original genius as a power that frees an author from the need 
to imitate: 
A Poet endued with a truly original Genius, will however be under no 
necessity of drawing any of the materials of his composition from the 
Works of preceding Bards; since he has an unfailing resource in the 
exuberance of his own Imagination, which will furnish him with a 
redundance of all those materials, and particularly with an inexhaustible 
variety of new and splendid imagery, which must be regarded as one 
distinguishing mark of original poetic Genius. [EOG 148] 
"New and splendid imagery" is supposed to derive from genius, 
especially in happier, freer moments when there is no necessity to 
deviate. Duff strives to make original genius the ultimate ground, 
whereas Young draws from the Roman tradition to intimate divine 
origins of genius. Young and Duff rely on much of the same natu-
ralistic figuration; their difference arises from Duff's suppression of 
the theological dimension. 
Young interprets the origins of originality through a myth of divine 
inspiration. But this genius is not analogous to the daimonion of Soc-
rates nor to any of the guardian spirits suggested by tradition. Instead, 
Young radically introjects the divine spark: "With regard to the moral 
world, conscience; with regard to the intellectual, genius, is that god 
within" (Conj. 78). Young's "genius" does not descend to man but 
rises with him; he advises the aspiring author: "let thy 
genius rise (if a genius thou hast) as the sun from chaos; and if I 
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should then say, like an Indian, Worship it, (though too bold), yet 
should I say little more than my second rule enjoins, (viz.) Reverence 
thyself" (Conj. 87). Young thus proposes a secularized religion of self-
realization. Unfortunately, our genius does not necessarily present 
itself directly: "Genius, in this view, is like a dear friend in our com-
pany under disguise; who, while we are lamenting his absence, drops 
his mask, striking us, at once, with equal surprise and joy" (Conj. 
86) . Originals are the products of divinity in man, but divine epiphany 
occurs in a peculiar scene of self-demasking. To recognize our own 
genius, we must wait for the moment when the disguise is dropped. 10 
Our disguise presumably consists of "figures" borrowed from pre-
vious authors, and which we in rare moments escape-unless the 
"dear friend" whose absence we lament turns out to be, not our own 
genius, but a feared precursor. The Christian exorcism of "daemons" 
(Conj. 96-97) is a figure for the pseudoreligious turn Young proffers, 
the passage from multiple precursors to an original persona. 
The theological framework of Young's "Conjectures" becomes most 
explicit at its close. Raising the subject of Addison's genius, Young 
considers Addison's final words that "taught us how to die." If "the 
mind of a man of genius" is like "a perpetual spring" that assures 
eternal life, these dying words that "spoke human nature not unre-
lated to the divine" (Conj. 109) perform a similar function. 
Young's final three paragraphs return to the image drawn by the 
initial two. He prefaces his remarks by writing of a wish to reveal the 
"hidden lustre" concealed in some monument. Now he refers again 
to "the sacred deposit, which by Providence was lodged in my hands." 
At the same time that he reflects the Roman tradition of a genius that 
passes on a torch to man, Young passes on his revised conception of 
genius. Addison, a Christian man of genius, turns out to be the 
"sepulchral lamp" mentioned earlier; Young has led us to "the long 
hidden lustre of our accomplished countryman, who now rises, as 
from his tomb, to receive the regard so greatly due to the dignity of 
his death; a death to be distinguished by tears of joy; a death which 
angels beheld with delight" (Conj. 109). Why is Young so concerned 
to praise Addison? In his praise, of course, he chooses to ignore 
Addison as a forerunner in the theory of genius. While Young asserts 
10Compare Shaftesbury' s "Soliloquy": "Thus Dialogue is at an End. The Antients 
cou'd see Their own Faces; but we can't" (Char. I, 205) . 
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his wish to restore Addison's reputation, he simultaneously proclaims 
his own mission, to eulogize Addison, a "sacred deposit, which by 
Providence was lodged in my hands." To pronounce Addison's ge-
nius is for Young to become a divine messenger, to mediate between 
heavens and earth, to transform the light of the sun into sparks of 
thought and the blaze of imagery: to write with genius, as genius. 
One striking absence from Duff's account is the theological ground 
that Young retains for genius. Young's original composition appears 
to "rise from the vital root of genius," and genius, in turn, "is that 
god within" (Conj . 71, 78) . Duff curtails the theological dimension 
and implies, firmly within the empiricist tradition, that genius is an 
independent power of mind. Although Young's "genius" prevails in 
the poetic tradition of the nineteenth century, his rival Geran:J., whose 
associationist theory in some ways parallels Duff's, finds double-edged 
expression in modern aesthetics. 
Eighteenth-century aesthetics culminates in the writings of Im-
manuel Kant, whose Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) and the Anthropologie 
in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798) present central statements on genius 
(Genie) in the tradition begun by Shaftesbury. Both brief passages 
begin by conceiving genius in connection with a theory of talented 
artistic creation. Section 46 of the third Kritik and section 47 of the 
Anthropologie attempt unified expositions of genius following the as-
sociationism of Gerard, but hints of the theological conception de-
stabilize Kant's definitions . 
Kant explicitly links the German Genie with French genie rather than 
with Latin genius-because he discusses genius as an inborn capacity 
of the artist, that is, he traces the word to Latin ingenium and keeps 
the Latin genius at a distance. The genius of the artist is the product 
of nature, not of divine agency. In a parenthesis, however, Kant 
acknowledges the buried etymology of genius: "For presumably the 
word Genie is derived from genius, from the peculiar guiding, guardian 
spirit that is given to a person at his birth, and from whose inspiration 
these ideas were supposed to come forth ."11 The recognition of a 
double etymology allows Kant (like Addison) to emphasize the mean-
ing of "Genie" as a mental capacity (ingenium) while retaining the 
mythological overtones suggested by the notion of a guardian genius. 
11lmmanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Karl Vorlander (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 
1924), 182-83 in the original pagination. In English, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, trans . J. H . Bernard (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 151. 
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But Kant (again like Addison) does not acknowledge the difficulties 
associated with combining psychological and mythological concep-
tions. The discussion in the Anthropologie also becomes more complex 
when Kant seeks to explain the reason for using a " mystical" name, 
Genie, to mean "the exemplary originality of talent" : 
But the reason why the exemplary originality of talent is called by this 
mystical name, is that the one who has it cannot explain its outbursts 
to himself; nor can he make comprehensible to himself how he comes 
upon an art, which he could not have learned. For invisibility (of the 
cause of an effect) is a collateral idea of a spirit [Geist] (a genius [Genius ], 
which accompanied the talented already at his birth), whose inspiration, 
so to speak, it only follows . 12 
At the close of a century of dispute between theological and psycho-
logical explanations, Kant observes the final similarity between the 
notion of talent and the idea that a spirit accompanies a man from 
the time of his birth . The "exemplary originality of talent" that creates 
beautiful art cannot be explained, even by its possessor. 
According to Kant's later analysis, then, Genie derives from Latin 
genius, but this guiding spirit appears essentially in the capacity of 
Latin ingenium. Although Kant directly acknowledges the work of 
Alexander Gerard, his efforts to equate genius with ingenium ultimately 
ally him with Addison and Young. Yet the palimpsest of "genius" 
asserts itself when Kant finishes by recognizing its etymology: a slip-
page from Genie (ingenium) to genius occurs in both the Kritik der 
Urteilskraft and the Anthropologie. 
Whereas Greek daimon names a vague transcendent power, and 
Latin genius refers to a transcendent being, modern English "genius" 
characteristically signifies an immanent, self-sufficient mental activity. 
As the eighteenth century opens, Shaftesbury casts "genius" in the 
role of ."mind," or "human spirit." This genius is not transcendent, 
and thus Shaftesbury mentions unusual "divine Men of a transcending 
Genius." Soliloquy, in Shaftesbury's terminology, names the inde-
pendence of human genius; yet theorists of genius never agree con-
12Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1800/1798), in Kant' s Werke in sechs Biinden, 
voL 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1964), 545· The major passage on genius is section 
54 in the second edition and section 57 in Kanis gesammelte Schriften (1907). In English, 
see Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Victor Lyle 
Dowdell and ed. Hans H. Rudnick (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1978), 125. This translation is based on Oswald Kiilpe's edition of 1907. 
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cerning the origins of originality. "Transcending (original) genius," 
or mind that steps beyond established paths, uneasily seeks to usurp 
the place of transcendent guidance. Addison gives a radical turn to 
English "genius" by means of the synecdoche that equates it with 
" great Genius ." All genius comes to be great though nontranscen-
dent. In the wake of Locke's associationism, Fielding understands 
genius as a power of mind, a gift of nature that must be combined 
with learning. Gerard similarly writes of genius as a natural faculty 
of mind, closest to invention. 
When Young persists in ascribing divine origins to genius, he si-
multaneously creates an introjected divinity, "that god within." An 
unnamed friend is like the Christian emperors who "expelled dae-
mons, and dedicated their temples to the living God." The new "ge-
nius" suggests a religion of the self that purges itself of precursor-
demons. Yet the notion of originality displaces transcendent origins, 
for the pre-Romantic genius strives to become its own originator. In 
a complex natural scenario, however, self-origination appears as a 
necessary deviation from overtrodden paths. 
Despite their search for a sound basis of originality, then, eight-
eenth-century English authors represent originality as a swerve away 
from origins . The poet, who can no longer claim a transcendent muse, 
relies on natural talents that permit him to explore new paths. Genius 
turns inward, transformed from the status of an externalized divine 
guide into the role of a mundane wanderer in aesthetic realms. The 
new humanistic genius fails to replace spiritual guidance by soliloquy, 
however, for new forms of transcendence emerge. 
4 The Transcendence 
of Monologue 
"Transcendence" is an inheritance from Kant, who displaces tran-
scendent concepts, or the transcendent use of concepts, by writing 
of transcendental knowledge. Twentieth-century philosophers have, 
however, repeatedly modified the rhetoric of transcendence to suit 
their particular ends. Edmund Husserl "reduces" the transcendent 
and implicitly bases his phenomenology on an experiential, immanent 
monologue, while Martin Heidegger turns back toward a preexper-
iential, ontological transcendence . In consequence, phenomenology 
has wavered between epistemological and metaphysical projects . 
Husserl's phenomenological method primarily seeks to secure a field 
of absolute certainty by grounding its theses in the immanence of 
monadic consciousness, but Heidegger's ontology questions all as-
sumed philosophies of immanence, from Descartes to the neo-Kan-
tians, and points to the essential transcendence of Dasein . 
Jacques Derrida carries Heidegger's deconstructive project further 
and attempts to show that Husserl relies on an unexamined notion 
of monologue. La voix et le phenomene and De Ia grammatologie represent 
the crux of his project to deconstruct the monological "metaphysics 
of presence." From his analysis of Husserl to his readings of Rous-
seau, Derrida systematically shows that voice, monologue and au-
toaffection are infiltrated by writing and difference. Derrida questions 
the effort of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen to ground conscious-
ness in the supposedly pure presence of monologue or undifferen-
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tiated autoaffection. Analysis of Rousseau's Confessions further reveals 
the absence that haunts even the most intimate passion for immediacy. 
Heidegger' slater works implicitly restore the transcendent meaning 
of monologue. No longer the interiority of a subject, mono-logos be-
comes the ultimate reality of language. Heidegger's later philosophy 
grants special status to poetry, as an "authentic" response to the 
essence of language. In a sense, then, Heidegger strives to recover 
ancient origins by reclaiming a spiritual Logos as transcendent genius. 
Husser! and the Immanence of Consciousness 
The role of immanence in Husser!' s philosophic method may be 
understood in connection with Kant's distinction between the tran-
scendental and the transcendent. Explaining the character of tran-
scendental knowledge, Kant asserts, "Not every a priori cognition 
should be called transcendental, but rather only that through which 
we recognize that and how certain ideas (intuitions or concepts) are 
employed solely or are possible a priori" (A56/B8o). 1 Knowledge is 
"transcendental" when it concerns the possibility or modes of cog-
nition, our "manner of cognition [Erkenntnisart] of objects insofar as 
this should be possible a priori" (An/B25). The error of "transcendent 
use" involves a faulty application of concepts, which seeks to "step 
beyond [iiberschreiten]" the bounds of experience (A296/B352-53). In 
contrast to the transcendent use of concepts, then, immanent use 
"limits itself solely to possible experience" (A327/BJ83) . Immanent 
use of reason refers to nature only through possible experience; tran-
scendent use of reason involves a "connection [Verkniipfung] of the 
objects of experience, which transcends [iibersteigt] all experience" 
(A845/B873) . 
Kant expresses his scorn for the transcendent use of principles by 
means of an image. Both transcendental and transcendent principles 
"transcend" experience; but while the former are grounded a priori, 
the latter deceptively pretend to ground themselves only by denying 
'Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed . Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1956). I henceforth refer to the first (A) and second (B) editions. In English, 
see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: 
St. Martin's, 1965). The use of an idea, not the idea itself, is immanent or transcendent 
(A643/B671). Translations are my own. 
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that they step beyond the evidence of experience. Transcendent prin-
ciples are those "that encourage us to tear down all those boundary-
posts and claim for ourselves a completely new ground, which no-
where recognizes demarcation" (A296/B352) . The transcendent use of 
principles threatens rational boundaries and fraudulently annexes a 
new territory. 2 Enemy of adventure, Kant clings to his island of pure 
reason and warns against false hopes aroused by the illusion of new 
lands. 
In his lecture at a Kant Festival in 1924, Husserl directly acknowl-
edges his debt: during the development of phenomenology, Husserl 
has recognized "a manifest, essential relationship between this phe-
nomenology and the transcendental philosophy of Kant ." 3 He dis-
cusses "metaphysical transcendence" and finds a similarity between 
the Kantian "transcendental attitude" and the "natural attitude" spo-
ken of by phenomenology (ibid. , 248, 254). Husserl neglects to men-
tion his equal debt to Kant's conception of the transcendent, which 
phenomenological method will attempt to "bracket out."4 
In his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen 
Philosophie, Husser) uses the words "transcendent" and "immanent" 
2This anarchic rejection of property rights is especially distasteful to Kant, who 
describes his own work by means of the figure of colonization: "We have now not 
merely traveled through the territory of pure understanding, and carefully observed 
every part of it, but have also measured it across, and determined the place of every 
thing on it. But this territory is an island, and enclosed by nature itself in unchangeable 
boundaries. It is the territory of truth (an enticing name), surrounded by a wide and 
stormy ocean, the real place of illusion, where many a fog-bank and many a quickly 
melting iceberg give the appearance of new lands, which ceaselessly deceive the fa-
natical sea-traveler with empty hopes, and involve him in adventures, which he can 
neither desist from nor bring to an end" (A235-36/B294-95) . 
' Edmund Husserl, " Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie, " in Husserl-
iana: Erste Philosophie 1923/24, ed. Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 
230. 
40n occasions other than the Kant Festival, Husserl denies the fullest acknowledg-
ments by observing that Kant never took possession of the promised land of phenom-
enology, though he was the first to sight it . See Edmund Husserl, ldeen zu einer reinen 
Phiinomenologie und Phiinomenologische Philosophie, ed. Karl Schuhmann (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), sec. 62. In citing ldeen below I note the page numbers in the 
1950 edition, which the English edition retains: Edmund Husser!, Ideas Pertain ing to a 
Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 2 vols ., trans. F. Kersten (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). Compare Die Krisis der Europiiischen Wissenschaften und 
die Transzendentale Phiinomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), sec. 26-27. For 
a more detailed exposition of the relationship between Husserl' s phenomenology and 
Kant' s transcendental philosophy, see !so Kern's Husser/ und Kant (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1964); and Walter Hoeres' Kritik der transzendentalphilosophischen Erkenntnis-
theorie (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1969). 
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to describe different types of perceptions, or intentional acts .5 Rather 
than speak of "outer" and "inner" perception, Husser! cautiously 
notes two modes of directedness. Immanently directed acts "have as 
their essence, that their intentional objects, if they exist at all, belong 
to the same stream of experience as they themselves . That is therefore 
always the case, e.g., where an act is related to another act (a cogitatio 
to a cogitatio) of the same I" (Ideen 68). The intentional objects of an 
immanently directed act belong to the same experiential unity as the 
intentional act, for "consciousness and its object form an individual 
unity, produced purely through experiences [Erlebnisse]" (ibid.). Im-
manent acts constitute a unity of perceiver and perceived, as when 
a speaker asserts, "I speak." How far this realm of immanence extends 
is a difficult problem of Husserlian phenomenology. Thus the delimi-
tation of transcendent acts, as those which exceed immanence, is 
equally problematic: "intentional experiences for which that is not 
the case are transcendentally directed; as, e.g., for all acts directed to 
essences, or to intentional experiences of other I' s with other streams 
of experience; and equally for all acts directed to things" (Ideen 68). 
"Transcendence" and "immanence" characterize two kinds of inten-
tional acts or modes of "givenness" to consciousness (Ideen 77). 6 While 
Husser! does at times discuss the "transcendence of the thing," his 
distinction is essentially epistemological rather than ontological. 
Husserl's later discussion of transcendence and immanence em-
phasizes the certainty of the immanent and the doubtfulness of the 
transcendent perception. Immanence is the foundation of Husserl's 
phenomenology, because "every immanent perception necessarily 
guarantees the existence of its object" (Ideen 85). Husserl's discussion 
of immanent perception leads, however, to the transcendental ego. 
5Here words associated with "intentionality" are used in the technical sense, referring 
to the directedness by which consciousness constitutes, or " intends," an object. 
6] .-P. Sartre's "Une idee fondamentale de Ia phenomenologie de Husserl: L'inten-
tionalite," in Situations 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 29-30, misconstrues Husserl's dis-
cussion of transcendence and immanence in the Ideen . Thus, according to Sartre, the 
idea of intentionality should put an end to philosophies of immanence. In Sartre's 
version, a philosophy of immanence conceives knowledge in terms of "contents of 
consciousness," whereas Husserl views knowing as a going out toward (s'eclater vers) 
its object. Sartre misrepresents Husserl by suggesting that the idea of intentionality 
implies a "philosophy of transcendence" at odds with all " philosophy of immanence." 
Intentionality is indeed central to Sartre's philosophy of transcendence, but Husserl 
deals with both immanence and transcendence in an epistemological context that is 
virtually unrelated to Sartre's usage. 
88 PHILOSOPHY OF GENIUS 
The unique evidence of the cogito means that "only for the I and for 
the stream of experience in relation to itself does this distinguished 
state of affairs exist, only here is there something like immanent 
perception" (Ideen 85-86) . Husser! describes this pure "I" as "a pe-
culiar, nonconstituted transcendence, a transcendence in imman-
ence" (Ideen 110). According to Husser! , all other forms of 
transcendence must, as unreliable constructs, be "bracketed out"; 
Husser! conceives only the transcendental ego to be immanent. 
In one sense, then, Husser! sets up a philosophy of transcendence: 
in relation to the transcendental ego. The Cartesianische Meditationen 
are not directly concerned with the distinction between transcendence 
and immanence, yet Husser!' s discussion of the transcendental ego 
proceeds from one interpretation of this opposition. An experienced 
"transcendence in immanence" suggests that the pure "I" of the cogito 
is transcendental: "I am no longer the one who finds himself in the 
natural attitude as a human being .... Through the phenomenological 
epoche I reduce my natural human I and my inner life-the realm of 
my psychological self-experience-to my transcendental-phenome-
nological I, the realm of the transcendental-phenomenological self-
experience."7 In the Pariser Vortriige and Cartesianische Meditationen, 
however, Husser! subordinates even this transcendence to imma-
nence: "Transcendence is an immanent character of being, which 
constitutes itself inside the ego" (CM 32; cf. CM 117). Husser! does 
develop a philosophy of transcendental subjectivity, but it involves 
a methodological reduction to the sphere of immanence in which both 
the transcendence of the world and of other egos are constituted in 
the immanence of transcendental subjectivity. As a skeptic in relation 
to the transcendent, and in support of a philosophy of monadic con-
sciousness, Husser! asserts that we should accept nothing except "what 
we can make essentially visible to ourselves in consciousness itself, 
in pure immanence" (Ideen 113). The unsettling consequence of Hus-
ser!' s philosophy of immanence finds expression in the repeated ques-
tion, "How do I escape from my island of consciousness?" (CM 32, 
7Edmund Husser! , Ca rtesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortriige, ed. S. Strasser (The 
Hague: Martin us Nijhoff, 1973), 64-65 (henceforth cited as CM) . In English , see Edmund 
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An In troduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). 
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116).8 The secure island of Kantian reason turns into a prison for 
consciousness when phenomenology constructs a transcendental the-
ory of knowledge by reduction to the "sphere" of immanence. 
Derrida and the Impossibility of Monologue 
La voix et le phenomene marks both Derrida's turn away from phe-
nomenology and his development toward deconstructive method in 
the traditions of Heidegger and Nietzsche. Derrida argues that Hus-
ser!' s theory of language privileges voiced speech and relies on an 
impossible ideal of monologue: the meanings "given" to the phe-
nomenologist in an originary presence allegedly occur as, or are se-
cured by, internalized discourse. 9 
Derrida focuses on the Logische Untersuchungen, section 8, entitled 
"The Expressions in the Solitary Inner Life." Determined to lay bare 
Husser!' s hidden metaphysical presuppositions, Derrida makes this 
incidental passage stand for the broader tendencies in Husser!' s phi-
losophy. According to Derrida, this section reverts to an internalized 
voice in order to preserve both the bodily and ideal aspects of sound 
linked to meaning. Derrida's third chapter, then, entitled "Meaning 
as Soliloquy" (Le vouloir-dire comme soliloque), implies that Husserl's 
theory of meaning is grounded on monologue. 10 As Derrida recog-
nizes, Husserl's discussion denies the creative power of monologue 
and assumes an undifferentiated presence to oneself. Husser! con-
cludes his discussion of solitary speech with a scenario in which 
someone says to himself: You did that badly, you can't go on like that. 
But in the genuine, communicative sense one does not speak in such 
8Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, 4th ed. (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1977), 6o, clearly 
responds to Husserl's mode of questioning. I shall henceforth cite Sein und Zeit as SZ. 
"To some extent, Derrida discloses a hidden metaphysical assumption only by ex-
aggerating the monological aspect of Husserl's theory of signs. Rather than exalt mon-
ologue to a position of supreme importance, Husser) dismisses it from the domain of 
truly significant communication. Yet while Husserl repudiates "expressions in the 
solitary inner life" (Ausdrucke im einsamen See/en/eben), he implicitly depends on a mon-
ologicallevel of thought as the basis of phenomenological evidence. 
10But Husserl argues the reverse: monologue has meaning only because meanings 
are intuited prior to their linguistic expression. Husser( bases his phenomenology on 
a prethematic meaning-intention; monologue appears pointless to him, because it com-
municates nothing new to the speaker. 
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cases, nor does one tell oneself anything; one merely imagines oneself 
as speaking and communicating. In monological speech, words cannot 
perform the function of indicating the existence of mental acts, because 
such indication would be completely purposeless here. For the acts in 
question are experienced by us in the same moment.'' 
Monologue is futile if its meaning is simultaneously experienced and 
if no real communication occurs because the speaker always already 
knows what he "means." Husserl consequently discredits the sig-
nifying function of dreams and other unconscious bearers of meaning, 
and further excludes gestures, in order to focus on expressions with 
"intended" meanings. According to Husserl's analysis, which denies 
that solitary discourse produces anything new, monological speech 
falls short of the realm of genuine communication. Yet Husserl under-
estimates the role of "expressions in the solitary inner life" because 
he assumes that a prelinguistic level of meaning precedes whatever 
we tell ourselves . The generative function of monologue fades in the 
light of logical meanings that are supposed to ground linguistic 
utterances. 
Derrida paraphrases Husserl's statement of the limits of mono-
logue: "If the subject indicates nothing to himself, it is because he 
cannot do this, and he cannot do this because he does not need to . 
As the lived [le vecu] is immediately present to oneself in the mode 
of certitude and of absolute necessity, the manifestation of oneself to 
oneself through the delegation or representation of an indicator is 
impossible because it is superfluous."12 Husserl grants the possibility 
of solitary speech but denies that it exerts a significant communicative 
function . Derrida questions the supposed presence to oneself and 
thus takes a more radical step toward the undoing of monologue. 
Reading the Logische Untersuchungen, section 8, in conjunction with 
the Cartesianische Meditationen, Derrida suggests that monologue is 
"Edmund Husser!, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. II, pt. 1 (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 
1913), 36-37 (henceforth cited as LU). In English, see Edmund Husser!, Logical Inves-
tigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), II, 279-So. 
'
2Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phi!nomene: Introduction au probleme du signe dans Ia 
phi!nomenologie de Husser/ (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 65. In English, 
see Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon and Other Essays on Husser/'s Theory of Signs, 
trans. David Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 58. I shall hence-
forth cite this work as VP, using a slash to separate page numbers for the French 
edition from those for the English translation . But all translations cited here are my 
own. 
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impossible, just as no ultimate reduction to the monadic sphere can 
be performed. 
At issue is not whether one can talk to oneself but whether the self 
of such a conversation is ever truly monadic. In other words, can a 
solitary speaker retain a coherent and pristine realm of immanence? 
Husser! denies that inner voice is the last resort of his reduction of 
the "immanent sphere" by asserting the primacy of prelinguistic in-
tuitions. But Derrida recognizes that Husser! requires the fiction of a 
monological voice, in order to assure the existence of a "mental cor-
porality" (geistige Leiblichkeit) . 
Derrida's subversion of the supposedly monadic phenomenological 
voice ensues from an awareness of difference within language. Con-
ceived as a stream of language, conciousness can never insulate itself 
against otherness: monadic consciousness turns nomadic. Derrida 
notes that "the sign is originarily wrought by [travaille par] fiction" 
(VP 63/56). The fictionality or rhetoricity of signs introduces difference 
where previously a solitary sameness was assumed. Derrida conse-
quently disturbs the facile distinction between internal and external 
language. He maintains that solitary speech is never entirely pure, 
purged of the shared language of others. The conventional occur-
rences of dialogue are preconditions of monologue; the "I" observes 
and questions "itself" in the medium of the "they."13 
Thus Derrida perceives a "non-identity to oneself of the supposedly 
originary presence" (VP 76/68). Solitary speech shows itself as a du-
bious autoaffection that denies its inevitable reference beyond itself. 
"Autoaffection" is the particular object of Derrida's attack against self-
originatory myths: "Is not the concept of pure solitude-and of a 
monad in the phenomenological sense-impaired by its own origin, 
by the very condition of its presence to itself: 'time' reconceived start-
ing from the differance within autoaffection?" (VP 77/168). To indicate 
the internal difference within language, Derrida alters the spelling of 
this key word: differance strikes at the illusion of a stable, unchanging 
self. Derrida further undermines the phenomenological monad by 
" Compare L. 5. Vygotsky's attack on Piaget's discussion of "egocentric" speech, in 
Thought and Language, trans. Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1962), chap. 2. See also Emile Benveniste's analyses of man in language, in 
Problemes de linguistique gem!rale (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1966); and, of course, Mikhail 
Bakhtin's Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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showing the impossibility, not only of monologue, but of autoaffec-
tion in general. 
"Voice" appears as a kind of autoaffection that establishes presence, 
"a medium which at once preserves the presence of the object before 
the intuition and the presence to itself" (VP 85/76). Thus the illusion 
of an isolated subject arises. Without leaving the immanent sphere, 
a subject appears to affect itself through language: "the subject can 
hear itself or speak to itself, allow itself to be affected by the signifier 
which it produces without any detour through the instance of exte-
riority, of the world, or of what is not one's own in general" (VP 881 
78). This monological autoaffection commands a privileged position: 
"Every other form of autoaffection must either pass through what is 
not one's own or renounce universality. When I see myself, whether 
this is because a limited region of my body offers itself to my look or 
because it is reflected in a mirror, what is not my own has already 
entered into the field of this autoaffection which from then on is no 
longer pure" (VP 88/78-79). Only the internal voice is experienced as 
"absolutely pure autoaffection," such that "the operation of hearing 
oneself speak," the autoaffection of the voice, gives rise to subjectiv-
ity. Derrida pushes this analysis one step further and concludes that, 
according to the tradition, "voice is consciousness" (VP 89/79) . 
Derrida undoes this statement of the "metaphysics of presence" by 
reference to problematics of repetition and inscription. He finds a 
tension within Husserl's work, because "the possibility of writing 
inhabited the inside of speech" (VP 92/82) . Difference, which pro-
duces the transcendental subject, asserts itself despite Husserl's wish 
to preserve a pure presence: "Autoaffection is not a modality of ex-
perience characterizing a being that would be already itself (autos). It 
produces sameness as a relation to itself in the differance from itself, 
the same as the non-identical" (ibid .). Both monologue and autoaf-
fection thus reveal their illusory character, erroneously posited as 
prior to what in fact produces them. Passing through Heidegger's use 
of the related term Selbstaffektion, in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik 
(especially section 34), Derrida arrives at a statement of the impos-
sibility of pure autoaffection, as a result of the movement of temporal 
difference: "The theme of a pure interiority of speech or of 'hearing 
oneself speak' is radically contradicted by 'time' itself. The going-out 
'into the world' is also, itself, originarily implied by the movement 
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of temporalization" (VP 96/86). Derrida interprets Husser!, then, by 
following the lead of Heidegger's revision. 
Just as there are dramatic soliloquies and scenes of writing, there 
is necessarily a scene of monologue. The supposedly pure inner voice 
is infected by rhetoricity; "the 'presence' of sense and of speech has 
already begun to be missing from itself" (VP 97/87). Derrida gener-
alizes from a linguistic observation-that all "mono-logos" is per-
meated by dialogue-to the argument that the subject or "I" is incapable 
of pure presence to itself, even in the form of a self-addressed prop-
osition of self-knowledge. 14 The supposedly pure autoaffection of 
monological voice is already divided by differance or writing (VP, chaps. 
6-7) . The incursion of writing, associated with the indicator (An-
zeichen), thus pronounces the death of all idealized monological purity. 
Derrida continues his subversion of monologue by interpreting the 
scene of autoaffection in Les confessions. The text of Rousseau repre-
sents an autoeroticism that undergoes an analogous play of presence 
and absence. Even more intricate than phenomenological efforts to 
secure the presence of an object to a subject by means of voice, Les 
confessions constitute a scene in which Rousseau manipulates the pres-
ence and absence of his love object by means of masturbation. While 
the phenomenological autoaffection supposedly ensures the self-pres-
ence of the "intended" object to the subject, Rousseau's autoeroticism 
similarly aims at the imaginary presencing of an absent other. Derrida 
finds a connection in the shared futility of these projects, for voice is 
as much a phantom as is the imagined object of autoeroticism. 
Thus De Ia grammatologie describes "the age of Rousseau" in familiar 
terms. Consciousness is grasped as an experience of autoaffection: 
"The logos can be infinite and present to itself, it can produce itself as 
autoaffection, only through voice: an order of the signifier by which the 
subject goes out from itself i~ itself, does not borrow outside of itself 
the signifier which it emits and which affects it at the same time. Such 
at least is the experience--or consciousness--of voice: of hearing one-
self speak."15 Husser! appears as a latecomer in the era of metaphysics 
140n this vast and differentiated subject, see VP 105-6; L'ecriture et Ia difference (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1967), 139, 153, 171-72, 265; and De Ia grammatologie (Paris: Editions 
de Minuit, 1967), 23, 33, 94 (henceforth cited as Gram.). 
15Gram . 146. In English, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chak-
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since Descartes, characterized by "phonologism." With Rousseau the 
situation is more complex, however; for him, "this motif composes 
and organizes itself with its opposite: a ceaselessly reanimated mis-
trust with respect to speech that is called full." For Rousseau knows 
the failure of voice, inasmuch as "we are dispossessed of the coveted 
presence in the gesture of language by which we seek to seize it" 
(Gram. 203-4/141); he both condemns "writing as the destruction of 
presence" and gives priority to "writing as the restoration, by a certain 
absence and by a sort of calculated effacement, of the disappointed 
presence of oneself in speech" (Gram . 204/142). 
Writing thus emerges as a "dangerous supplement" that both adds 
and supplants. Rousseau's Confessions represent this supplement as 
a writing parallel to masturbation; Rousseau himself refers to "that 
dangerous supplement which deceives nature ."16 According to Der-
rida, this deception of nature is like the operation of writing, because 
it turns away from nature into the imaginary. Whereas Husserl re-
quires monologue to assure self-presence, Rousseau needs mastur-
bation to secure desired, absent feminine presences. But like the voice 
that suffers contamination by writing, autoeroticism must acknowl-
edge its self-delusion: "The presence that is thus delivered to us in 
the present is a chimera . Autoaffection is a pure speculation" (Gram . 
221ft 54) . 
Masturbation and monologue share in the effort to obtain illusory 
presence. But autoaffection extends beyond the activity of mastur-
bation and includes other attempts to procure an absent presence . 
Since the immediacy of jouissance appears unattainable, pure presence 
must cede to differentiated absence, the play of transference or chain 
of supplements. As monologue is infected by meaningless indicators 
and writing, severed from the "meaning-intention" of the subject, so 
masturbation is plagued by the absence it must posit while seeking 
to overcome distance. Derrida's reading of Rousseau retrospectively 
demonstrates the impossibility of pure monologue. 
Derrida traces a path from voice and autoaffection, impossible 
dreams of pure presence, through autoeroticism and writing, as ges-
ravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 98. Page numbers 
in the English edition appear after the slash in the citations below; all translations are, 
however, my own. 
16Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Les confessions (Paris: Garnier-Fiammarion, 1968), vol. 1, 
p. 146. Cited in Gram. 215 . 
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tures toward a recuperated presence in confrontation with inevitable 
absence. The ultimate undoing of the voice/writing dichotomy means 
that not only monologue but also writing appears in an autoerotic 
light: "within the chain of supplements, it was difficult to separate 
writing from onanism" (Gram. 235l165). And voice remains a form of 
autoaffection that denies its internal contradiction and difference: 
"Voice and consciousness of voice-that is to say in short, conscious-
ness as presence to oneself-are the phenomenon of an autoaffection 
lived as suppression of differance" (Gram. 236l166). 
While monologue affords a delusion of presence by suppression of 
absence, writing is the delusory making-present in absence . Derrida's 
"preference" for writing reflects his choice of explicit mediation as 
opposed to pretended immediacy. Monologue seeks to elude the in-
evitable play of presence and absence, of differance; masturbation en-
ters into this play; writing sets up the conditions of possibility for 
presence and absence, "transcendental" conditions of mediated im-
mediacy. In a way that requires further scrutiny, Derrida's writing 
aims toward a new transcendentalism. Language, or figuration, be-
comes the precondition of all possible experience. Heidegger chooses 
a different turn on the same path. 
Heidegger and the Transcendence of Dasein 
Heidegger's reinterpretation of Kant is most apparent in his use of 
the word "transcendence" (Transzendenz). Many critics have ques-
tioned Heidegger's discussion of transcendental philosophy as fun-
damental ontology, and even Heidegger admits that Kant became an 
"advocate for the question of Being I had raised."17 But apart from 
the immediate problems relating to the interpretation of Kant's first 
Kritik as a grounding of metaphysics rather than as a theory of knowl-
edge, Heidegger clearly projects the terminology of Sein und Zeit onto 
Kant's text . 
In Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Heidegger' s exposition of 
transcendental knowledge begins by subtly replacing the adjectival 
17Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1973), p. XIV (henceforth cited as KPM). In English, see Martin 
Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: 
Indiana Universi ty Press, 1962). 
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form "transcendental" by the substantive form "transcendence": 
"transcendental cognition investigates not beings themselves but rather 
the possibility of the prior understanding of Being, i.e. at the same 
time: the constitution of the Being of beings. It concerns the stepping 
beyond (transcendence) of pure reason to beings, so that reason can 
now in the first instance take on experience as a possible object" (KPM 
16).18 Heidegger initiates his ontological turn away from Kant's in-
quiry into a mode of cognition (Erkenntnis) by substituting "transcen-
dence" for the Kantian "transcendental." That is, he subsumes the 
epistemological terms of transcendental cognition and transcendental 
use of ideas under an ontology involving transcendence. The Kantian 
schematism becomes inseparable from "the most inner happening 
[Geschehen] of transcendence," and transcendental philosophy be-
comes equivalent to an "essential uncovering [Wesensenthiillung] of 
transcendence" (KPM 105, 120). Heidegger concludes that "if Kant 
calls this mode of cognition 'transcendental,' from this may be inferred 
that it has transcendence as its theme" (KPM 128). Heidegger argues 
that Kant was concerned to make transcendence visible (KPM 159), 
but contrary to Heidegger's claim, Kant never abstracts from "tran-
scendental cognition" to thematize transcendence . Without marking 
any discontinuity between the exposition of Kant's thought and his 
own philosophical work, Heidegger grafts the language of Sein und 
Zeit onto Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft: "The existential analytic of 
everydayness .. . should show that and how transcendence-being-
in-the-world-is already at the basis of all intercourse with beings" 
(KPM 228). As in Heidegger's other works of this period, transcen-
dence appears as the ontological essence of Dasein . 
After the publication of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger writes several 
works that give special emphasis to transcendence. As if to provide 
a previously neglected key to his thought, "Was ist Metaphysik?" 
and "Vom Wesen des Grundes" insistently return to this term. Fur-
thermore, the Marburg lectures of 1928 culminate in a discussion of 
"the transcendence of Dasein." What roles does transcendence play 
in Heidegger' s philosophy?19 
' 8Despite reservations, I follow the usual translation of Sein and Seiende as " Being" 
and " beings." Because the distinction has more to do with temporality than with a 
difference in number, "Being" and "the existing" (or " the existent" ) are in some cases 
preferable . 
19ln tracing the uses of " transcendence" from Sein und Zeit to " Yom Wesen des 
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"Transcendence" is seldom named by Sein und Zeit, but it functions 
under various guises throughout. A footnote to "Vom Wesen des 
Grundes" can thus assert that "what has until now been published 
of the researches concerning Sein und Zeit has as its task nothing other 
than a concretely disclosing project [Entwurj] of transcendence (cp. 
sections 12-83, especially section 69)."20 Heidegger's note refers to 
virtually all of Sein und Zeit, from section 12 to the end. In other 
words, Sein und Zeit deals with transcendence insofar as it explicates 
"being-in-the-world," the necessary precondition or ground of ex-
perience. 21 Because only section 69 explicitly discusses transcendence, 
Heidegger indicates that it appears in diverse forms without being 
named. 
A substantial footnote in "Vom Wesen des Grundes" further ex-
plains the centrality of transcendence by recalling the title of what 
was then the "First Part" of Sein und Zeit: "The Interpretation of 
Dasein in terms of Temporality and the Explication of Time as the 
Transcendental Horizon of the Question of Being."22 Spatial meta-
phors proliferate. According to the footnote, the transcendence of 
Dasein indicates that Dasein exists "ec-statically" or "ec-centrically" 
(ekstatisch, 'exzentrisch') . This interpretation recurs at several stages of 
the analysis of Dasein. As Heidegger shows in the Marburg lectures, 
then, the ontological difference repeats itself within transcendence. 
In addition to the transcendence that must always already have taken 
place, as a precondition of existence, another transcendence continues 
to occur, as in the form of intentionality. Sein und Zeit never acknowl-
edges this doubleness of transcendence, and Heidegger' s unresolved 
relationship to Husserlian phenomenology complicates its disparate 
uses. 
Grundes, " the essential problem is not to establish definitions but to clarify the func-
tioning of this key word in Heidegger's texts. From this point of view the Marburg 
lectures are especially instructive because they make explicit the role Heidegger gives 
transcendence in his revision of the philosophical tradition. 
20Martin Heidegger, "Yom Wesen des Grundes," in Wegmarken, 2d ed. (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), 16on (henceforth cited as "WG"). 
21 KPM makes clear that Heidegger regards his writings as constituting a fundamental 
ontology in the sense that they deal with "conditions of possibility" : "the ontological, 
i.e. here always pre-ontological cognition is the condition of the possibility that some-
thing like the existing itself [Seiendes selbst] can stand opposite a finite being in general" 
(p. 67). 
22SZ, pp. ix, 41. The original pagination is reproduced in the English edition: Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1962). 
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After section 12 of Sein und Zeit establishes being-in-the-world as 
the ground of all encounter with beings in space, section 13 begins 
the redefinition of transcendence. This revision follows from Heideg-
ger's overcoming of the epistemological tradition of subject-object 
relation. False questions arise from the traditional approach, for ex-
ample: "how does this cognizing subject come out of its inner 'sphere' 
into an 'other, external one,' how can cognition in general have an 
object, how must the object itself be thought, so that finally the subject 
knows it, without needing to risk a leap into another sphere?" (SZ 
6o). In contrast, his version of phenomenological method strives to 
raise the more fundamental question by understanding cognition as 
"a mode of being of Dasein as being-in-the-world" (SZ 61). 
Sein und Zeit attempts to ground the presumed "transcending of 
the subject" in a more fundamental, ontological transcendence. Hei-
degger argues that "being-there" (Da-sein) is always already being-
in-the-world (ln-der-Welt-Sein): 
In directedness to ... and comprehending, Dasein does not first go 
beyond its inner sphere, so to speak, in which it first is encapsulated, 
rather it is in its primary mode of being always already "out there" 
with an existent [Seienden) that encounters it in an already discovered 
world. And the determinative openness for beings to be cognized is 
not anything like a departure from the inner sphere, but rather Dasein 
is, in this "being-out-there" with the object, in the rightly understood 
sense, "inside," i.e., it is itself as being-in-the-world, that cognizes. [SZ 
62) 
Heidegger writes in reaction against contemporary works of episte-
mology, such as Nicolai Hartman's Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921) . 
Yet his interpretation of transcendence also involves a radicalization 
or revision of Husserl's phenomenology. If the terms "directedness 
to" and "comprehending" replace Husserlian intentionality, the ques-
tion arises: to what extent does Heidegger ground intentionality as 
described by Husser!, and to what extent does he modify it? 
Heidegger's analysis of discourse (Rede) repeats the inner-outer 
problematic of transcendence. Heidegger argues that Dasein is always 
already "in the world," and in regard to expression Heidegger main-
tains that Dasein is always already "outside," beyond itself: "All 
speech concerning ... , which communicates in that of which it speaks 
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[in ihrem Geredeten], has at the same time the character of a speaking-
itself-out [Sichaussprechen]. Speaking, Dasein speaks itself out, not be-
cause it first of all is encapsulated as something 'inner' in opposition 
to something outer, but because it is already 'out there' as being-in-
the-world" (SZ 162). At this stage of the work, Heidegger has char-
acterized Dasein as "being-in-the-world" in the mode of Verstehen. 
Thus language, as the expression (or as the actuality) of understand-
ing, is another form of transcendence. To the extent that it takes part 
in the constitution of "world," then, language is implicitly another 
aspect of transcendence, or of the transcendental horizon of experi-
ence (SZ t6o-6t). 
In section 69, Sein und Zeit explicitly grounds the "transcendence 
of Dasein" in the "transcendence of the world": "In order for the 
thematization of the present-at-hand ... to be possible, Dasein must 
transcend the thematized existent [das thematisierte Seiende]" (SZ 363). 
A footnote to this passage hints at Heidegger's relationship to Husserl: 
"That and how the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in the 
ec-static temporality of Dasein, the following section will show" (SZ 
363n). Without contradicting his teacher, Heidegger puts "intention-
ality" in its place, derivative in relation to Heidegger's own 
" transcendence ." 
Section 69c contains the fullest reinterpretation of transcendence, 
in connection with certain directional modes of Dasein (Um-zu , 
Wozu, Dazu, Um-willen). Without considering the relationship be-
tween these terms and intentionality, Heidegger turns to an onto-
logical interpretation of temporality. Again, ontological 
transcendence serves to displace the subject-object model: "The 
'problem of transcendence' cannot be brought down to the ques-
tion: how does a subject come out to an object, whereby the totality 
of objects is identified with the idea of the world. It is to be asked: 
what makes it ontologically possible for a being to be encountered 
in the world and objectified as such? The return to the ec-static, hor-
izontally founded transcendence gives the answer" (SZ 366). Later 
texts show, however, that Heidegger cannot strictly maintain the 
ontological difference within transcendence. 
Until the recent publication of the Marburg lectures, "Vom Wesen 
des Grundes" was the seminal explication of Heidegger's "transcen-
dence." In its condensed restatement of the problematics of Sein und 
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Zeit, as of the ontological difference, this text employs " transcen-
dence" to mark the difference between Being and beings (Sein and 
Seiendes) . Heidegger refers to the ground of the ontological difference 
as the transcendence of Dasein, and his search for the essence of 
rational grounds becomes a study in transcendence: "If the essence 
of the ground has an inner connection to the essence of truth, then 
the problem of the ground can also only have its home where the 
essence of truth creates its inner possibility, in the essence of tran-
scendence ."23 At the same time that he points to a truth founded in 
transcendence, Heidegger enacts a gentle philosophical Destruktion 
by asserting that his project is more fundamental than Husserl's: "If 
one characterizes all conduct in relation to beings as intentional, then 
intentionality is only possible on the ground of transcendence, but neither 
identical with this nor, on the other hand, that which makes tran-
scendence possible" (WG 31!29). 
Heidegger accepts the traditional meaning of transcendence as "a 
step beyond," but he tries to avoid describing it as something that 
can happen. Nevertheless, he initially explains transcendence in terms 
of its inherent spatial metaphor: "The step beyond may be formally 
grasped as a 'relation' that reaches 'from' something 'to' something. 
That to which the step beyond accedes, which for the most part is 
inappropriately called the 'transcendent', is included in the step be-
yond. And finally, in the step beyond, something is always stepped 
beyond" (WG 33l35). Taking the etymological origins of the word as 
his pre-text, Heidegger seeks to rule out aspects that are inappropriate 
for his purposes. "Stepping beyond" retains a disturbing residue of 
spatial imagery, and Heidegger tries to eliminate what he considers 
its unsuitable metaphorical content. He concedes that "the human 
Dasein" has the possibility of going beyond concrete spatial limita-
tions, but he hopes to keep this "step beyond" separate from his 
purportedly more fundamental transcendence as the step beyond that 
makes existence possible (WG 34l37) . 
After Heidegger purges transcendence of its spatia-temporal mean-
ings, he suggests paradoxically that it is a going beyond that neither 
"goes" nor goes "beyond." Heidegger's transcendence cannot occur 
but rather must always already be: "With the fact of Da-sein the step 
23WG 31129. Numbers after the slash refer to pages in the bilingual edition: Martin 
Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1969). All translations are my own. 
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beyond is already there ." Thus "beings themselves" (das Seiende selbst) 
must be transcended, which means defining Dasein as an ontological 
being and linking transcendence with "being-in-the-world" (WG 35/ 
39-41) . But "transcendence" functions in Heidegger's texts as more 
than a synonym for "being-in-the-world," although in some contexts 
the terms appear to be interchangeable. In fact, ontological transcen-
dence is the more fundamental term, without which there could be 
no construction of "world." 
The Marburg lectures of 1928 further reveal the strategic place of 
transcendence in Heidegger's overcoming (Uberwindung) of the tra-
dition. As in Sein und Zeit and "Vom Wesen des Grundes," Heidegger 
employs "transcendence" both to undermine the epistemological tra-
dition based on a subject-object dichotomy and to distinguish his 
philosophical project from that of Husserl. The text is contained in 
volume 26 of the Gesamtausgabe. 24 Entitled by Heidegger' s editors "The 
Transcendence of Dasein," section 11 is apparently an earlier version 
of the text that became section 2 of "Vom Wesen des Grundes" and 
begins similarly, with an interpretation of the word "transcendence." 
Heidegger observes that the philosophical tradition has viewed the 
transcendent in opposition to the immanent. The immanent, then, 
"is that which remains within, meaning: what remains in the subject, 
in the soul, in consciousness,-the transcendent is then that which 
does not remain within but is rather outside: that which lies outside 
of the soul and of consciousness" (MAL 204) . Heidegger caricatures 
the "capsule-conception of the subject" (Kapselvorstellung des Subjekts) 
that is implied by this version of transcendence: "What thus lies 
outside the barriers and the enclosing wall of consciousness therefore 
has, when one speaks from the most intimate court of this conscious-
ness, stepped beyond the enclosing wall and stands outside" (ibid.). 
Consciousness appears as a fortress, perceiving the world as if from 
inside a walled courtyard. Heidegger believes that this transcendence 
involves a false ontology of the subject, in which "the subject is 
represented as if it were a capsule, with an inside, a capsule-wall, 
and an outside ... a barrier between inner and outer must be stepped 
24Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, in 
the Gesamtausgabe, vol. 26, ed. Klaus Held (Frankfurt am Main : Vittorio Klostermann, 
1978), henceforth cited as MAL. Heidegger's editors have made it impossible to be 
certain of the accuracy of these transcripts . In English, see The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). 
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beyond" (MAL 205). Heidegger calls this the "epistemological concept 
of transcendence" because it raises questions about the knowledge a 
subject can have of a transcendent object. 
At a safe distance from Freiburg, Heidegger argues that Husserl's 
phenomenology also relies on this "ontic transcendence." Heidegger 
maintains that Husser! did not understand intentionality radically 
enough, and in consequence his intentionality is "a narrow concep-
tion, insofar as it is understood to mean a relation to what is present 
at hand" (MAL 168). Heidegger insists that Husserl's conception is 
less fundamental than his own: "The problem of transcendence in 
general is not identical with the problem of intentionality. This is, as 
ontic transcendence, only possible on the ground of the original 
transcendence: being-in-the-world" (MAL 170). In Heidegger's view, 
the problem of transcendence points beyond theories of knowledge 
to an ontological inquiry. A passing comment suggests that "the vul-
gar phenomenon of transcendence is the transcendence in which 
Dasein essentially and immediately moves" (MAL 169). 
Heidegger can thus assert that his more fundamental transcendence 
is "the original constitution of the subjectivity of a subject" (MAL 211) . 
This transcendence must always already be, as a precondition for 
subjective existence: "The subject transcends as subject; it would not 
be a subject if it did not transcend. Being a subject means transcen-
ding" (ibid.). Dasein does not occasionally involve itself in a move-
ment of going beyond; rather, Dasein itself is the step beyond. If 
transcendence is not a particular behavior of Dasein in which a mun-
dane obstacle is exceeded, then "what is stepped beyond is rather 
the existent itself, which can become manifest to the subject, and 
indeed on the ground of its transcendence" (MAL 212). Dasein tran-
scends, not by perceiving objects, but through its "being-in-the-world" 
that grounds all potential experience . 
Heidegger employs "transcendence" in his overcoming of the 
epistemological tradition. He displaces the subject-object model of 
cognition by reference to a transcendence that undermines the "cap-
sule-conception of the subject," and even the intentionality of Husser! 
appears derivative in relation to Heidegger's ontological transcen-
dence. But a contrary interpretation has tacitly intervened. Heidegger 
cannot entirely purge transcendence of the spatial metaphor it con-
tains. Ontic transcendence reasserts itself when Heidegger writes of 
"the transcendence, in which Dasein essentially and immediately 
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moves" (MAL 169) . While Husserl does not write fundamental on-
tology, Heidegger grants that he does account for the transcendence 
familiar to everyday Dasein. From a Heideggerian standpoint, Husserl 
perhaps deals with an inauthentic transcendence or with a transcen-
dence of Dasein in the mode of inauthenticity. 25 
Logos as Genius 
Early in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger anticipates his subsequent turn 
toward the logos. Section 7B translates logos as discourse (Rede), a 
"letting see" (Sehenlassen) (SZ 33). In turn, understanding is seeing 
"something as something" (Etwas als Etwas) (SZ 149). Metaphoric 
"seeing-as" combines with metonymic "seeing-for." Though Hei-
degger does not explicate the modes of understanding in rhetorical 
terms, several of his texts reencounter the logos . 
Heidegger' s early philosophy culminates in silence because the call 
of conscience does not open up a "conversation with oneself" (Selbst-
gespriich) (SZ 273), while "in anxiety words fail us" (die Angst verschliigt 
uns das Wort). 26 Skeptical of everyday language, Heidegger refers to 
an ontological level of "discourse" (Rede); Heidegger believes that 
discussions of signs generally neglect the grounding of language in 
ontological modes of Dasein . In contrast, Heidegger asserts that dis-
course is "existentially equiprimordial with finding oneself and un-
derstanding" and the basis of language: "That only now language 
becomes a theme, shall indicate, that this phenomenon has its roots 
in the existential constitution of the resoluteness of Dasein. The ex-
istential-ontological foundation of language is discourse" (SZ 6o). An earlier 
passage similarly discusses the foundation of meaning and language 
in the "resoluteness" of Dasein involved in understanding (SZ 87). 
But Heidegger later questions this approach that places the under-
standing of Dasein at the origin of language. In a marginal comment 
25Heidegger ultimately approaches transcendence in relation to problems of self. Thus 
in a Marburg lecture of 1927 he asserts: 'The se/fhood of Dasein grounds itself in its 
Transzendenz," Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt 
am Main : Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 425 . Compare Karl Jaspers' contemporaneous 
work on transcendence in his Philosophie, vol. y Metaphysik (Berlin: Julius Springer, 
1932). 
26"Was ist Metaphysik?" in Wegmarken , 2d ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klos-
termann, 1978), 111. 
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to this passage, supplied by the fourteenth edition of Sein und Zeit, 
Heidegger writes that Dasein and language are equally fundamental: 
the earlier statement is "untrue. Language is not layered [aufgestockt], 
but rather is the originary essence of truth as There [Da]'' (SZ 442). 
This self-correction nevertheless conceals the shift in Heidegger' s ter-
minology. Whereas Sein und Zeit distinguishes everyday "language" 
(Sprache) from ontological "discourse" (Rede), some kind of meaning-
ful articulation prior to explicit verbalization, Heidegger' s later works 
refer to language and "the essence of language" that may be ap-
proached through poetry. 
Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes and "Holderlin und das Wesen der 
Dichtung" (1936) initiate Heidegger's later reflection on language. As 
the essence of language, poetry "precedes" ordinary usage: "Poetry 
never takes up language as a raw material that is present at hand, 
rather poetry itself makes language possible ... . the essence of lan-
guage must be understood out of the essence of poetry."27 Heidegger 
gestures toward "the conversation as an authentic happening of lan-
guage" (HWD 40); Holderlin's poetry inspires Heidegger to write of 
the divine mission of a poet, who stands "between these-the gods, 
and those-the people" (HWD 43) . Like ancient daimones and ma-
lachim, poets mediate between god(s) and men. Through poetry, the 
divine Word becomes accessible; the danger is that essential language 
may become perverted in becoming common: "inauthenticity" of lan-
guage is linked to its daily "chatter" (Gerede), while "authenticity" is 
the metaphysical capacity to create a world out of the essence of 
language. 
Heidegger reflects on language by responding to previous authors 
in a "repetition and destruction" (Wiederholung und Destruktion) of the 
tradition. His reading of Novalis is one of the most surprising and, 
indirectly, one of the most decisive for his development "on the way 
to language." The essay entitled "Der Weg zur Sprache," in Unterwegs 
zur Sprache, begins with a contemplation on the metaphysical meaning 
of language as monologue. Without expressing any interest in the 
mundane phenomenon of a subject's inner speech, Heidegger ap-
proaches the sense in which language carries on its own monologue. 
Novalis is another source of the idea that "language speaks,"28 and 
27" Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," in Erliiuterungen zu Holder/ins Dichtung, 
5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), 40 (henceforth cited as "HWD" ). 
28At the start of Novalis' "Lehrlinge zu Sals," a mysterious voice pronounces (in 
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Heidegger's discussion of Novalis' "Monolog" gives meaning to this 
phrase. 29 The opening lines of "Der Weg zur Sprache" cite Novalis 
approvingly: "To start with, let us hear an expression by Novalis. It 
stands in a text which he entitled Monolog. The title points to the 
secret of language: it speaks solely [einzig] and solitary [einsam] with 
itself. One sentence of the text reads: 'Precisely what is peculiar about 
language, that it is concerned merely with itself, no one knows.' " 30 
indirekter Rede) that "one does not understand language, because language does not 
understand itself, does not want to understand itself: genuine Sanskrit spoke, merely 
in order to speak, because speaking was its desire and its essence." Heidegger's Ur-
sprung des Kunstwerkes to some extent supports the myth of an original, "authentic" 
language, such as Greek before its displacement by Latin translations. See Holzwege, 
5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), 13. 
'"The original version of the obscure and profound aphorism entitled "Monolog" is 
contained in Nova/is: Werke, Tagebucher, und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs, ed. Hans-
Joachim Miihl and Richard Samuel (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1978): "There is a really crazy 
(m1rrische] thing about speaking and writing; the correct conversation is a mere word-
play. The laughable error is only to be wondered at, that people think-they speak 
for the sake of things. Precisely what is peculiar about language, that it is merely 
concerned with itself, no one knows. For this reason it is such a wonderful and fruitful 
secret,-that when one merely speaks, in order to speak, he expresses exactly the most 
magnificent and original truths. But if he wants to speak of something definite, moody 
language lets him say only the most laughable and perverse rubbish . Thence arises 
the hatred, which so many serious people have against language. They note its mis-
chievousness but do not notice that the despicable chatter (das veriichtliche Schwatzen] 
is the infinitely serious side of language. If one could only make comprehensible to 
people that it is with language as with mathematical formulae-they constitute a world 
for themselves--they play only with themselves, express nothing but their wonderful 
nature, and just for this reason are they so expressive-just for this reason do they 
mirror the strange play of relations of things. Only through their freedom are they 
parts of nature and only in their free movements does the world soul express itself 
and make them into a gentle measure and groundplan of things. So it is also with 
language-whoever has a fine feeling of its fingering (Applicatur], its beat, its musical 
spirit, whoever perceives in himself the gentle working of its inner nature, and there-
after moves his tongue or his hand, he will be a prophet; on the other hand, whoever 
knows it well but does not have enough of an ear and a sense for it will write truths 
like these but will be bested by language and mocked by men, like Cassandra by the 
Trojans. If I believe that I have thus indicated most clearly the essence and office of 
poetry, yet I know that no one can understand it and that I have said something 
completely absurd because I wanted to say it, and thus no poetry comes into existence. 
How would it be, however, if I had to speak? and if this drive to speak were the sign 
of the inspiration of language, of the efficacy of language in me? and if my will only 
willed everything that I had to, then this could after all be poetry, without my knowl-
edge and belief, and make a secret of language comprehensible? and so I would be a 
writer with a calling [ein berufener Schriftsteller] , for a writer is indeed only one inspired 
by language [ein Sprachbegeisterter]?-" (vol. 2, p. 438; translation mine). 
30In Martin Heidegger's Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 241; and in 
01z the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 11. 
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In opposition to all subjective interpretations of speech, Heidegger 
accedes that language speaks, not men; men speak "authentically" 
by letting language speak. But what can it mean that language speaks 
with itself? How does this seemingly divine autoaffection interact with 
human languages? 
Heidegger's discussion of "the way to language" parallels Novalis' 
statements, which Heidegger ultimately summarizes: "Language is 
monologue. Now this implies two things: it is language alone [allein ] 
that authentically speaks. And it speaks solitarily" (US 265l134). De-
spite his diffidence in relation to Novalis' version of "Monologue," 
Heidegger unmistakably stands in the tradition that asserts: "Man 
does not speak alone-the universe also speaks-everything speaks-
infinite languages."31 Heidegger faults his precursor "because Nov-
alis, in the field of vision of absolute idealism, imagines language 
dialectically from the standpoint of subjectivity" (US 265l134), but 
Heidegger' s writings merge phenomenological discourse with the an-
tisubjectivist tendency already evident in Novalis' texts. Heidegger's 
later thoughts on language rejoin the powerful pathways of "pure" 
poetry that follow inherent possibilities of language. 
Through the musical grammar of thought, Heidegger exemplifies 
ways in which speech responds to language: "Language speaks. Man 
speaks, in so far as he corresponds to language . Corresponding is 
hearing. It hears, insofar as it belongs to the bidding of silence."32 
Human "speaking" (sprechen) becomes "corresponding" (entsprechen) 
and "hearing" (hOren) becomes "belonging-to" (gehOren), following 
clues already provided by language. A further, personifying trope 
occurs with the mysterious "it hears" (es hart), in which "the corre-
sponding"' (das Entsprechen) seems to hear, not man. The peculiarly 
passive agent in this process seems to be the "bidding of silence" 
(Geheiss der Stille). In conjunction with his antisubjectivist views of 
language, Heidegger allows free play to the inner music, correspon-
dences, and hidden palimpsest of language. Because the true problem 
is to correspond to language, Heidegger denies all effort to achieve 
originality: "Nothing rests on bringing forth a new view of language. 
I shall henceforth cite this work as US. Page numbers in the English edition appear 
after the slash. 
31 Novalis, Werke, II, 500. 
32 US 32-33. The essay entitled "Language" appears in Martin Heidegger's Poetry, 
Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). 
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Everything rests on learning to live in the speaking of language" (US 
33)-
Heidegger works more profoundly through traditions of the logos 
in the recently published Freiburg lectures on Heraklitus (1943-44). 
Heidegger' s analyses focus on Heraklitus' Fragment Bso: 
ouk ernou alia tou Logon akousantas 
hornologein sophon estin Hen Panta. 
Not listening to me, but to the Logos, 
it is wise to agree that the All is One. 
English editions of Heraklitus' fragments generally do not capitalize 
Logos, but Heidegger recapitulates the ontological difference (sug-
gested by the English translations of "Being" and "beings") by dis-
tinguishing between Logos and logos. This distinction allows him to 
write that Fragment 50 deals with the "homological relationship of 
the human logos to the Logos."33 The single Logos "is the originary, 
origin-granting col-lection that holds itself at the origin, as the essence 
of Being itself" (Hera. 292). 34 For Heidegger, then, the homology of 
being-there (Da-sein) and Being (Sein), or of human logos and divine 
Logos, means that "man can be related through his logos to the Logos 
in the homologein, but this he is not always and perhaps only seldom" 
(Hera. 306). Although man is only seldom capable of correspondence, 
the possibilities for this privileged moment suggest Heidegger's late 
revision of existentialist authenticity. The "agreement" spoken of by 
Heraklitus is not conformity in the opinions of men but a relationship 
to the Logos. Because man is generally "turned away from the Logos," 
the presence of human logos conceals the absence of the divine Logos: 
33Martin Heidegger, Heraklit , in the Gesamtausgabe, ed . Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), 296 (henceforth cited as Hera.). Until this im-
portant volume appears in translation, English readers can only compare Martin Hei-
degger and Eugen Fink, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67, trans . Charles H. Seibert (University: 
University of Alabama Press, 1979). The capitalization of German nouns would efface 
the difference between logos and Logos; as in his essay "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)," 
Heidegger distinguishes these forms by referring to them in Greek. 
34Heidegger continues with an unusual reference to metaphor: " Accordingly it looks 
as if Heraklitus had read off the essence of reading and gathering from human doing 
and from there carried it over to the Being of beings in general. Such a carryover is 
called, in Greek, metapherein. The characterization of the Being of beings as Logos would 
then be a metaphor. In this metaphor would lie the often practiced, partly conscious 
and partly unconscious but perhaps unavoidable procedure of carrying over the lines 
and forms of human manner and human conduct onto the world totality" (Hera. 292). 
If this is the case, then "divine Logos" is necessarily an anthropomorphizing trope. 
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"That, therefore, which authentically and essentially concerns the 
human soul in its ground, i.e., in its proper logos, the Logos as Being, 
just this would indeed be present for man and his dispersion on the 
self-seeking path, but yet at the same time absent and set aside and 
therefore foreign" (Hera. 307). Heidegger wavers between a univer-
salized ontological assertion and a discussion of rare moments. The 
transcendence of the Logos precedes human logos: "The dictum of 
Heraklitus says that man in his essence belongs to Being and is de-
termined to the collection of this; and that only from it does he receive 
his own possibility" (Hera . 356). A special movement of human lan-
guage, poetry that responds to the essence of language, suggests a 
form of authenticity. 
Heidegger turns back from subjective monologue toward the tran-
scendence of divine language. Like the lightning of Zeus, Logos brings 
the world into appearance. Heidegger rediscovers or invents a myth 
that unites lightning (der Blitz), a figure of Zeus, with the Logos and 
Hen Panta: 
The lightning brings forth, at once, all that is present in the light of its 
presence. The lightning now named steers. It brings to each in advance 
the essential place that is shown to him. Such a bringing-to is at once 
the bringing-forth, the Logos. "Lightning" stands here as a name for 
Zeus. He is, as the highest of the gods, the destiny of the universe. 
Accordingly the Logos, the Hen Panta , would be nothing other than the 
supreme God. The essence of the Logos would thus give a hint into the 
godliness of God .35 
While Heidegger does not claim that Heraklitus taught this union of 
Logos with Zeus, he rediscovers the meaning of transcendence in 
Heraklitus' Logos. Ultimately, Heidegger narrates a new myth of ge-
nius: in place of divine selection or talent, poetic creativity emerges 
as a "listening ... to the Logos" (Hera. 371). 
35Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)," in Vortriige und Aufsiitze (Pful-
lingen: Neske, 1954), 214. In English, see Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, trans. 
David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 59-78. 
Part Two 
LITERATURE OF MONOLOGUE 
You know that I have long been accustomed to the art 
of soliloquy. If on leaving a social gathering I return 
home sad and troubled, I retire and ask: What is the 
matter? .. . a mood? ... Yes ... Are you doing badly? 
. . . No . . . I press myself; I wrest the truth from myself. 
Then it seems to me that I have a gay soul, tranquil, 
honest and serene, which interrogates another that is 
ashamed of some stupidity it is afraid to confess. 
However, the confession comes. If it is an act of 
stupidity I have committed, as happens fairly often, I 
absolve myself. If it is one that has been done to me, 
as occurs when I have met people disposed to abuse 
the facility of my character, I pardon . The sadness 
dissipates; I return to my family, a good husband, a 
good father, a good master, at least so I imagine; and 
no one feels the effects of a disturbance that was about 
to expand to all who approached me. 
I will advise this secret examination to all those who 
wish to write; in this way, they will at once become 
more honest people and better authors . 
-DENIS DIDEROT, Discours de la poesie dramatique 
5 Pre-Shakespearean and 
Shakespearean Soliloquies 
If there is no true solitude for the believer who conceives God to 
be omnipresent, then the earliest soliloquies are necessarily divine . 
Medieval religious dramas present God (and the rebellious angel, 
Lucifer) in solitary speeches, while human solitude typically involves 
expressions of prayer or conscience, piety or guilt. Later the anguished 
contemplations of Marlowe's Faustus appear in conjunction with the 
addresses of good and evil angels. Renaissance drama retains the 
connection between solitary speech and communication with divine 
beings. 
Shakespeare's Richard III, Macbeth, and Hamlet introduce a vivid 
mode of psychological soliloquy. Malformed by nature, distanced 
from society, and unaware of God, Richard proclaims himself "de-
termined to prove a villain." He opens as a secret schemer and does 
not collapse under the strain of defeat until a dream of ghostly curses 
condemns him. At that point, an unsettling internal dialogue disrupts 
his efforts to attain unswerving self-determination. Macbeth and Lady 
Macbeth are also destroyed by solitary hallucinations. Hamlet's so-
liloquies unfold as equally conflict-ridden meditations, while Ophe-
lia's deviant monologues express the threat of madness he occasions. 
Dramatic soliloquies develop together with the evolving represen-
tation of English individuality. Freeing itself from narrative uses of 
soliloquy, in which characters rehearse a sequence of events, drama 
reveals the psychological complexity or theological transcendence of 
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solitary characters. When solitary speech loses its foundation in prayer, 
anguished conscience and madness grip the soliloquist. Just as the 
subject appears on the verge of appropriating a unified discourse, 
monologue uncovers internal divisions. 
The development of soliloquy in drama combines monological rep-
resentation and performance, for the history of monologue is a mon-
ological history, a history of swerves or deviations that border on the 
madness of so many literary monologues . Rhetorical differences man-
ifest themselves as intimate forms of psychological doubling, which 
often resemble encounters with supernatural beings. 
"Alas, sinner, what have I done?" 
The Anglo-Norman Ordo Repraesentationis Adae (or feu d'Adam) opens 
as a dialogue of God with Adam and Eve, followed by subversive 
dialogues initiated by devils. The stage direction for God, "Figura," 
perhaps shows an awareness of the questionable nature of repre-
senting God on stage; God's image is only a figural illusion. As tra-
ditions of monologue evolve, drama makes represented spirits into 
figures for psychological turns. Following a brief retelling of the bib-
lical story of creation, God instructs Adam and Eve through dialogue: 
Adam! Let him respond: Sire? 
FIGURA I have formed you 
Of the earth. 
ADAM I know it well. 
FIGURA I formed you in my image' 
The drama is at first essentially a narrative and only faintly dramatic. 
God observes that he has given Adam his equal (pareil), Eve, who 
also recognizes Adam as her equal. The tensions in the representation 
revolve around the error of this pair in attempting to become the 
equal of God. Adam and Eve are created for perfect dialogue, but 
1References to the Ordo Repraesentationis Adae (which I shall cite as ORA) and to the 
Corpus Christi Cycle from Wakefield and Brome follow the line numbers and the in-
consistent orthography retained in David Bevington's Medieval Drama (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin, 1975). I have slightly altered his translations. I shall henceforth cite the 
Wakefield Master's "The Creation" as "Cr." and his "Mactatio Abel" as " MA." Brome's 
"Sacrifice of Isaac" I shall designate as "Sl." 
Pre-Shakespearean and Shakespearean Soliloquies 113 
their first sin propels them further from the parity with God they 
seek and brings monologue into the world. At a distance from God, 
expelled from Paradise, human language takes on a new potential for 
solitude. 
Adam's firs t words, "I know it well," anticipate a crucial moment 
of dialogue just before the Fall (ORA 281): all is well as long as Adam 
and Eve's knowledge corresponds with God's, but knowledge of the 
devil (Diabolus) soon undoes them. When the "Figura" retires to a 
church backstage, Adam and Eve are left to enjoy Paradise in the 
company of demons. The perfect dialogue turns out to be a polylogue 
of demonic temptations, as the Latin stage directions indicate: "Mean-
while, let demons run about the platea, making appropriate gestures; 
and let them come, one after the other, close to paradise, showing 
Eve the forbidden fruit, as if tempting her to eat it. Then let the devil 
come to Adam and say to him: 'What are you doing, Adam?' "(ORA 
113). A dialogue ensues in which the devil tempts Adam with the 
prospect of becoming God's peer ("per," ORA 167, 190). Adam resists 
steadfastly and labels the evil being "Satan" (ORA 196). 
The devil then gives up on Adam, walks through the audience, 
and comes to Eve. She also recognizes Satan, but for her the name 
apparently connotes no evil. Eve listens with interest while the devil 
tempts her by describing her and Adam as an ill-matched pair. Adam 
reproaches Eve for talking with Satan, recalling the tradition that this 
traitor sought to place himself higher than God (ORA 289-90). When 
she has eaten the forbidden fruit, Eve commits Adam to the same sin 
by reminding him that "you are my peer" (per) (ORA 313). 
After he joins Eve in sin, Adam begins a guilty self-reflection: "Alas, 
sinner, what have I done? I Now I am dead without escape." The 
breach of God's commandment opens up a new possibility of solil-
oquy. Adam reflects that, through the folly that has led him to aban-
don his Creator, he now knows sin (ORA 321-28). While he complains 
of his distance from "my Creator," "my Lord," the "King of Glory" 
(ORA 321, 339, 348), this proliferation of names does nothing to bring 
God closer. The separation makes it possible for Adam to speak God's 
name as an expletive, without referential significance ("Deu!"). He 
bemoans his new solitude that results from Eve's betrayal, Eve whom 
"God gave me as an equal [pareil] ." 
Tempted by the devil's own wish to become God's equal, the hu-
man pair is gripped by a kind of madness. Adam both speaks of his 
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own "madness" (jolor) and refers to his wife as a "crazed woman" 
(femme desvee) (ORA 357). He turns to Eve and curses the hour "when 
you became my equal [parail]" (ORA 372) . Because his human equal 
cannot help him, Adam thinks of God, but recognizes that sin has 
disrupted their communication: 
I will be redeemed thence by no mortal, 
Unless by God in his majesty. 
What do I say, unfortunate? Why did I name Him? 
Will He help me? I have angered Him ... 
I don't know where to turn, 
When we have not kept faith with God. 
[ORA 378-84] 
The drama traces the development from divine dialogue, in a Paradise 
before sin, to the isolated monologue that results from the Fall. The 
sinless Adam and Eve never appear to be alone, for they always 
engage in dialogues with the "Figura," with each other, and with the 
devil. Yet Adam receives the possibility of worldly dialogue from God 
only to find that this dialogue with Eve destroys him; and to deviate 
from the path decreed by God is to open up the possibility of mon-
ologue. Adam and Eve express their new solitude by hiding them-
selves, for they recognize that-by attempting to become God's equal-
they have lost all rights to be His peer. 
The Fall occurs in the tension between man's likeness to God and 
his desire to become God's equal. God has formed Adam in His 
likeness (a mun semblant), and has given him an equal (ta femme e tun 
pareil) . Provoked by the devil, man deviates by seeking to become 
God's equal, thus striving to usurp the divine dialogue. Conse-
quently, the devil promises Adam: 
Eat it, and you'll do well . 
You'll have nothing to fear from God; 
Instead you will be in everything His peer. 
[ORA 165-67] 
The devil further tells Adam he will be "without a lord," freed of 
God's sovereignty. If Adam's fantasy is to usurp the divine Logos, 
Eve only wishes to become privy to all He says, and the devil prom-
ises, "He won't be able to hide advice from you" (ORA 266). From 
the moment of creation, Adam is God's likeness (semblant), but the 
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forbidden fruit brings this figurative likeness dangerously close to an 
experience of literal equality. After tasting the fruit, Eve says, "I seem 
to be God the all-powerful" (ORA 308). From likenesses of God, Adam 
and Eve become feigners of God. Adam sees clearly that Eve is his 
peer, and only Eve shares his present plight. God, the "Figura," 
explicitly interprets their sin as the misguided effort to "be my equal" 
(estre mon per) (ORA 415, 443). Like poor readers, they seek to trans-
form a metaphorical relationship into literal equivalence. 
Following their attempt to become God's peer, Adam and Eve re-
ceive only "peril" and "perdition" (ORA 508, 574, 536). Driven out 
of Paradise, a place where one does not erroneously seek equality, 
Adam laments: 
Alas! woe is me, how evil was that hour .. .. 
Where was my sense? What became of my 
memory, 
That for Satan I forsook the king of glory? 
[ORA 519, 531-32] 
To follow Satan is to attempt to displace God and also to become 
crazed. Loss of God's dialogue is loss of the divine Logos and the 
eternal life that accompanies it. The Fall arises from folly and gives 
rise to new folly, for Adam wonders where his sense has gone, and 
Eve appears to him as a woman bereft of reason. Opposition to divine 
dialogue, Satan's slander against reason, motivates the Fall of human 
language into solitude. 
Like the Ordo Repraesentationis Adae, the Wakefield Corpus Christi 
Cycle opens with God's speech, an introductory address that begins 
"The Creation" as a divine soliloquy. Before He creates man, God 
alternates between the first person and the royal "we" of His heavenly 
court. In a striking example of soliloquy as the divine Logos, God 
narrates and creates simultaneously: 
[DEUS] Ego sum alpha et o: 
I am the first, the last also, 
Oone God in mageste . . . . 
All maner thing is in my thoght 
Withoutten me ther may be noght, 
For all is in my sight. 
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Hit shall be done after my will; 
That I have thoght I shall fulfill 
And manteyn with my might. 
[Cr. 1-3, 13-18] 
While God's soliloquy serves a narrative function, it also indicates 
that the divine Logos is primary and that only this Logos is genuinely 
solus. As in the biblical account, the first-person plural form is either 
a royal "we" or a hint that angels are also present: 
At the beginning of oure dede 
Make we heven and erth, on brede, 
and lightys faire to se. 
[Cr. 19-21) 
The excitement of this pageant begins after the fifth day of Creation, 
when Lucifer presumes to usurp God's place. This competing solil-
oquy parodies God's speech, for while God creates light, Lucifer revels 
in the light he possesses: 
I am so fare and bright, 
Of me commys all this light .. . . 
And ye well me behold; 
I am a thowsandfold 
Brighter then [sic) is the son. 
[Cr. 82-89] 
A typical monologist, Lucifer mistakenly considers himself to be au-
tonomous. Wakefield thus represents him as a comical fool, full of 
pride, who blithely sits in God's throne: "I am so semely, blade and 
bone, I My sete shall be theras was His" (Cr. 102-3). Evil angels de-
bate about his presumption until suddenly they find themselves in 
hell with demons, foretelling man's Fall. 
One moment in Wakefield's "Mactatio Abel" further reveals the 
development of monologue in relationship to prayer. After the Fall, 
Cain and Abel can only strive, by means of sacrifice and prayer, for 
the dialogue Adam and Eve have lost. Wakefield's comic realism 
makes Cain a likable rogue in contrast to his pious brother, who 
sermonizes: 
And therfor, brother, let us weynd, 
And first dens us from the feynd 
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Or we make sacrifice; 
Then blis withoutten end 
Get we for oure service, 
Of Him that is oure saulis leche. 
[MA 78-83] 
Cain answers as the audience may wish to answer: 
How! let furth youre geyse; the fox will preche. 
How long wilt thou me appech 
With thy sermoning? 
Hold thy tong, yit I say, 
Even ther the good wife strokid the hay! 
Or sit downe, in the dwill way, 
With thy vain carping. 
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As often as Abel repeats the name of "God," Cain refers to "the 
dwill." Unable to grasp divine relation, or confusing God with Satan, 
Cain commands his offering to "bren, in the dwillys name!"(MA 278). 
When Abel comments that "thy tend shuld bren withoutten smeke," 
Cain answers, figuring himself as the devil, "Com kis the dwill right 
in the ars!" (MA 287). 
God speaks to Cain at this point, responding to his inadequate 
dialogue with Abel: "Cam, why art thou so rebell I Agans thy brother 
Abell?" Cain responds in one of his funniest blasphemous speeches, 
mocking the "small" voice that has addressed him: 
Why, who is that hob over the wall? 
We! who was that that piped so small? 
Com, go we hens, for perels all. 
God is out of his wit! 
Com furth , Abell, and let us weynd. 
Me think that God is not my freynd . 
On land then will I flit . 
[MA 297-303] 
Cain misunderstands God as a "hob"(goblin) localized in space and 
consequently believes he can go where "God shall not me see." In-
tensifying the disobedience of Adam and Eve, Cain hears God's words 
and refuses to take them seriously. After he murders Abel, Cain first 
confronts his guilt only by threatening the audience in an aside: "If 
118 LITERATURE OF MONOLOGUE 
any of you think I did amis, I I shal it amend wars then it is" (MA 
331-32). The staged soliloquy retains an element of address to the 
audience. Cain continues, however, in a new vein of conscience: 
Bot now, syn he is broght on slepe, 
Into som hole fain wold I crepe. 
For ferd I qwake, and can no rede; 
For, be I taken, I be bot dede . 
(MA 336-391 
This drama exemplifies the use of soliloquy in conjunction with re-
jections of God's words . Unable to pray, at a distance from God, Cain 
(like the fallen Adam) breaks into solitary speech. Dialogue and mon-
ologue compete through the interaction of piety and impiety, good 
and evil, relationship to God and to devils. 
In contrast, the Wakefield and Brome cycles represent Noah and 
Abraham in a mode of pious soliloquy. Wakefield's "Noah" first ac-
knowledges "mightfull God veray, maker of all that is," who "maide 
both night and day, beest, fowle, and fish; I All creatures that lif may 
wroght thou at thy wish" (1, 3-4). Brame's "Sacrifice of Isaac" opens 
similarly, combining address to God with a review of the Creation 
narrative: 
Fader of hevyn omnipotent, 
With all my hart to the I call! 
Thow hast goffe me both lond and rent, 
And my livelod thow hast me sent. 
I thanke the heyly, evermore, of all . 
First of the erth thou madist Adam, 
And Eve also to be his wiffe. 
[SI 1-71 
As the story of the sacrifice of Isaac continues, Abraham speaks asides 
that are essentially addresses to God: "A, Lord, my heart brekith on 
twain, I This childys wordys they be so tender!" (127-28) . Onstage, 
however, prayer is presumably not prayer and constantly interacts 
with elements of performance. The attempted dialogue with God 
turns into an indirect communication with other human beings. Prayer, 
when it has lost the exclusive relation to God, becomes dialogue with 
the community. To separate oneself from this community is to risk 
an even greater Fall. The earliest monologues are speeches of God 
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and of the dissenting Lucifer; Adam and Cain exclaim their solitary 
pangs of conscience that result from disobedience; Noah and Abra-
ham pray to restore the dialogue. After Babel, the confusion of tongues 
makes uniform speech, or divine Logos, into a distant dream. 
" Divinity, adieu!" 
In later drama, soliloquy emerges as the strongest stylistic expres-
sion of guilt and madness. Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus works 
through the dynamics of an individual fate in relation to divine Logos . 
Like medieval dramas that represent the Fall and Cain's murder, 
Marlowe's play explicitly presents the soul's choice between heaven 
and hell, God and Lucifer. This metaphysical stage is set by Faustus' 
decision to cut himself off from God and to communicate with Me-
phostophilis . But Marlowe advances beyond the medieval tradition 
both by individualizing Faustus and by adding to the psychological 
significance of the supernatural beings he confronts. Doctor Faustus 
stages the human potential to perform vastly different roles and to 
receive or refuse guidance from a conscience that is figured by debates 
between good and evil angels. 
Marlowe's play opens with Faustus' renunciation of the God he 
seeks and never successfully finds . For Adam, monologue is a con-
sequence of the Fall; for fallen humanity, solitude is a given, and 
Faustus first appears in the self-address of solitary meditation: 
Settle thy studies, Faustus, and begin 
To sound the depth of that thou wilt profess . 
Having commenced, be a divine in show-
Yet level at the end of every art 
And live and die in Aristotle's works. 
[I.i .l-5]2 
Prior to any individual sin, Faustus is already an isolated subject who 
practices the "self-dissection" Shaftesbury later prescribes. Having 
received his theological degree, Faustus considers what it means to 
"be a divine in show." He reviews his studies: "Sweet Analytics, 'tis 
thou has ravaged me" (I.i.6). Ambition competes with the claims of 
2Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, ed. Sylvan Barnet (New York: New American 
Library, 1969). Numbers in text below refer to lines. 
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divinity, as Faustus longs for the forbidden arts that would "make 
men to live eternally I Or being dead raise them to life again" (l.i.22-
23). He provisionally asserts that "when all is done, divinity is best" 
(l.i.35) and turns to Jerome's Bible. But a conjunction of passages 
leads Faustus to conclude that "what will be, will be! Divinity, adieu!" 
(l.i-45). Adversary of the divine, Mephostophilis later claims to have 
predetermined this outcome: 
'Twas I, that when thou wert i' the way to heaven 
Damned up thy passage. When thou took'st the book 
To view the Scriptures, then I turned the leaves 
And led thine eye. 
[V .ii.too-3] 
Mephostophilis blocks Faustus' "passage" to heaven by misleading 
him through a sequence of scriptural passages . If Mephostophilis 
represents evil impulses within Faustus himself, then this opening 
scene is a confrontation between good and evil modes of reading, an 
encounter between the godly and demonic speech of the self. The 
demonic is an introjected desire that finds expression in a kabbalistic 
delight over magical signs: 
These metaphysics of magicians 
And negromantic books are heavenly; 
Lines, circles, letters, characters-
Ay, these are those that Faustus most desires . 
[I.i .47-50] 
Faustus seeks "a world of profit and delight I Of power, honor, and 
omnipotence" (l.i.51-52), ultimately seeking to deify himself, like 
Adam and Eve tempted to become God's "per": "A sound magician 
is a demi-god! I Here tire my brains to get a deity!" (l.i.59-6o). 
In the scenes that follow, Faustus' solitary meditations turn into, 
or are figured as, choices between supernatural beings. Divinity and 
black magic stand in the balance . At several stages, good and evil 
angels enter the stage and externalize the options Faustus confronts. 
After he calls magicians to his aid, the angels represent the duplicity 
within Faustus' soul: 
Good Angel. 0 Faustus, lay that damned book aside 
And gaze not on it lest it tempt thy soul 
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And heap God's heavy wrath upon thy head! 
Read, read the Scriptures-that is blasphemy! 
Bad Angel. Go forward, Faustus, in that famous art 
Wherein all nature's treasure is contained. 
Be thou on earth as Jove is in the sky, 
Lord and commander of these elements! 
[I.i.6?-74l 
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At the moment of choice between books of Scripture and of black 
magic, the evil angel predictably tempts Faustus with the prospect of 
becoming God-like. His incantation, a performance rather than a 
prayer, figures God's name: 
Within this circle is Jehovah's name 
Forward and backward anagrammatized, 
Th' abbreviated names of holy saints, 
Figures of every adjunct to the heavens, 
And characters of signs and erring stars, 
By which the spirits are enforced to rise. 
[!.iii. 8-9] 
When Mephostophilis appears, however, he demystifies Faustus' 
pompous performance. "Did not my conjuring raise thee?" he asks, 
and Mephostophilis answers: 
That was the cause, but yet per accidens: 
For when we hear one rack the name of God, 
Abjure the Scriptures and his savior Christ, 
We fly in hope to get his glorious soul. 
[I.iii-44-48] 
Faustus requests explanations of Lucifer and hell. The otherworldly 
meaning of Mephostophilis' answers is unsettled when Faustus asks, 
"How comes it then that thou are out of hell?" and Mephostophilis 
responds, "Why this is hell, nor am I out of it" (I. iii . 75) . Without 
losing the supernatural level of the drama, we are led to consider that 
the entire diabolical world may be Faustus' own projection. 
Solitary, Faustus hears the voice of conscience and the voices of 
conflicting angels. He debates with himself: "Now, Faustus, must 
thou needs be damned; I Canst thou not be saved!" (II.i.1-3). A strug-
gle between conflicting imaginations ensues when Faustus attempts 
to conjure away thoughts as he has conjured spirits. Faustus com-
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mands: "Away with such vain fancies, and despair- I Despair in 
God and trust in Belzebub!" (II.i.4-5). A first reading may suggest 
that Faustus wishes to dispel both "vain fancies" and "despair." But 
the noun subtly shifts toward the function of a verb, and Faustus 
finds that he commands himself to despair. The following line spec-
ifies his self-deluded command, "despair in God" and "trust in Bel-
zebub," but Faustus wavers: 
Why waver'st thou? 0 something soundeth in mine ear, 
"Abjure this magic, turn to God again ." 
Ay, and Faustus will turn to God again. 
To God? He loves thee not; 
The god thou serv'st is thine own appetite 
Wherein is fixed the love of Belzebub! 
Faustus has tried to conjure away despair but only succeeds in bring-
ing it on himself. Hearing internal voices that argue conflicting po-
sitions, Faustus begins to refer to himself in the third-person form. 
Yet he refuses to turn back to God, because he has introjected Him: 
"the god thou serv'st is thine own appetite." Within his internalized 
stage, good and evil angels represent his conflict: 
Bad Angel. Go forward, Faustus, in that famous art. 
Good Angel. Sweet Faustus, leave that execrable art. 
Faustus . Contrition, prayer, repentance, what of these? 
Good Angel. 0 , they are means to bring thee unto heaven. 
Bad Angel. Rather illusions, fruits of lunacy, 
That make men foolish that do use them most . 
Good Angel. Sweet Faustus, think of heaven and heavenly things. 
Bad Angel. No Faustus, think of honor and of wealth. 
[Il .i.15-23] 
The play develops as Faustus' movement toward damnation, in con-
nection with his series of prises de conscience. The angelic mechanism 
again and again offers Faustus the chance to "renounce this magic 
and repent." While the good angel tells Faustus to repent, for "God 
will pity thee," the bad angel responds that "God cannot pity thee!" 
(II.ii.12-13). For the audience, the angels are visually present, but 
Faustus experiences them as voices that "buzzeth in mine ears." Faus-
tus' externalized fantasies largely determine the world of the drama. 
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Though Faustus finally learns to "be silent then, for danger is in 
words" (V.i.27), he breaks into his most beautiful, impassioned speech 
at the sight of Helen: 
Was this the face that launched a thousand ships 
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium? 
Sweet Helen, make me immortal with a kiss. 
Her lips suck forth my soul. See where it flies! 
[V.i.g6-gg] 
Faustus relinquishes his Christian soul as he imagines himself a hero 
of the Iliad: 
I will be Paris, and for love of thee 
Instead of Troy shall Wittenberg be sacked; 
And I will combat with weak Menelaus 
And wear thy colors on my plumed crest. 
Yea, I will wound Achilles in the heel 
And then return to Helen for a kiss. 
[V.i .103-8] 
Faustus is inescapably damned through his intercourse with a spirit, 
a kind of imaginative autoeroticism. Mephostophilis expounds the 
condition of "desperate lunacy" that grips Faustus; the chain of as-
sociations links fantasy, madness, and converse with the devil. Me-
phostophilis commands Faustus to despair, and finally even the good 
angel can no longer offer repentance . The dialogue of spirits employs 
the past tense (of Faustus' unalterable sin) and the future tense (of 
Faustus' unalterable punishment): 
Good Angel . 0 Faustus, if thou hadst given ear to me 
Innumerable joys had followed thee . 
But thou did'st love the world . 
Bad Angel. Gave ear to me, 
And now must taste hell's pains perpetually 
Good Angel. 0 , what will all thy riches, pleasures, pomps 
Avail thee now? 
Bad Angel. Nothing but vex thee more, 
To want in hell, that had on earth such store. 
[V.ii.106-12] 
When the angels exit, Faustus is left with a solitude in which to reflect, 
but not to repent. The devils tear him apart, a logical consequence of 
124 LITERATUR E OF MONOLO GUE 
the "self-dissection" Faustus already performs in contradictory 
fantasies. 
Richard III recasts the Faustus story in a more naturalistically de-
picted political realm. Shakespeare's schemer finds himself turned 
away from God and toward evil. His deviation finally results in psy-
chological disintegration. While no evil spirits enter Richard's waking 
world, this may be because, as Anne recognizes, he himself is a devil. 
The absence of supernatural beings continues as long as Richard is 
confident in his subjective autonomy; when he weakens, he begins 
to experience spiritual powers beyond himself. 
Richard's opening speech combines various rhetorical devices. His 
use of the royal or communal "we" anticipates his later usurpation 
and pretends to participation in the general celebrations: 
Now is the winter of our discontent 
Made glorious summer by this sun of York; 
And all the clouds that loured upon our house 
In the deep bosom of the ocean buried. 
(l.i .1-4j' 
The opening soliloquy serves a narrative function, raising questions 
about the interaction of "conventional" and "realistic" rhetoric. Yet 
Richard turns the generalized description into a context for his own 
stated divergence from norms when he finds himself excluded from 
the prevailing customs: 
But I, that am not shaped for sportive tricks 
Nor made to court an amorous looking glass; 
I, that am rudely stamped, and want love's majesty 
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph; 
I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion, 
Cheated of feature by dissembling Nature, 
Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time 
Into this breathing world scarce half made up, 
And that so lamely and unfashionable 
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them; 
Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace, 
'William Shakespeare, Richard Ill , ed. Mark Eccles (New York: New American Li-
brary, 1964), henceforth cited by line numbers. This passage contains the first of several 
Faustian echoes: the "buried arms hung up for monuments" remind us of Faustus' 
"bills hung up as monuments" (l.i.18). A seminar that Howard Felperin held at Yale 
University in 1976 deeply influenced my reading of Shakespeare. 
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Have no delight to pass away the time, 
Unless to spy my shadow in the sun 
And descant on mine own deformity. 
(J.i.14-27] 
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This single sentence, dominated by an obstinate "1," narrates the 
development of a monological subject. Richard maintains that nature 
has formed him inadequately, such that he cannot play the role of 
lover demanded by the times. He is like an unprepared actor "sent 
before my time I ... scarce half made up." If nature has not made 
him the actor he wishes to be, Richard will produce his own dramatic 
persona . Richard's perverse delight is a self-reflective performance of 
himself, associated with viewing "my shadow in the sun" and de-
crying "mine own deformity." Deviation becomes an impetus to per-
formance. Richard III, like Doctor Faustus, centers around the individual 
capacity to perform diabolical, or deviant, roles: 
And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover 
To entertain these fair well-spoken days, 
I am determined to prove a villain 
And hate the idle pleasures of these days. 
(J.i.28-31] 
Hatred comes as a necessary concomitant of the role Richard chooses 
for himself. Shakespeare combines the conventionality of a traditional 
self-proclaiming figure of vice (determined by fate) with the realism 
of a specific, self-creating villain (determined by personal will). The 
naturalistic pretense of Richard's soliloquy is underscored when it is 
suddenly interrupted by his brother's entrance, and Richard exclaims, 
"Dive, thoughts, down to my soul" (l.i .41). 
Contrary to his claim that he cannot "prove a lover," Richard begins 
his career as diabolical performer when he successfully courts Anne. 
But he is already so "determined to prove a villain" that he combines 
roles to make himself a villainous lover. Though she repeatedly calls 
him "devil" (l.ii .45-49,73), Anne is bewildered by his performance, 
and Richard exults: 
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Was ever woman in this humor wooed? 
Was ever woman in this humor won? 
I'll have her, but I will not keep her long. 
[I.ii.227-29] 
Richard's only "friends to back my suit" are "the plain devil and 
dissembling looks" (I.ii.235-36). Consummate actor, he finds that 
dissembling makes him anew: 
I do mistake my person all this while . 
Upon my life, she finds, although I cannot, 
Myself to be a marv'lous proper man . 
[I.ii .252- 54l 
Richard's self-presentation transforms him, for he has learned to "seem 
a saint when most I play the devil" (I.iii .337) . Richard knows that 
even devilishness is an act, and the audience, aware of his perform-
ance, is implicated in his guilt . 
Richard's downfall is a more realistic version of that experienced 
by Faustus . While spirits appear on Marlowe's stage, ambiguously 
literal or figurative representations of Faustus' inner conflict, the ghosts 
in Richard III occur as part of Richard's nightmare . In place of good 
and evil angels, then, Richard dreams of those he has murdered; all 
tell him to "Despair and die!" (V .iii .127-64). 4 The last of them, the 
ghost of Buckingham, has been more closely allied with Richard but 
acknowledges that "God and good angels fight on Richmond's side" 
(V.iii.176) . These visions are naturalized, as "Richard starteth up out 
of a dream" and holds a devastating soliloquy that appears as a dia-
logue with himself: 
Soft! I did but dream . 
0 coward conscience, how dost thou afflict me! 
The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight. 
Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh . 
What do I fear? Myself? There's none else by. 
[V.iii .179-183] 
The failure of Richard's military and political performances returns 
him to the limbo of indefinite identity: 
4Compare Doctor Faus tus, V. ii .104, in which Mephostophilis tells Faustus, " 'Tis too 
late, despair, farewell!" 
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Richard loves Richard: that is, I am I. 
Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am. 
Then fly . What, from myself? Great reason why! 
Lest I revenge. What, myself upon myself? 
(V .iii.184-87] 
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Fragmented by his disparate performances, Richard is reproved by 
each tale his conscience tells: 
I am a villain. Yet I lie, I am not. 
Fool, of thyself speak well . Fool, do not flatter. 
My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, 
And every tongue brings in a several tale, 
And every tale condemns me for a villain. 
[V .iii.192-96] 
Richard' s fall is figured as his decline into a bad performance that 
even he cannot grasp, and he sees that "there is no creature loves 
me" (V.iii .2o1). To himself he has become an enigma, exactly at the 
moment when he sees through and hence mistrusts all his personae, 
and to others he is only evil. Unlike the flat repentance of Adam on 
the medieval stage, Richard's reflections uncover the conditions of 
their own performance, associating soliloquy with deviance from ac-
cepted roles. By simulating diverse characters, Richard assures the 
splitting of his "I"; conscience disturbs his monological schemes by 
bringing conflicting voices into his dreams and solitary speech. 
"Alas, he's mad" 
The meaning of a stylistic device, like the meaning of a word, arises 
as a function of its use. The meaning of dramatic monologue, then, 
evolves in conjunction with diverse literary frameworks . In medieval 
drama, soliloquy is essentially linked to the divine Logos, prayer, and 
expressions of guilt . Soliloquy, in the dramas of Faustus and Richard, 
reveals the workings of deviant minds that deliberately choose evil. 
Monologue is thus associated with deviations from God, the com-
munity, and from the good in general. But while monologue turns 
away from dialogue with God, its alliance with demonic (or uncon-
scious) powers assures that no unity of the solitary voice can prevail. 
Shakespeare extends the conventions of soliloquy, when his plays 
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represent psychological complexities through solitary speeches. Mon-
ologue always implies an absence, but Shakespeare shows that this 
lack is not merely a deficient mode of experience. 
In Macbeth, supernatural beings partially constitute the subjective 
world. If the play opens as a gathering of "weird sisters," this scene 
is equally a representation of the confused ambitions within Macbeth: 
"Fair is foul, and foul is fair," the witches exclaim, and Macbeth's 
opening words echo theirs: "So foul and fair a day I have not seen."5 
Banquo apparently also experiences the strange creatures, yet "to me 
you speak not" (l.iii.57). Macbeth gives his secret fantasies away by 
his confused reaction. Banquo notices his confusion and asks, "Why 
do you start, and seem to fear I Things that do sound so fair?" (l.iii . 
51-52). While Banquo is suspicious of the "instruments of darkness," 
Macbeth accepts their "supernatural soliciting." Macbeth's sequence 
of soliloquies begins in response to them, and he is oblivious while 
Banquo observes him: "Look, how our partner's rapt" (l.iii.143). 
Brought back to an awareness of the others present, Macbeth excuses 
himself, saying that his "dull brain was wrought I With things for-
gotten" (l.iii.149-50). Macbeth's excuse is partly true, for the appar-
itions have reminded him of "forgotten" ambitions. 6 
On the verge of murder, Macbeth's contemplative soliloquy stands 
between those of Richard and Hamlet. Already psychologically poi-
soned by his wife, Macbeth ties himself up in awkward assonances: 
If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well 
It were done quickly. If th' assassination 
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch, 
With his surcease, success; that but this blow 
Might be the be-all and the end-all-here, 
' William Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. Sylvan Barnet (New York: New American Library, 
1963), l.i.10 and l.iii.JS. Line numbers appear in text below. 
6Lady Macbeth, the other central soliloquist, is reminiscent of Doctor Faustus except 
that she calls upon spirits to transform her. Rather than represent spirits that appear 
in response to her invocations, Shakespeare emphasizes the sheer act of her rhetoric: 
"Come, you spirits / That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here, I And fill me, from 
the crown to the toe, top-full / Of direst cruelty!" (l.v.41-44) . Physical change acts as 
a trope for psychological hardening. Lady Macbeth desires assistance from figures of 
cruelty, since Macbeth is "too full o' th' milk of human kindness"; she plans to "pour 
my spirits in thine ear," poisoning his thought with her words. 
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But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, 
We'd jump the life to come. 
[I. vii. 1-7] 
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Even Macbeth's solitary speech betrays him, as if refusing to be merely 
an instrument of his murderous intentions: the subjunctive mode of 
possibility confounds his present thoughts. 
When Macbeth resolves to renounce their plan, stating that "we 
will proceed no further in this business" (l.vii.31), Lady Macbeth again 
acts as his evil angel to win him over. One novelty of Shakespeare' s 
presentation derives from the absence of any good angel to balance 
the evil counsel Macbeth receives. Plotting to murder Banquo, Mac-
beth idly imagines that he must do so for the sake of his guardian 
spirit, as "under him I My genius is rebuked, as it is said I Mark An-
tony's was by Caesar" (III.i.55-57). This "genius" has already been 
turned inward and perverted in accordance with Macbeth's schemes. 
Macbeth is so far from being able to respond to the call of conscience 
that his wife, or evil angel, becomes the mouthpiece for his guilt. 
Before several witnesses, Lady Macbeth sleepwalks and gives away 
their secret. The form of mad monologue begins to develop in this 
oblivious speaking subject. Her soliloquy echoes Macbeth's first, with 
the difference that dramatic conventions make Banquo unable to hear 
the contemplations that engross Macbeth (l.iii .127-42). Shakespeare 
invents a new convention in which a deviant mode of nonaddressed 
speech becomes accessible to other characters onstage . Consequently, 
the attending doctor is able to diagnose her condition: 
Foul whisp'rings are abroad . Unnatural deeds 
Do breed unnatural troubles. Infected minds 
To their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets. 
More needs she the divine than the physician. 
God, God forgive us all! 
Absent from the lives of the protagonists, divinity can be invoked 
only by an impassionate character who has no active part in the 
drama. The doctor, still supporting established theology, believes that 
Lady Macbeth requires the help of God . But Shakespeare's drama 
supersedes this wisdom, showing that theological conflicts have been 
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transferred into the realm of psychological, solitary speech: the new 
problem of the monologist is not God's absence but madness . 
Hamlet is Shakespeare's masterwork of monologue, so much so that 
the protagonist's soliloquies have virtually become canonized as in-
dependent poems. In contrast to Richard or Iago, who dominate their 
plays by nearly successful monological scheming, Hamlet soliloquizes 
in reaction to a hostile world. One might say that Hamlet turns his 
anger inward, transforms longed-for actions into words, and verges 
on madness because he cannot withstand the internal conflicts his 
monologue confronts. 
The tradition links soliloquy and supernatural apparitions; there is 
also no clear separation between mad monologue and demonic in-
tervention . When both demons and God are introjected, self-address 
is always also a potential demonic or divine address. The ghost of 
Hamlet's father reappears while Hamlet is in his mother's bedroom, 
and as Hamlet speaks to the apparition, the Queen comments, "Alas, 
he's mad" (III.iv.106). 7 Hamlet remains oblivious to her, like Macbeth 
before Banquo, until the ghost tells him to speak with her. She wonders, 
Alas, how is't with you 
That you do bend your eye on vacancy, 
And with th' incorporal air do hold discourse? 
. .. 0 gentle son, 
Upon the heat and flame of thy distemper 
Sprinkle cool patience. Whereon do you look? 
[III.iv.n7-25) 
To the extent that other characters do not share his experience, the 
monological speaker is subject to accusations of madness. Hamlet 
insists that he sees his father's ghost, but his mother persists in her 
belief that "this is the very coinage of your brain" (III.iv.138). Because 
Hamlet speaks of private experiences, his language is incomprehen-
sible, semantically isolated; imagination and madness oppose com-
munal norms. When the ghost initially reveals the murder to Hamlet, 
he exclaims, "0 my prophetic soul!" (l.v.38). The drama does not 
ultimately confirm either madness or prophecy, yet Hamlet is able to 
speak so cogently to the Queen that his uncanny experience of ghosts 
comes to represent the external world in which "something is rotten." 
'William Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed . William Farnham (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970). 
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As Lady Macbeth's sleepwalking reveals the suppressed cries of 
Macbeth's conscience, Ophelia's hysteria expresses Hamlet's imbal-
ances. Ophelia first comments on his condition as the doctor com-
ments on Lady Macbeth's, saying: "0 heavenly powers, restore him!" 
(III.i .141) and "0, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown" (III.i.150) . 
Unable to grasp his speech or to communicate with him, Ophelia can 
only observe Hamlet's decline. This failure of language becomes gen-
eral for her, when she lapses into song and becomes incapable of 
addressing others. Hamlet's insulation works itself out as critical self-
analysis, while Ophelia appears to be destroyed by his communicative 
absence. 
Hamlet's monologue arises out of an experienced impotence. Rather 
than perform the command he thinks he receives from his father's 
ghost, Hamlet resorts to meditation, an effort to "unpack my heart 
with words" (II.ii.571). Solitary speech takes the place of action. Ham-
let also understands his difficulty as an inability to perform when he 
responds to the feigned emotion of a traveling actor: 
0 , what a rogue and peasant slave am I! 
Is it not monstrous that this player here, 
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, 
Could force his soul so to his own conceit 
That from her working all his visage wanned, 
Tears in his eyes, distraction in his aspect, 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting 
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing, 
For Hecuba! 
Hamlet wishes he were capable of such performance and attempts to 
stage the events that follow in a way that will improve his acting. 
Failing to preserve the distinction between actual and performed emo-
tion, Hamlet imagines the player's response to his own condition: 
What would he do 
Had he the motive and the cue for passion 
That I have? He would drown the stage with tears 
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech, 
Make mad the guilty and appall the free . 
[II.ii. 544-48] 
Hamlet dissolves the difference between life and drama by recogniz-
ing his world as a stage and blames himself for the persona that 
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inhibits his act of revenge . To kill the usurping King would not suffice; 
Hamlet longs to perform the vengeful act in an appropriately dramatic 
way. But since Hamlet's grandest performances are solus, he can only 
stage a scene that may provoke a guilty performance from the King: 
I'll have these players 
Play something like the murder of my father 
Before mine uncle. I'll observe his looks. 
I' ll tent him to the quick . If 'a do blench, 
I know my course. 
Such a performance, Hamlet judges, will be more reliable than the 
words of his prompting spirit: 
The spirit that I have seen 
May be a devil, and the devil hath power 
T'assume a pleasing shape, yea, and perhaps 
Out of my weakness and my melancholy, 
As he is very potent with such spirits, 
Abuses me to damn me. 
Sensing the connection between spirits and private experience, Ham-
let needs firmer grounds on which to act. But the "ground" he chooses 
is only a stage, for "the play's the thing I Wherein I'll catch the con-
science of the king" (II.ii . 590- 91). 
Hamlet believes he does discover the King's guilt through the play 
within the play, but an equally central moment is a double soliloquy. 
As the King kneels in prayer, Hamlet enters the scene and soliloquizes 
at a distance, concluding that to murder the King would be to send 
his soul to heaven (III .iii. 73-78) . The King's posture of prayer implies 
a relationship to God that Hamlet lacks and declines to interrupt. But 
in their degraded world, the King has only discovered his inability 
to pray. Shakespeare presents an indirect dialogue between opposing 
characters. 
The final scene requires that Hamlet turn performer. A fencing 
match sets the stage; when all are mortally wounded, Hamlet calls 
on Horatio to "report me and my cause aright I To the unsatisfied" 
(V.ii.328-29) . The soliloquist longs to communicate his private 
thoughts: 
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0 God, Horatio, what a wounded name, 
Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me! 
If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart, 
Absent thee from felicity awhile, 
And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain, 
To tell my story. 
[V.ii.333-38] 
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Less concerned for his bodily wounds, Hamlet pleads with Horatio 
to tell the story that will heal his "wounded name." For a character 
who learns the inadequacy of solitary speech, performance is decisive. 
His internal narratives have been hopelessly divided; Hamlet finally 
commands another's narrative and its conclusion in silence. 
Early English drama makes soliloquy a concomitant of sin and sep-
aration from God. As drama develops, soliloquy appears as the device 
by which prayer can overcome the distance between human and 
divine realms. Supernatural beings recurrently interact with solilo-
quies, as if to indicate the uncertain status of spirit, between divinity 
and subjectivity. The villainous world of Richard III becomes possible 
after God's absence is assumed: until his downfall, Richard unfolds 
his schemes without the interruption of spirits. While a spirit does 
enter into Hamlet's world, his isolation is so extreme that his doubts 
revolve around the question of the validity of the ghost's message . 
Supernatural beings become figures of inner turmoil; as the tensions 
between immanence and transcendence work themselves out in the 
dialectic of monological modes, the supposedly autonomous subject 
discovers its internal conflicts . To the extent that soliloquy is coupled 
with relationships to society and divine beings, it never entirely loses 
the connection with otherness and transcendent Logos. Even apparent 
solitude and madness show themselves as relationships to the divine. 
The new poetic monologue, instead of interacting with supernatural 
powers, turns toward contemplation on the appropriate rhetoric for 
imaginative expressions of the self. 
6 Coleridge's Conversational 
Pretense 
Coleridge's conversation poems extend the conventions of dramatic 
soliloquy to an apparently autonomous lyrical form. 1 Dramatic solil-
oquy and poetic monologue both generate illusions of individual 
speech, yet the difference in genre has decisive implications. In the 
dramatic context, soliloquy retains mimetic pretensions as part of a 
represented world, while the written conversation poem tends to 
draw attention to its own representational illusion. The poetic mon-
ologist is typically less concerned to describe the world than to reflect 
on the experiences that constitute it. 
Coleridge, whose finest lyrics are representative of the Romantic 
monologue, writes most enthusiastically of Shakespeare's genius in 
connection with the great soliloquist, Hamlet. Perhaps because Col-
eridge identifies with Hamlet, monological forms characterize his 
strongest poems. Although the conversation poem does not inher-
ently carry abnormal associations, the solitude it implies creates an 
opening for the aberrations of "phantom magic." Coleridge further 
develops the conversational mode suggested by Shakespearean so-
1The conversation poems also draw from traditions of songs and sonnets, but these 
earlier first-person forms rarely pretend to capture a particular moment and setting in 
time and space. John Donne's poems include notable exceptions. Shakespeare's sonnets 
characteristically imply a generalized, nonspecific present. Coleridge's conversational 
tone finds a significant echo in Wordsworth's "Tintem Abbey. " 
1 34 
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liloquy and Augustan poetry and clusters a set of related poems around 
supernatural phenomena. 
The rise and fall of Coleridge's conversational pretense may be 
traced as a fictional biography, from his identification with Hamlet, 
through "The Eolian Harp" and "Frost at Midnight," until the sub-
version of the conversational mode by "Kubla Khan." The multiple 
voices of "Kubla Khan" disrupt the scene of vision, revealing a po-
tential threat to composition. If Coleridge's early poetry succeeds by 
virtue of its firm control of the conversational tone, his more radical 
lyrics disturb the poetic voice that had been established. 
Coleridge's ''Hamlet'' 
Coleridge's identification with Hamlet provides a key to his poetic 
form: while Collins, Cowper, and Young are more immediate pre-
cursors, Coleridge makes the meditative Hamlet his imaginative model. 
Returning year after year to the figure of Hamlet, Coleridge both 
characterizes him in general and attempts to grasp the secret of his 
soliloquies. Admiration is tempered by awareness of Hamlet's failure 
and deterioration; Coleridge uneasily recognizes himself in Hamlet, 
and fears the imbalances that accompany imaginative excess. After 
carefully interpreting Hamlet's soliloquies, Coleridge observes that 
"such a mind as Hamlet's is near akin to madness."2 He affirms, yet 
fears, their kinship . 
The Marginalia to the text of Hamlet provide an opportunity of 
reading, as it were, over Coleridge's shoulder. In one note dated 
January 7, 1819, Coleridge states Hamlet's central importance for his 
own career: "Hamlet was the play, or rather Hamlet himself was the 
character in the intuition and exposition of which I first made my 
turn for philosophical criticism, and especially for insight into the 
genius of Shakespeare, noticed" (SC I, 16). Coleridge notices Hamlet 
"especially for insight into the genius of Shakespeare," leaving am-
biguous whether "genius " refers to Shakespeare's creative powers 
or to his mind. Hamlet is, for Coleridge, both an exemplary expression 
2Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shakespearean Criticism, 2d ed., ed. Thomas Middleton 
Raysor (London:). M. Dent, 1960), vol. 2, p . 152 (henceforth cited as SC). 
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of Shakespearean dramatic method and a reflection of Shakespeare 
himself. In Hamlet, the style and psychology of genius come together. 
"I have a smack of Hamlet myself, if I may say so," Coleridge 
hazards to confess in the Table Talk of June 24, 1827.3 He describes 
Hamlet's character as "the prevalence of the abstracting and gener-
alizing habit over the practical," just as he had earlier referred to 
Hamlet's "predominant idealism" and "ratiocinative meditativeness" 
(SCI, 22). Coleridge admires "Shakespeare's mode of conceiving char-
acters out of his own intellectual and moral faculties," and insistently 
returns to "The Character of Hamlet" (SCI, 34). He accepts the dra-
matic illusion and discerns the cause of Hamlet's excesses: the out-
ward and the inward fail to balance. 
A Lecture of 1812 asks, "What then was the point to which Shake-
speare directed himself in Hamlet?" Coleridge's response elaborates 
the dialectics of self-presentation: "He intended to pourtray [sic] a 
person, in whose view the external world, and all its incidents and 
objects, were comparatively dim, and of no interest in themselves, 
and which began to interest only, when they were reflected in the 
mirror of his mind" (SC II, 150). Shakespeare projects himself onto 
Hamlet, who in turn reflects the world "in the mirror of his mind." 
Yet Coleridge's interest in Hamlet is similar to Hamlet's interest in 
the world, as a reflection of himself. Furthermore, Coleridge's account 
of the "mirror of the mind" hints at Richard III's impulse to view his 
"shadow in the sun" (Richard III, I.i .26; cp. I.ii.262-63), which unites 
psychology and performance. Coleridge does not only allude to the 
narcissism of perception that is reflected in an internal mirror, a dis-
placement of the tabula rasa. He alludes to Wordsworth's "emotion 
recollected in tranquillity" and the final lines in the poem "I wandered 
lonely as a cloud" when he comments that "Hamlet beheld external 
things in the same way that a man of vivid imagination, who shuts 
his eyes, sees what has previously made an impression on his organs" 
(SC II, 150). But Coleridge's perceptual afterimage is a reflection of 
Shakespeare or Hamlet. 
While he enthusiastically praises Hamlet, Coleridge never dissim-
ulates the identification by which he discovers himself in Shake-
speare's genius. He claims a basic affinity with Hamlet; his 
interpretations equally invent a Hamlet who has more than a smack 
' Table Talk of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (London: George Routledge, 1884), 56. 
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of Coleridge. Reflecting on him, Coleridge finds the locus of interest 
in Hamlet's existence to be a "mirror of his mind, " a mirror that 
reflects its interpreter and catches the projection of its creator. The 
hall of mirrors superimposes images of Shakespeare, Hamlet, and 
Coleridge. But by attending to the personal image of his precursor, 
Coleridge conceals his debt to Hamlet's characteristic form, the solil-
oquy, the starting point of Coleridge's poetic strength . 
The Scene and Moment of Monologue 
Coleridge's first literary successes, the conversation poems, are like 
Shakespearean soliloquies that have been freed from dramatic form. 
Coleridge obliquely transposes a set of conventions already centuries 
old. Coleridge's conversation poems are continuous with a more re-
cent mode to the extent that they are "in the Augustan vein."4 Yet 
Coleridge's conversation poems dissimulate their poetic nature-un-
like the excessively "poetic" poems of Gray, Collins, and Cowper. 
Far closer to theatrical soliloquy, the conversation poems set a scene 
that takes the place of dramatic context. Coleridge's first-person 
speakers become the center of an implicit, unwritten drama. 
"Conversation poem" is first of all an oxymoron. Conversations 
are not poems, nor are poems conversations. All pretense, the con-
versation poem creates a fictional scene in which a persona "speaks." 
The entire scenario is an illusion generated by poetic "voice," and 
Coleridge's conversation poems characteristically reveal their decep-
tion by wandering toward imaginative extremes. The fictive conver-
sational voice returns to the initial scene only after following Hamlet's 
example and engaging in flights of fancy. 
Coleridge's conversation poems work as invocations of presence, 
where the imagination acts as muse to invoke the poetic voice. "The 
Eolian Harp," according to one contemporary critic, "collapses in a 
self-surrender that augurs badly for the Imagination.''5 Yet Coleridge's 
early poetic monologues succeed precisely through their presentation 
of a poetic voice, a feigned presence that redirects the conventions 
4Walter Jackson Bate, Coleridge (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 46. 
' Harold Bloom, The Visionary Company, 2d ed . (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 
202. 
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of Shakespearean drama. Coleridge introduces novel conventions to 
create poems that "affect not to be poetry." 
"The Eolian Harp," in Poems on Various Subjects (1796), was origi-
nally entitled "Effusion XXXV, Composed August 2oth, 1795, at Cle-
vedon, Somersetshire." The title links the scene of composition with 
that of the poetic persona, insisting that the poem be read as a kind 
of lived soliloquy. But the details of time and place only conceal the 
poem's literary pretense. The actual date and location of composition 
are not necessarily relevant to the imaginary scene of a monological 
speaker. 6 
On the surface, "The Eolian Harp" cannot be considered a mon-
ologue. The conversational voice addresses another person, as does 
the speaker in Shakespeare's sonnets, but within an explicit scene of 
discourse. What scene of dialogue does the poetic voice project? Pe-
culiarities of the conversational pretense become obvious as soon as 
we attempt to specify the mode of speech it purports to represent. 
This is an odd scene in which apparently not a single word is spoken 
aloud (except perhaps those suggested by EH 52-54). By means of 
direct address and synecdoche, the opening lines describe and create 
a pose of intimacy: "My pensive Sara! thy soft cheek reclined I Thus 
on mine arm." The "I" addresses Sara either silently within an im-
aginary scene or imaginatively within a scene of writing. Coleridge 
activates a variety of illusions, freed from dramatic forms, such that 
the monologue hovers ambiguously between represented imagination 
(the poem's speaker is silently together with Sara) and imagined rep-
resentation (the poem's author writes of himself and Sara). Verbless, 
indefinite in time, the words present a reciprocal contact in which 
there can be no final distinction between literary and real personae. 
At all levels of illusion, the scene expands from the point of intimate 
contact to the lovers' surroundings. Spatial description combines with 
a hint at the recent past: 
most soothing sweet it is 
To sit beside our Cot, our Cot o'ergrown 
With white-flowered Jasmin, and the broad-leav' d Myrtle, 
(Meet emblems they of Innocence and Love!) 
And watch the clouds, that late were rich with light, 
6'The Eolian Harp" (henceforth EH) is quoted from Coleridge's Poetical Works, ed. 
Ernest Hartley Coleridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912). 
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Slow saddening round, and mark the star of eve 
Serenely brilliant (such should Wisdom be) 
Shine opposite! 
[EH 2-9] 
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The sunset reflects the speaker's fantasy in a "soothing sweet" mood 
that finds sadness and serenity in nature. The following lines turn 
from sky to earth and from vision to smell and sound: 
How exquisite the scents 
Snatch' d from yon bean-field! and the world so hushed! 
The stilly murmur of the distant Sea 
Tells us of silence. 
[EH 9-12) 
A homonymic play confuses worldly "scents" with subjective "sense," 
for the speaker cannot separate the language that represents objective 
scents from language that presents subjective sense. The demonstra-
tive phrase, "yon bean-field," like "Thus" in line 2, signals the pre-
supposed scene of intimacy. Exquisite scents (and sense) lead to a 
proclamation of "the world so hushed!" Paradoxically, the poetic 
voice refers to the "murmur of the distant Sea" that "tells us of 
silence." A sound, when written, bears silence. Coleridge's conver-
sational voice is like the sea's murmur that speaks a silent 
communication. 
The subsequent description of the Lute is a figure of poetic 
imagination. The wind harp stands as an emblem for the entire 
poem: 
And that simplest Lute, 
Placed length-ways in the clasping casement, hark! 
How by the desultory breeze caressed, 
Like some coy maid half yielding to her lover. 
[EH 12-15) 
According to the familiar Romantic image, the poetic speaker should 
identify with the Lute as the muse plays upon his imagination. But 
images mirror each other as the harp's solo reverses the scene of the 
poem. In the figured reversal, Sara becomes associated with the Lute, 
which is "like some coy maid half yielding to her lover." Figurative 
development gradually detaches the speaker from his initial scene; 
the metaphorical relation further transforms the speaker's words into 
LITERATUR E OF MONOLOGUE 
a natural breeze that caresses Sara. In a sense, the speaker takes the 
place of his muse. 
Four moments of imaginative abstraction increasingly distance the 
poetic speaker from the initial scene (EH 17-25, 26-33, 34-43, 44-48) 
until Sara interrupts. Exclamations of pretended emotion characterize 
the speaker's monologue. The direction of causation is reversed, how-
ever, as an elaborate fantasy within fantasy returns the speaker to 
the Lute: 
And thus, my Love! as on the midway slope 
Of yonder hill I stretch my limbs at noon, 
Whilst through my half-clos' d eye-lids I behold 
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main, 
And tranquil muse upon tranquillity; 
Full many a thought uncall'd and undetain'd , 
And many idle flitting phantasies, 
Traverse my indolent and passive brain 
As wild and various as the random gales 
That swell and flutter on this subject Lute! 
[EH 34-43] 
At first, the Lute sounds in the silence of the poetic scene; finally, 
the Lute reappears within an imaginative context, as a figure for the 
"idle flitting phantasies" that "traverse my indolent and passive brain." 
The poetic mind becomes an object of description, while the Lute 
becomes subject-to tropological modification. 
Following several acceptable images, the poetic voice indulges in 
an excess. The fiction of the scene makes Sara's "more serious eye" 
the source of correction, calling the speaker back from visions of the 
"inward eye." The infraction is not so much that of "vain Philosophy" 
as of abstraction from acceptable theology. Sara's response, appar-
ently as silent as the poetic fantasy, also calls the speaker back to her, 
"Meek Daughter in the family of Christ" (EH 53). The speaker learns 
that God is not an appropriate object of fantasy. At his most literal, 
then, the speaker addresses Sara by placing her in a religious tradition . 
He further revalues the silence that opens the poem when he dis-
covers that "never guiltless may I speak of him I The Incomprehen-
sible" (EH 58-59). Multiple pretenses allow a fictional present to be 
infused by intimations of diverse absences; monologue as a poetic 
device suggests a scene of imaginary address. 
The imagery of "Frost at Midnight," in contrast to the spatial im-
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agery of the poem that purports to have been "Composed at Cleve-
don, Somersetshire," works through temporal fantasies toward the 
strengthened illusion of monological presence. The midnight speaker 
weaves together past reminiscences, the present moment, and future 
anticipations. Invoked presences intersect at midnight, a meeting of 
yesterday, today, tomorrow. "Frost at Midnight" also creates the 
illusion of a solitude more radical than that of "The Eolian Harp," 
for the speaker only addresses his sleeping child .7 Neither speaker 
appears entirely alone, but as the speaker of "Frost at Midnight" 
observes, 
The inmates of my cottage, all at rest, 
Have left me to that solitude, which suits 
Abstruser musings. 
[FM4-6] 
"Frost at Midnight" is comparable to a Shakespearean soliloquy 
without theatrical context. The drama of internal turmoil or "abstruser 
musing" animates Colderidge' s conversation poems, as when a mys-
terious natural scenario opens the midnight monologue: 
The Frost performs its secret ministry 
Unhelped by any wind. The owlet's cry 
Came loud-and hark, again! loud as before. 
[FM 1-3] 
The "secret ministry" of frost eludes perception, apparently creating 
ex nihilo. At this troubled moment, no imaginative wind activates 
poetic creation, whether figured as eolian melodies or as ice crystals. 
By projection or identification, frost at midnight is also the poet at 
midnight; the poem works through the speaker's effort to achieve 
reassurance through figuration. Whereas the speaker of 'The Eolian 
Harp" is inspired by his surroundings, the speaker of "Frost at Mid-
night" experiences difficulties that equally derive from his 
environment: 
'Tis calm indeed! so calm, that it disturbs 
And vexes meditation with its strange 
71 shall cite "Frost at Midnight" (henceforth FM) from Coleridge's Poetical Works, ed. 
Ernest Hartley Coleridge. 
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And extreme silentness. Sea, hill, and wood, 
This populous village! Sea, and hill, and wood, 
With all the numberless goings-on of life, 
Inaudible as dreams! 
[FM8-13] 
Solitude at first "suits I Abstruser musings," but excessive calm "dis-
turbs I And vexes meditation." Starting from the mysterious rite of 
natural creation, the poetic voice presents the corresponding human 
form of imaginative creation, linked to nature by the relation of father 
and son. The speaker is unsettled by an uncanny presence: " 'Tis 
calm indeed! so calm, that it disturbs I And vexes meditation." An 
indefinite "it" eludes comprehension, and the speaker falls into baf-
fled repetition of "sea, and hill, and wood." Negative description of 
the "numberless" and "inaudible" surroundings press the speaker 
toward paralysis until he invents a presence, like the Lute, that ini-
tiates further poetic development. 
The speaker, who like Coleridge's Hamlet seeks reflections of his 
own mind, makes an ash in his fireplace into a "companionable form": 
the thin blue flame 
Lies on my low-burnt fire, and quivers not; 
Only that film, which fluttered on the grate, 
Still flutters there, the sole unquiet thing. 
Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature 
Gives it dim sympathies with me who live, 
Making it a companionable form, 
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit 
By its own moods interprets, every where 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself, 
And makes a toy of Thought. 
[FM 13-23] 
Coleridge is aware that the "idling Spirit" has a propensity to interpret 
as an "Echo or mirror seeking of itself." Poetic creation is also, for 
such a speaker, the activity of a voice that seeks realization through 
poetry. 
If "The Eolian Harp" operates by figurative abstraction to fantastic 
imagery, "Frost at Midnight" works backward and forward in time 
to establish the continuity between father and son. Like the opening 
of "The Eolian Harp," stanza 3 addresses another: 
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Dear Babe, that sleepest cradled by my side, 
Whose gentle breathings, heard in this deep calm, 
Fill up the interspersed vacancies 
And momentary pauses of the thought! 
[FM43-47] 
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The child's breathing, unlike Sara's reproving glance, is a sheer rhe-
torical bridge between "the interspersed vacancies I And momentary 
pauses of the thought." The speaker identifies with the film on the 
grate; then, recognizing the arbitrariness of this figurative identifi-
cation, he establishes a more "natural" trope, in which his son acts 
to fuse past, present, and future. No interruption curtails the proc-
esses of fantasy: 
it thrills my heart 
With tender gladness, thus to look at thee, 
And think that thou shalt learn far other lore, 
And in far other scenes! For I was reared 
In the great city, pent 'mid cloisters dim, 
And saw nought lovely but the sky and stars. 
But thou, my babe! shalt wander like a breeze 
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags 
Of ancient mountain. 
The speaker of "The Eolian Harp" loses sight of Sara, but the speaker 
of "Frost at Midnight" makes the "Dear Babe" central to his imagi-
native affirmation. In a sense, the child becomes the speaker's in-
spiring "breeze." The final stanza projects further into the future, at 
the same time that a rhetorical device completes the circle, returning 
to the first line and present of the poem: 
Therefore all seasons shall be sweet to thee, 
... whether the eave-drops fall 
Heard only in the trances of the blast, 
Or if the secret ministry of frost 
Shall hang them up in silent icicles, 
Quietly shining to the quiet Moon. 
[FM 65-74] 
The troubling "secret ministry" is redefined in service to a poetic 
trance that dominates the naturalistic imagery. The midnight scene 
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becomes a place of creation, with icicle poems created in the light of 
the moon. 
Coleridge writes soliloquies that continue, and yet finally abscond 
from, the dramatic tradition. The conversation poem feigns repre-
sentational space and time in order to present a situated, lyrical mon-
ologue. Ultimately, the written form of conversational poetry only 
feigns to be voice, but the imaginative representation of presences 
can create a compelling illusion of the speaking subject. If the con-
versation poem pretends not to be poetry, it aims at the pretense of 
a speaking subject whose imagination transposes private experience 
into an accessible poetic form. 
Voices of Decay 
"Kubla Khan," the culmination of Coleridge's conversation poems, 
both employs and destroys the conversational mode. Replete with 
exclamations that indicate a presumed immediacy of feeling, Coler-
idge's strongest short poem no longer begins with a corresponding, 
intimate scene. Rather than present a scene of intimacy as the point 
of departure for imaginative wanderings, "Kubla Khan" opens with 
a fantastic landscape of Xanadu. The speaker's present is initially an 
absence from the poem, a lack that Coleridge's preface counters by 
describing the conditions of composition. But Coleridge presents a 
most peculiar scene of composition, in which the words of the poem 
purportedly accompany private imagery of a dream. On one level, 
the conversation poems strive to represent commonplace domestic 
situations, while "Kubla Khan" breaks off its elaborate fantasy in 
conjunction with a threat of madness. 
The prose preface operates as do the opening lines of "The Eolian 
Harp" and "Frost at Midnight," delineating a place and time of cre-
ative activity. Whereas the conversation poems only implicitly rep-
resent the moment of writing in their scenes of monologue, the preface 
explicitly discusses the genealogy of "Kubla Khan." Narrating a scene 
of interruption, the preface fosters the conception of "Kubla Khan" 
as "a vision in a dream" that has been only partially recovered by 
waking memory. 
Although prefaces are conventionally more literal than poems, crit-
ics have doubted the accuracy of Coleridge's autobiographical data. 
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A naive reading wishes to accept the preface as an accurate description 
of the scene of composition,8 while a more sober reading concludes 
that it is unreliable. 9 If we recognize preface and poem as equal literary 
fictions, however, neither half of Coleridge's double text merits special 
status. Both preface and poem voice a pseudoautobiographical "1," 
a parallel that unsettles the facile dichotomy between prose and verse 
as literal (or referential) and figurative (or fictional) . Preface and poem 
unsettle the conventional notions of representational correspondence 
in different genres. Too marvelous for strict autobiography, but not 
too literal for fiction, the preface need not depend on a pretension to 
autobiographical truth. 
The preface, "Of the Fragment of Kubla Khan," insistently refers 
to " the following fragment," emphasizing a part-whole relationship 
between present words and some unspecified totality . Coleridge den-
ies independent status to the poem "Kubla Khan, " perhaps because 
it breaks the familiar pattern of the conversation poems. The synec-
doche is accompanied by a perspectivizing allusion to "a poet of great 
and deserved celebrity," whose estimation of the poem contrasts the 
author's . Is the fragment great or small, heavy or light? "Fragments" 
also "vaulted like rebounding hail" in line 21 of the poem, before 
compared with "chaffy grain beneath the thresher's flail." The ground 
of this literary fragment shows itself to be as unsteady as are the 
fragments in " that deep romantic chasm" and will not support weight-
ier pretensions . The fragment is published, "as far as the Author's 
own opinions are concerned, rather as a psychological curiosity, than 
on the ground of any supposed poetic merits" (Pr. 1). 10 The request 
of Lord Byron, whose fame appears secure, provides ground for pub-
lication, even if not on the basis of "poetic merits." 
If "Kubla Khan" is a "psychological curiosity," the preface further 
insists on the authenticity of its narrative by citing purportedly real 
chronology and geography (Pr. 2). Yet Coleridge discusses the poem's 
"Author" at a distance suggested by the third-person form. The lan-
guage of cause and effect, illness and cure, add to an impression of 
8See John Livingston Lowes, T!Je Road to Xanadu: A Study in t!Je Ways of Imagination 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1927). 
9See Elisabeth Schneider, Coleridge, Opium, and Kubla K!Jan (New York: Octagon, 
1966). 
101 cite the preface ("Pr. ") by sentence number and the poem ("KK") by line number 
as they appear in Coleridge's Poetical Works, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge. 
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necessity in the narrated events: "In consequence of a slight indis-
position, an anodyne had been prescribed, from the effects of which 
he fell asleep in his chair at the moment that he was reading the 
following sentence, or words of the same substance, in 'Purchas' s 
Pilgrimage': 'Here the Khan Kubla commanded a palace to be built, 
and a stately garden thereunto. And thus ten miles of fertile ground 
were inclosed with a wall' "(Pr. 3-4). The author reads Kubla's com-
mand at the moment when a drug induces sleep, allowing him to 
evade the problems of conscious borrowing. The poem's allusions are 
thus casually ascribed to the influence of a virtually unconscious read-
ing rather than to a controlled act of writing. Purchas' words appear 
to ground Coleridge's fragment more firmly than do "poetic merits." 
Sleep further frees the author from responsibilities associated with 
deliberate action: "The Author continued for about three hours in a 
profound sleep, at least of the external senses" (Pr. 5). If Coleridge 
as dreamer does not consciously control the act of composition, an 
external-internal opposition gives his creativity the appearance of self-
generation. 
By describing a three-stage procedure, Coleridge effectively traces 
"Kubla Khan" to a creative act based on unconscious processes. 
Step 1, dream composition, is also not composition, because the au-
thor "could not have composed less than from two to three hundred 
lines; if that indeed can be called composition in which all the images 
rose up before him as things, with a parallel production of the cor-
respondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of 
effort" (Pr. 5). Can that be called composition "in which all the images 
rose up before him as things"? The previous images of "substance," 
"ground," and "fragment" suggest an affinity between physical and 
textual realities; here the extraordinarily substantial images may be 
either visual or poetic. The visionary moment is itself presumably 
extralinguistic, because Coleridge writes of a "parallel production of 
the correspondent expressions." Simultaneous with but not equiva-
lent to the images, the correspondent expressions appear as if nat-
urally or necessarily linked to what they express. Although words 
suggest themselves in parallel, the narrator indicates that the unu-
sually concrete images are his primary impression. In contrast to this 
claim, the underlying poetic meaning of "images" keeps his "vision" 
in literary bounds from the start. The ambiguous "image" begins to 
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undo the primary claim of an effortless vision that naturally gives rise 
to correspondent expressions. 
Step 2, transcription of the dream composition, follows immediately, 
when the author "appeared to himself to have a distinct recollection 
of the whole, and taking his pen, ink and paper, instantly and eagerly 
wrote down the lines that are here preserved" (Pr. 6). The instanta-
neous impulse to write implies that the poetic lines precisely repro-
duce the dreamed expressions. Unlike the prolonged dream period 
of "about three hours," the secondary scene of writing condenses 
into an instant. There is no need to judge whether the fifty-four crafted 
lines of "Kubla Khan" could actually be instantly or automatically 
composed: Coleridge's claim to a later, synchronic "recollection of 
the whole" is an aspect of his double text. The alleged instantaneous 
scene of writing strives to unify the diachronic process during which 
"all the images rose up before him as things ." This moment captures 
the dream sequence as a simultaneous order, admitting no break until 
the author completes "the lines that are here preserved.'m 
Step 3, interruption, occurs as suddenly as does the transcription. 
The "moment" of reading already appears in sentence 3 when the 
author "fell asleep in his chair at the moment that he was reading 
the following sentence." The necessity of a secondary act of reading, 
or dream interpretation, shows itself with the event of interruption. 
The published preface eludes any intimation of deliberate craft, how-
ever, by reducing the time interval to a moment: "At this moment 
he was unfortunately called out by a person on business from Porlock, 
11 A manuscript note unpublished until 1934 calls into question the claim to a genetic 
unity of " Kubla Khan." It similarly raises questions about the conscious intentions of 
a drugged subject but makes steps 1 and 2 appear to form part of the same process, 
for "a sort of Reverie" is contemporaneous with the act of composition: 'This fragment 
with a good deal more, not recoverable, composed in a sort of Reverie brought on by 
two grains of Opium, taken to check a dysentery, at a Farm House between Porlock 
& Linton, a quarter of a mile from Culbone Church, in the fall of the year, 1797." 
Probably written long before the Preface of 1816, this note is cited by Schneider, 
Coleridge, Opium, and Kubla Khan, 24-25. In discussing the double text of "Kubla Khan" 
as published, rather than the " facts" of its composition, we do not need to take the 
manuscript note into consideration. But the earlier, less extravagant version interest-
ingly contrasts the dualistic account of a dream followed by recollection; steps 1 and 
2 appear to take place simultaneously. The preface narrator emphasizes an immediate 
"vision" that is directly accompanied by a corresponding voice; "This fragment ... 
composed in a sort of Reverie" only grammatically omits the speaker ("I") from his 
act of composition and leaves the possibility of deliberate creation. 
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and detained by him above an hour" (Pr. 7). The dream and period 
of detainment both have measurable durations, but the transcription 
seems to break off in the midst of its lightning-fast burst. The preface 
subsequently refers to "the vision" retrospectively; on returning to 
his room, the author "found, to his no small surprise and mortifi-
cation, that though he still retained some vague and dim recollection 
of the general purport of the vision, yet, with the exception of some 
eight or ten scattered lines and images, all the rest had passed away 
like images on the surface of a stream into which a stone has been 
cast, but, alas! without the after restoration of the latter!" (Pr. 7). The 
mention of dissolving images affirms the independent, picturelike 
quality of an initial vision. But the speaker's subsequent "mortifica-
tion" establishes a gloomier connection between the fading vision 
and loss of life: mortificare is to cause to die . The interruption of the 
processes of writing is a symbolic death, especially for the older Col-
eridge, who knows that he has lost his poetic genius. 
As if to revise the preceding simile and derive new assurance, the 
preface cites ten lines from Coleridge's poem "The Picture ." This 
allusion is part of the effort to ground "Kubla Khan" visually. A "poor 
youth" suffers a loss like that of the narrator, and "then all the charm I 
Is broken-all that phantom-world so fair I Vanishes" (Pr. 8). But for 
the youth of "The Picture," in a narcissistic fantasy, natural events 
restitute what has been lost: 
The stream will soon renew its smoothness, soon 
The visions will return! ... 
And soon the fragments dim of lovely forms 
Come trembling back, unite, and now once more 
The pool becomes a mirror. 
[Pr. 9-10] 
Coleridge's conversation poems and reading of Hamlet similarly re-
volve around this quest after a mirror of the self. For the preface 
narrator, however, the metaphor fails: although he retains "some 
vague and dim recollection" of the vision, his fragments do not unite. 
In the narrative that describes the author's dream and transcription, 
the disruption is nonreversible and does not end in restoration. Falling 
short of the author's "phantom-world," the preface only mirrors an-
other text . 
The final paragraph of the preface contrasts the author's deliberate 
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intentions and his spontaneous creation: "from the still surv1vmg 
recollections in his mind, the Author has frequently purposed to finish 
for himself what had been originally, as it were, given to him" (Pr. 
11). The author's sleep writing takes on the aura of an inspired mo-
ment, "given" by unexplainable forces and inaccessible to conscious 
intentions. The preface thus claims that "Kubla Khan" is an inspired 
fragment never resumed after its abrupt interruption. The closing 
sentence projects a hypothetical future and readership by citing Theo-
critus' words, 'Til sing to you a sweeter song another day" (later 
emended to 'Tll sing to you a sweeter song tomorrow") . Like the 
final lines of the poem, this final proleptic awareness combines po-
sitive anticipation with a negative moment: "but the to-morrow is yet 
to come." 
The last stanza of "Kubla Khan" does not appear to derive from 
the same effortless, unreflective impulse that allegedly produces "the 
lines that are here preserved." Thus critics have been as skeptical of 
the poem's formal unity as doubtful of its genetic unity. Several in-
terpreters consider the poem to be divided into two disparate parts, 
before and after the shift to first person in the third stanza. 12 According 
to the critical cliche, an impersonal voice describes Kubla' s pleasure 
dome and grounds, after which a first-person speaker recalls a past 
vision, loosely associated with Xanadu. Based on the shift in "vision" 
that occurs in the last stanza, this received idea ignores the compli-
cations of the middle stanza, yet a two-part structure of the poem is 
commonly admitted. 
In the closing lines of the poem, a first-person voice presents an 
alternative version of origins. Like the preface, these lines interpret 
the mysteries of vision: "A damsel with a dulcimer I In a vision once 
I saw" (KK 37-38). Discontinuous with previous descriptions by the 
first stanza, these words implicate the speaker in his visionary ex-
perience and locate the vision at a distinct, past time . The dream is 
over. No longer speaking as if the forests were "here" and the gardens 
" there," the nostalgic voice recollects something that is no longer 
12Schneider, Coleridge, Opium, and Kubla Khan, 242-47; Walter Jackson Bate, Coleridge 
(New York: Macmillan, 1968), 78; George Watson, Coleridge the Poet (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1966), 124. One exception is an article by Alan Purves, "Formal 
Structure in 'Kubla Khan,' " Studies in Romanticism, 1 (1962), 187-91. On the basis of 
formal analysis, Purves concludes that the poem is finished and unified and that any 
further continuation would destroy its symmetrical precision . 
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immediately present, even to imagination. The first appearance of 
Kubla's world emphasizes the visual, but the damsel vision attends 
to sound: 
It was an Abyssinian maid, 
And on her dulcimer she played, 
Singing of Mount Abora . 
[KK 39-41] 
A new set of proper names displaces Xanadu, Kubla, and Alph. 13 The 
modified proper names, like the damsel's song, introduce additional 
words into the vision. As his earlier imaginative scene is superseded, 
the speaker loses his referential assurance, breaks off his represen-
tational pretense, and tries to recall the song of his imaginary figure: 
the Abyssinian Maid sings of a place, in a referential mode. Rather 
than strive to regain his attempted correspondence to immediate vi-
sion, the speaker gives up his own song in order to seek hers: 
Could I revive within me 
Her symphony and song, 
To such a deep delight 'twould win me, 
That with music loud and long, 
I would build that dome in air, 
That sunny dome! those caves of ice! 
[KK42-47] 
An imagined recollection of the damsel's music replaces the visions 
of Xanadu. But the relationship between damsel and dome is mys-
terious: what does the new vision have in common with the old? If 
the visions are linked, why is the damsel absent from Kubla's domain? 
The speaker's imagined damsel, playing her "sweet" instrument, con-
trasts the "woman wailing" he projects into Kubla's turbulent pleas-
ure grounds. The speaker implicitly acknowledges the instability of 
poetic constructs when he anticipates building "that dome in air ." 
As he longs to regain his lost vision, the speaker echoes intentions 
stated by the preface: "from the still surviving recollections in his 
mind, the Author has frequently purposed to finish for himself what 
13Could this "Alph" be the first letter of the Hebrew (or Greek) alphabet, making 
the sacred river a sacred language that flows "through caverns measureless to man" ? 
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had been originally, as it were, given to him." As in the citation from 
Theocritus (Pr. 12), completion depends on the existence of an imag-
ined audience: "And all who heard should see them there." The 
audience retraces the sequence of the author's creative process: his 
vision gives him a voice, and their hearing produces a visionary sight. 
Could the author speak his vision, the private would become public, 
establishing a previously isolated vision as a common referent. At the 
same time, the speaker would be perceived as mad and banished to 
a circle for the purposes of exorcism. 
This hypothetical communication would be incomprehensible, and 
provoke excommunication, because the audience could only respond 
with fear: "all should cry, Beware! Beware! I His flashing eyes, his 
floating hair!" (KK 48-49). The speaker is inscribed in the prosopo-
poeia that presents others' imaginary discourse, and hearers try to 
remedy the inspired state he now has them represent and invoke. 
The previous occurrence of things visionary makes relevant a warning 
to "weave a circle round him thrice, I And dose your eyes with holy 
dread." Suddenly the auditor-speakers are like Kubla: they seek to 
enclose the threatening poet, as Kubla' s decrees try to secure his 
pleasure grounds. A reversal takes place: whereas the speaker earlier 
identifies with Kubla and the poetic effort to stabilize a dome of 
pleasure, now he and his vision specifically endanger customary 
boundaries. Once the speaker renounces efforts to build on ground, 
instead seeking to "build that dome in air," he is associated with the 
destabilizing forces that undo Kubla's pleasure. Deviation from the 
conversational mode unleashes dangerous forces. The radicalized mode 
of monologue, a self-referential innovation that pretends to present 
the language of a dream, threatens to overturn the entire monological 
reference. 
Similar to the second half of the preface, the final stanza of "Kubla 
Khan" recognizes that the vision has faded. The preface explicitly 
narrates the scene of interruption and accepts the poem as a fragment. 
The poem, however, only implies and does not directly acknowledge 
the disappearance of vision. Without thematizing this loss, the speaker 
attempts to recuperate what has gone or rather considers the possible 
consequences of such a recuperation. The imagined speech of auditors 
at first affirms the preceding visionary stanzas, yet their response also 
works against affirmation. Because "I cannot" is implied by the con-
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ditional statement that begins, "Could 1," the first two stanzas are 
undermined .14 If the poet cannot "build that dome in air, " then the 
speaker himself judges his rendering of Xanadu unsuccessful. At the 
moment the voice reads and speaks its own failure to represent, the 
fictional pretense is undone and the poem ends. Though the poem 
ultimately strives for assurance, its final prosopopoeia narrates as 
complete a deterioration as the preface, only figuratively . While the 
preface unifies the poem by linking it to a single scene of writing, the 
final stanza of the poem shifts scenes as it projects voices and inten-
sifies the speaker's retrospective confession of dissolution. The pre-
face recalls a visionary writing that is abruptly disrupted; the poem 
(p)refigures this external interruption as an internalized self-undoing. 
Coleridge's conversational poems and "Kubla Khan" exemplify one 
stage in the shifting traditions of literary monologue. Expressing a 
particular moment in time and treating "Kubla Khan" as a psycho-
logical curiosity, Coleridge presents a text that purports to transcribe 
mental processes. Romantic and post-Romantic monologues combine 
lyrical voice and dramatic scene to create a moment of feigned dis-
course, on the boundary between writing and representation. 
Coleridge's conversation poems turn against their origins in Shake-
spearean soliloquy. Because the fictive speaker does not form part 
of a dramatic scenario, this persona is haunted by an absence that 
inheres in its pretense. "Kubla Khan" brings an end to the naive 
conversational mode, which it interrupts through the final acknowl-
edgment: the dream is over. Whereas the conversation poems affirm 
the solitary voice, "Kubla Khan" shows its inadequacy, as it succumbs 
to a combination of external and internal pressures. The monologist, 
compelled to follow the peculiar constraints of written conversation, 
tends to lose touch with mimetic conventions. Pointing the way be-
yond Hamlet and toward poetic monologues by Shelley and Brown-
ing, "Kubla Khan" uncovers the affinity between monologue and 
14Humphry House, Coleridge: The Clark Lectures, 1951-52 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 
1967), 115, and Marshall Suther, Visions of Xanadu (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967), 275, interpret "Could I" as " I can ." Carl R. Woodring, "Coleridge and 
the Khan," in Essays in Criticism, 9 (1959), 362, opposes House and interprets "Could 
I" as signifying " I cannot. " This ambiguity adds to the differential scar that sets the 
poem in contrast to the prose statement of incompletion . Can a text appropriate the 
story its tropes tell, by thematizing substitution, negation, interruption , or decay? 
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madness.15 As developed by nineteenth-century authors, the con-
ventions of poetic monologue both create and disrupt the illusion of 
a speaking subject. Monologue as a rhetorical swerve joins with mon-
ologue as a fiction of solitude. Mad monologues gradually displace 
the eolian monologue of meditation and move toward a new literary 
type that finds further expression in first-person narratives. 
15See, for example, Shelley's "Julian and Maddalo" and Browning's "Madhouse 
Cells." 
7 Poe's Narrative 
Monologues 
Edgar Allan Poe's narrative monologues border on madness and 
disrupt the normally associated conventions of voice. Monologue is 
solitary speech, whether physically isolated, morally deviant, or se-
mantically opaque; Poe's strongest narrators are not only solitary hu-
man beings, for as a fictive consequence of the criminal acts they 
narrate, they often speak from solitary confinement. But while his 
narrators appear isolated and deviant, Poe's narratives themselves 
swerve away from norms. An initial problem is to distinguish between 
the narrative conventions Poe borrows, transforms, and creates, be-
cause the superficially popular genre of his fiction conceals the rela-
tionship to English literary tradition. By emphasizing the intensity of 
reader experience above all else, Poe himself neglects literary history, 
yet even the most emotionally charged reception of a text is made 
possible by literary context. Although Poe does respond to conven-
tions of the Gothic novel, his revision of epistolary narrative and 
conversational poetry is more decisive. 
Poe's most compelling fictions succeed as representations of diverse 
and often pathological characters. 1 Yet if we suspect that conscious-
ness, in literature, is "a fictive appearance generated by language, 
'Compare David Halliburton's Edgar Allan Poe: A Phenomenological View (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), 27, 246-47. 
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rather than something language describes or reflects,"2 then we must 
attend to the devices by which fiction creates the illusion of repre-
senting a consciousness. Such devices depend on intertextual rela-
tions in literary history. The "I" emerges at various stages and in all 
genres of English literature, including dramatic soliloquy, conversa-
tional poetry, and first-person narrative. Whereas the dramatic frame 
clarifies what it means for a character to say "I," the poetic and 
narrative "I" raises problems that derive from the disparity between 
the actual form of writing and the imaginary scene of speaking. Poe 
revises the conversational mode to present dreams, fantasies, pas-
sions, obsessions. 3 
The meaning of first-person narrative in stories by Poe becomes 
clearer in the context of his eighteenth-century precursors. The ear-
liest epistolary fiction of Samuel Richardson brings the narrator into 
a peculiar condition of identity with the narrated world . If the sur-
est truth of experience is "I think," the most irrefutable literary as-
sertion is "I write." Yet who is the "I" of such a statement? The 
fictional "I" creates itself and, simultaneously, its frame. Especially 
where the letters of only one character constitute a fictional world, 
there is no clear separation between the narrating persona and the 
world narrated . After Richardson, then, the scene of writing is an 
accepted component of the English novel. This scene influences the 
later development of self-conscious prose and particularly modern 
internal monologue that pretends to reproduce a scene of unwritten 
thoughts. 
Prior narrative traditions are tame, however, when compared with 
those introduced by Poe's first-person tales. In a sense, Poe transfers 
the intensely present "I" of Romantic verse to an analogous "I" of 
narrative . But his first-person accounts do not merely transpose the 
conversation poem into a narrative form: Poe's narrated monologues 
unsettle the representational conventions on which they initially de-
pend. At the same time that a first-person voice reveals exalted states 
2J. Hillis Miller, The Disappearance of God, 2d ed . (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1975), ix. 
3Poe's "The Raven" may be viewed as a post-Romantic conversation poem. Taking 
the colloquial first-person voice for granted, Poe characteristically infuses formal devices 
of assonance, rhythm, and rhyme. The tensions already present in Coleridge's works 
are therefore intensified when Poe opposes the mental imbalance of his speaker to the 
formal precision of his verses. 
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of consciousness, Poe subverts the realistic pretense by focusing at-
tention on the act of writing. The scene of Poe's greatest originality 
is the point at which he disrupts the conversational tradition by tamp-
ering with the unexamined illusion of narrative voice. 
"I write in the present tense" 
Apart from the obvious, yet superficial, influence of Gothic novels, 
Poe is most significantly influenced by the first-person form of 
epistolary fiction. A first-person "voice" is clearly essential to the 
genre based on personal letters and diary entries. 
Samuel Richardson innovates in a monological vein by producing 
the epistolary novel Pamela (1740). Twentieth-century literary norms 
make the novelty of Richardson's narrative devices difficult to ap-
preciate: Richardson introduces a genre of self-reflective writing while 
planting the seeds of its undoing. Early in Pamela, for example, the 
heroine represents her past thoughts in a letter to her parents: "0 
Pamela, said I to myself, why art thou so foolish and fearful? Thou 
hast done no harm! What, if thou fearest an unjust judge, when thou 
are innocent, would'st thou do before a just one, if thou wert guilty? 
Have courage, Pamela, thou knowest the worst! . . . So I cheered my-
self; but yet my poor heart sunk, and my spirits were quite broken."4 
Recalling her thoughts in the form of a pseudodialogue at a specific 
moment, Pamela apparently practices what Shaftesbury calls the 
"Home-Dialect of Soliloquy." As Shaftesbury's analysis predicts, the 
soliloquist becomes "two distinct Persons" when Pamela reasons with 
herself_5 At the height of perplexity she contemplates suicide and 
thinks: "Pause here a little, Pamela, on what thou art about, before 
thou takest the dreadful leap; and consider whether there be no way 
yet left, no hope, if not to escape from this wicked house, yet from 
the mischiefs threatened thee in it" (Pam . t8o). On one level, this 
passage works as psychological realism that represents a process of 
thought. At the same time, the pause in Pamela's thoughts is a pause 
in her narrative of events, like the dramatic monologue Diderot de-
scribes as "a moment of repose for the action, and of turmoil for the 
•samuel Richardson, Pamela (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958), 28 (henceforth cited 
as Pam.). 
5Char. I, 170 and 158. 
Poe's Narrative Monologues 157 
character."6 While these passages represent past thoughts, the nar-
rative form appears to correspond to the represented moment. 
Richardson's Pamela also shows a self-conscious awareness of the 
process of writing. She accounts for her possession of writing ma-
terials (Pam. 100, 154) and at several points notes her time of com-
position to the hour. Pamela's activity of writing is, in addition, 
occasionally interrupted by the world she describes . Amid contem-
plations, Pamela writes, "But I must break off; here's somebody com-
ing" (Pam. 75). Even more vividly, she writes of her feeling of dread 
and its influence on writing: "Though I dread to see him, yet do I 
wonder I have not ... . I can hardly write; yet, as I can do nothing 
else, I know not how to forbear!-Yet I cannot hold my pen-How 
crooked and trembling the lines!-I must leave off, till I can get quieter 
fingers!- "(Pam . 191). After Pamela describes her inability to write, 
the narrative breaks. As the fictional Pamela exists only by virtue of 
her writing, she literally "can do nothing else." Her peculiar self-
awareness only slightly disturbs the representational illusion with the 
recognition that "Pamela" exists only as a fictive writer. We experience 
Pamela primarily as a writer, but she remains a realistic character 
within the fiction. 
Richardson's novel explicitly narrates Mr. B's approach to Pamela, 
and it tells a parallel tale of the reader's approach to her texts. Mr. B 
must fight to obtain Pamela' s writings, a struggle which identifies 
him with the reader, who now holds the texts that are also objects 
within the fictional world. Like a sympathetic reader, Mr. B under-
stands and loves Pamela all the more for the words she pens (Pam. 
242-44); in fact, he only begins to acknowledge the depth of her 
character through her writing, just as the reader discovers her. 
"I write, therefore I am" is the principle of first-person narration. 
Even for Mr. B, Pamela is most truly herself in her writings. Yet as 
Mr. B. kidnaps and isolates her, she is pushed toward a mode of 
writing that is not intended to be read. Pamela cherishes the notion 
that she can be identical with what she writes and defends herself 
against charges of insincerity: "I know I write my heart; and that is 
not deceitful" (Pam . 240). The purity of her manuscripts at first de-
pends on their remaining untouched by Mr. B; when he demands to 
see all she writes, he undermines the very possibility of writing (Pam . 
60enis Diderot, De Ia poesie dramatique (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1970), 91. 
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251). Pamela imagines that she will no longer be able to write "with 
any face" --or heart?-if she must write without monological isola-
tion, in the expectation of Mr. B's readership. In a sense, then, the 
novel ought to end as soon as she and Mr. B are united; Pamela 
writes, of necessity, for only as long as they are separated and she 
contemplates matters that she must hide from him. The scene of 
writing is linked to the developments that overcome Pamela's solitude 
by bringing her closer to the reader and to Mr. B. 
Henry Fielding proves to be a genuine critic when he subsequently 
lambastes the new epistolary fiction in his Shamela (1741), revealing 
the essence of Richardson's narrative monologues by means of comic 
distortions. Shame/a does not merely parody Pamela's more obvious 
quirks, such as the ambiguous character of the heroine. Fielding's 
caricature pokes fun at the improbable narrative device by which 
Pamela continues to write during the most heated moments of action, 
and in so doing, Fielding reveals the nature of Richardson's epistolary 
form. 
One of Shamela' s most humorous diary entries, purportedly writ-
ten "Thursday Night, Twelve o'Clock," may serve as an introduction 
to Poe's revision of narrative conventions. In a style that obliquely 
prepares the way for Molly Bloom's internal monologue, Shamela 
describes events as they occur: 
Mrs. Jervis and I are just in bed, and the door unlocked; if my master 
should come-Odsbobs! I hear him just coming in at the door. You see 
I write in the present tense, as Parson Williams says. Well, he is in bed 
between us, we both shamming a sleep; he steals his hand into my 
bosom, which I, as if in my sleep, press close to me with mine, and 
then pretend to awake.-I no sooner see him, but I scream out to Mrs. 
Jervis, she feigns likewise but just to come to herself; we both begin, 
she to becall, and I to bescratch very liberally. After having made a 
pretty free use of my fingers, without any great regard to the parts I 
attacked, I counterfeit a swoon. 7 
Shamela is a counterfeiter both in bed and in her narrative pretense 
that suggests simultaneity with narrated action. She can as easily feign 
an impossible narrative stance as she can "counterfeit a swoon." Thus 
the parody of Pamela's character combines with a comic exaggeration 
7Henry Fielding, " joseph Andrews" and " Shame/a ," ed . Martin C. Battestin (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 313. The parallel scene in Pam ., Letter 25, does not actually 
employ the present tense . For comic effect Fielding combines this outrageous scene 
with the most radical of Richardson' s stylistic innovations. 
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of her manner of writing: Fielding exposes the possibly bizarre con-
sequences of Richardson's innovation. First-person, present-tense 
writing results in a variety of difficulties, such as the paradoxical 
illusion that Shamela can simultaneously write her diary and engage 
in a battle with Mr. B. Nothing in Pamela reaches such self-contra-
dictory extremes, of course, yet Fielding aptly captures the potential 
turns of perversity made possible by Richardson's representations of 
thought and of moments of writing. One hundred years later, E. A. 
Poe develops a kindred genre in which diabolical monologists appear 
menacingly present. 
"Why will you say that I am mad?" 
In one sense, then, Poe's first-person narrators stand firmly in the 
tradition of epistolary fiction as initiated by Richardson and parodied 
by Fielding. But when Poe situates his work in relation to tradition, 
he refers almost exclusively to poetic models. In "The Poetic Princi-
ple," Poe establishes both an aesthetic theory and a canon of "English 
and American poems which best suit my taste." 8 While Poe argues 
strongly that he has discerned the poetic principle, he describes some-
thing that he himself invents, in connection with his own poetic 
preferences. Poe favors short poems of high intensity, on the basis 
of a "peculiar principle" of psychology: 
a poem deserves its title only inasmuch as it excites, by elevating the 
soul. The value of the poem is in the ration of this elevating excitement. 
But all excitements are, through a psychal necessity, transient. That 
degree of excitement which would entitle a poem to be so called at all, 
cannot be sustained throughout a composition of any great length. After 
the lapse of half an hour, at the very utmost, it flags-fails-a revulsion 
ensues-and then the poem is, in effect, and in fact, no longer such. 
[CPS II, 1021] 
On the surface, Poe's principle of literary taste is a "psychal neces-
sity," the human inability to sustain a state of excitement for longer 
than half an hour. Imposing a half-hour limit that is not literally 
8E. A. Poe, The Complete Poems and Stories of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Arthur Hobson 
Quinn and Edward H. O'Neill (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), vol. 2, p. 1021 
(henceforth cited as CPS). 
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necessary, Poe imagines a faintly sexual scene, derived from figurative 
demands of a literary scene in which the excitement "flags-fails-a 
revulsion ensues," and the poem loses its status as poem. An emo-
tional coupling between poem and reader takes place. But does the 
poetic principle really derive from "psychal necessity," or does poetry 
control psychology? Only superficially do Poe's poetics depend on 
exclusively psychological principles. If Poe admires verses that pro-
duce an exalted state in the mind of the reader, he seeks poetic per-
sonae that create illusions of similarly exalted conditions. 
The poetic principle of elevating excitement produces a present 
scene analogous to that of Coleridge's conversational poetry. A mo-
ment in the speaker's experience corresponds to the reader's exalted 
experience. One mode of Poe's writing is, then, a radicalization of 
the poetic genre Coleridge begins with "The Eolian Harp." In his 
"Letter to B--," he admires Coleridge's "towering intellect" and 
"gigantic power" yet adds that "in reading that man's poetry, I trem-
ble like one who stands upon a volcano, conscious from the very 
darkness bursting from the crater, of the fire and the light that are 
weltering below" (CPS II, 86o). Whereas Coleridge "imprisoned his 
own conceptions," Poe-for the sake of an exalted half hour-strives 
to free the bound forces, as in "Tamerlane," the dream poems, "The 
Raven," "The Sleeper," and "Annabel Lee." Poe's tales present even 
more powerful first-person presences. Often enough, Poe's narrators 
are themselves imprisoned, yet in some way liberated by the scene 
of narration. The liberation of bound forces and representation of an 
exalted consciousness are initial premises for Poe's fiction . Poe gives 
free expression to thanatos, an impulse toward death or destruction; 
beyond their scenes of murder, Poe's narrators perform their own 
self-destruction in dramas linked to "the imp of the perverse." 
The deviant narrators of "The Tell-Tale Heart," "The Black Cat," 
and "The Imp of the Perverse" in some ways extend into short fiction 
the epistolary and conversational modes developed by Richardson, 
Coleridge, and their followers. Yet Poe's narrators often confront the 
representational illusion at the same time that they dispute the su-
perficial claim that they are insane. In Poe's texts, the scene of mad-
ness combines with a controlled scene of writing; at exactly this point, 
Poe destabilizes the genre he assumes: rhetorical forms both constitute 
and question a conversational pretense. 
On one level, Poe's mad monologues may be read as expressions 
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of psychological realism. "The Tell-Tale Heart," for example, presents 
itself as the spontaneous narrative of a murderer: "True!-nervous-
very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am! but why will you 
say that I am mad? The disease had sharpened my senses-not de-
stroyed-not dulled them. Above all was the sense of hearing acute. 
I heard all things in the heaven and in the earth. I heard many things 
in hell. How, then, am I mad? Hearken! and observe how healthily-
how calmly I can tell you the whole story" (CPS I, 445). As the scene 
of discourse, we may imagine ourselves in conversation with a con-
fined lunatic. His denial of madness only intensifies the effect of his 
bizarre claim to have "heard all things in the heaven and in the earth." 
The opening words imply that we have provoked the speaker by 
asserting what he denies: far from being insane, he says, "the disease 
had sharpened my senses," and if we choose to listen, we will share 
his exalted mood for a few minutes. As soon as we begin to read, 
then, we find ourselves written into a drama in which we have ac-
cused the speaker of being nervous or mad. The narrative opens with 
a paradox, however, which unsettles the representational illusion. 
The speaker combines mad assertions with narrative lucidity and 
presents a disconcerting contradiction between his representing and 
represented personae. The discrepancy between sane narrator and 
madman perhaps shows the error of assuming that linguistic nor-
malcy implies psychological normalcy. The narrator is mad, or at least 
abnormal, according to his own account, because he kills an old man 
for no reason. He is doubly mad when he imagines he hears the 
pounding of the dead man's heart and gives away the crime he had 
concealed. Yet the narrator tells a coherent tale, as if to demonstrate 
out of spite that he is sane, refuting the ordinary belief that he must 
be mad. This contradiction overturns mimetic conventions: a literal 
reading of the mad narrator shows itself to be naive, because only 
Poe's textual pretense creates the illusion of disparity between mad-
man and sane narrator. 
"The Black Cat" follows similar patterns, without the exclamatory 
wildness of the tell-tale narration. The contradiction is even sharper 
in " the most wild yet most homely narrative which I am about to 
pen," for the scene of writing is explicit. Condemned to death, the 
narrator explains: "To-morrow I die, and to-day I would unburthen 
my soul. My immediate purpose is to place before the world, plainly, 
succinctly, and without comment, a series of mere household events. 
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In their consequences, these events have terrified-have tortured-
have destroyed me. Yet I will not attempt to expound them" (CPS I, 
476). Again Poe invents a situation of radical conflict, in which lurid 
and lucid details compete . Renouncing all value judgments, thenar-
rator resolves to tell his tale in the most indifferent tones. He explains 
his peculiar behavior only by reference to a philosophical principle. 
The speaker has been prone to mysterious states, as when "the fury 
of a demon instantly possessed me"; the narrator attributes his ulti-
mate downfall to perversity: 
Of this spirit philosophy takes no account. Yet I am not more sure that 
my soul lives, than I am that perverseness is one of the primitive 
impulses of the human heart-one of the indivisible primary faculties, 
or sentiments, which give direction to the character of Man. Who has 
not, a hundred times, found himself committing a vile or a silly action, 
for no other reason than because he knows he should not? Have we 
not a perpetual inclination, in the teeth of our best judgment, to violate 
that which is Law, merely because we understand it to be such? [CPS 
I, 478] 
Similar to an evil genius, the "spirit of perverseness" appears as a 
reversal of the daimonion that turns Socrates away from evil. The spirit 
of perverseness inverts, turns upside down, subverts: "It was this 
unfathomable longing of the soul to vex itself-to offer violence to its 
own nature-to do wrong for the wrong's sake only-that urged me 
to continue and finally to consummate the injury I had inflicted upon 
the unoffending brute" (ibid .). Rather than speak of some psycho-
logical drive that leads men to evil, the narrator points to an abstract, 
counterrational impulse to violate whatever is-nature or law. The 
impulse to perverseness, governed by the rhetorical figure of chias-
mus, is a kind of hidden nature in man. The mad narrator undoes 
himself both through his perverse actions and in his submerged story 
of textual subversion, a tribute to "the power of words" (CPS II, 637). 
The spirit of perverseness is an antidaimonion that turns the speaker 
against himself; the overt instigator, a black cat, bears the name of 
Pluto, god of the underworld. 
'The Imp of the Perverse" reveals more explicitly the perverse 
power of words. Half treatise and half tale, the text opens in the tone 
of philosophical inquiry: "In the consideration of the faculties and 
impulses-of the prima mobilia of the human soul, the phrenologists 
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have failed to make room for a propensity which, although obviously 
existing as a radical, primitive, irreducible sentiment, has been equally 
overlooked by all the moralists who have preceded them. In the pure 
arrogance of the reason, we have all overlooked it." The neglected 
primum mobile resists the efforts of reason, of perception, of human 
purpose. Speaking in the tones of rationality, Poe's narrator points 
to the limits of reason, beyond which our senses must be guided by 
belief. Experiencing vertigo on the edge of an abyss, we encounter 
"a shape, far more terrible than any genius or any demon of a tale ." 
A thought takes form: "Because our reason violently deters us from 
the brink, therefore do we the most impetuously approach it" (CPS II, 
639-40). Rather than call us away from evil, the perverted "genius" 
presses us toward the abyss. The perverse further opposes reason 
and systems of good and evil because it can at least appear to "operate 
in furtherance of good." 
The narrator condenses the paradoxical perverseness into a defi-
nition: "It is, in fact, a mobile without motive, a motive not motivirt 
[sic]" (CPS II, 638). Displacing comfortable theological beliefs accord-
ing to which God is the primum mobile, this alternative, an introjected 
"mobile without motive," upsets all order. The perverse suggests that 
there can be motion without any rational ground, and even the ap-
parent motive can be without motivation. 
By a perverse logic, the entire analytical discourse is transformed 
when the speaker describes his present situation. Not only does the 
apparently unmotivated take on motive; perversely, we become vis-
itors to a prison rather than readers of a philosophical discourse: 
I have said thus much, that in some measure I may answer your ques-
tion, that I may explain to you why I am here, that I may assign to you 
something that shall have at last the faint aspect of a cause for my 
wearing these fetters, and for my tenanting this cell of the condemned. 
Had I not been thus prolix, you might either have misunderstood me 
altogether; or, with the rabble, have fancied me mad . As it is, you will 
easily perceive that I am one of the many uncounted victims of the Imp 
of the Perverse. [CPS II, 640] 
The speaker denies his madness by calling himself a victim of the 
principle he has outlined. Yet his language hovers between calculation 
and illogic. The narrator explains "why I am here .. . wearing these 
fetters" by reference to a cause that is only a perverse absence of 
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cause. From the standpoint of realistic representation, the perverse 
narrator betrays his deviance through linguistic peculiarities. He be-
gins his tale: "It is impossible that any deed could have been wrought 
with a more thorough deliberation. For weeks, for months, I pondered 
upon the means of the murder" (ibid.). Like the narrator of "The Tell-
Tale Heart" who comments that "it is impossible to say how first the 
idea entered my brain" (CPS I, 445), he assumes an understanding 
of what he has not yet explained. Both fictional speakers break ac-
cepted conventions by employing the definite article, where "the idea" 
and "the murder" have not been previously explicated. If we read 
these narrators as mimetic characters, their linguistic deviations may 
be signs of defective mental processes. From another perspective, 
however, ill-formed syntax is a contradiction embedded in the nar-
rative by Poe, to enhance the contradictions in the narrator's account. 
The narrator undoes himself in a scene of internalized self-address, 
after the words "I am safe" have become his standard refrain: "One 
day, whilst sauntering along the streets, I arrested myself in the act 
of murmuring, half aloud, these customary syllables. In a fit of pe-
tulance, I remodelled them thus; 'I am safe-1 am safe-yes-if I be 
not fool enough to make open confession!' " (CPS II, 641). Language 
overthrows him, for as soon as he asserts one thing, the perverse 
drives him to subvert this rational thesis: 
No sooner had I spoken these words, than I felt an icy chill creep to 
my heart. I had had some experience in these fits of perversity, (whose 
nature I have been at some trouble to explain), and I remembered well, 
that in no instance, I had successfully resisted their attacks . And now 
my own casual self-suggestion that I might possibly be fool enough to 
confess the murder of which I had been guilty, confronted me, as if 
the very ghost of him whom I had murdered-and beckoned me on to 
death. [CPS II, 641] 
A rhetorical moment takes the place of all ghosts, when "the imp of 
the perverse" drives the speaker to confess. "The rabble" would un-
derstand his behavior as a symptom of madness, but his perversity 
turns out to be a reflex inherent in words. 
"Ms. Found in a Bottle" 
Poe's radical revision of the conversational pretense derives, then, 
not from the poetic principle of psychological exaltation, but from a 
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rhetorical application of the spirit of perverseness . The mad mono-
logues achieve powerful effects of psychological realism and can be 
read as the conversations of deranged speakers. Beyond the operation 
of perverseness in self-destructive behavior, however, Poe's narrators 
show that language may undermine its own theses. As soon as a 
murderer tells himself, "I am safe-yes-if I be not fool enough to 
make open confession" (CPS II, 641), he already assures that he will 
pronounce his doom. In the tradition of the epistolary and confes-
sional novel, several of Poe's short fictions more radically disrupt the 
conversational mode by recognizing themselves as writing, and the 
realistic pretense fades . 
"Ms. Found in a Bottle" initially confronts the reader with an un-
certainty: Is this the manuscript found, or will it describe a recovery 
of some other document in a bottle? The manuscript we read is not, 
in any obvious sense, found in a bottle. Apparently, the story may 
be about a "Ms. Found in a Bottle," or it may actually be this manu-
script. The story generates the odd illusion that it exists within itself. 
A perplexing ambiguity makes impossible any clear distinction be-
tween the text that represents and the text that is represented . Mid-
way through the narrative, we are informed: "It was no long while 
ago that I ventured into the captain's own private cabin, and took 
thence the materials with which I write, and have written. I shall 
from time to time continue this journal. It is true that I may not find 
an opportunity of transmitting it to the world, but I will not fail to 
make the endeavor. At the last moment I will enclose the MS. in a 
bottle, and cast it within the sea" (CPS I, 133). The bottle is a familiar 
figure of textuality, of the metonymic relation between form and con-
tent, literary container and the thing contained. But the expected 
configuration is inverted: whereas the container is a bottle within the 
textual world, what is contained is the text itself. This illusion is also 
destroyed, however, because the bottle only exists by virtue of the 
text "inside" that describes its existence. Perversely, the text of "Ms. 
Found in a Bottle" usurps the world it describes by showing that it 
is identical with that world. The mimetic convention slips away when 
the text discloses itself merely as a text; the bottle and the wine merge, 
the container and the contained become inseparable. 
Yet the representational level remains: "At the last moment I will 
enclose the MS. in a bottle, and cast it within the sea." The text 
masquerades as an object in the world it represents; Poe, by titling 
the story, pretends to verify this pretense . Poe also "adds" an epi-
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graph that accords a special status to the words of the desperate writer: 
"Qui n'a plus qu'un moment a vivre I N'a plus rien a dissimuler" 
("One who has only a moment to live I Has nothing more to con-
ceal")." According to this proverb, then, no dissimulation can occur 
if the writer is on the verge of death. In the final lines of the story, 
"amid a roaring, and bellowing, and thundering of ocean and tem-
pest," the narrator writes that "the ship is quivering-oh God! and-
going down!" At this moment, presumably, the text is enclosed in 
the bottle, just as the ship is swallowed up by the sea. But the rep-
resentational illusion is also engulfed as the moment of writing be-
comes the moment of death: we can never remove the text from its 
alleged bottle, for text and bottle are identical. According to the rhe-
torical figure, the inside of the bottle should represent its contained 
meanings, but the fullest meaning of Poe's story is that this text is 
identical with its inside, the entire text is its meaning, so that in some 
sense the bottle can never be uncorked. 9 
The writer or speaker in "The Cask of Amontillado" never reveals 
his present place, yet he embeds figurative clues within the tale he 
narrates. In connection with the story of ruthless murder, a first level 
of allegory makes the unfortunate Fortunato a stand-in for the reader. 
As readers, our mistake is to think we can confidently, safely uncork 
a text and savor its wine. Within the representational illusion, For-
tunato shows the same faiblesse: "He had a weak point-this Fortun-
ato---although in other regards he was a man to be respected and 
even feared. He prided himself on his connoisseurship in wine" (CPS 
II, 667) . The narrator rightly claims that "I did not differ from him 
materially"-because, of course, both are textual fictions---"and bought 
largely whenever I could ." Yet they do differ: Fortunato prides himself 
on an ability at wine tasting; the narrator represents himself primarily 
as a buyer of wines. Fortunato is like a presumptuous literary critic, 
while Montressor is a writer who stores his textual bottles in endless 
vaults. While staging Fortunato's death, the narrator figures himself 
as a writer within the story. Fortunato makes the mistake of wishing 
to outdo Luchresi, who is reputed to have a fine "critical turn" (ibid.). 
As he walks unknowingly toward his tomb, Fortunato laughs and 
"threw the bottle upward with a gesticulation I did not understand ." 
9lntertextual relations between Poe's " Ms. Found in a Bottle" and Defoe's Robinson 
Crusoe constitute another extramimetic level of meaning, analysis of which is beyond 
the scope of the present discussion. 
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This is a potentially troubling moment for the narrator, whose reader 
has taken the text, or the act of signifying, into his own hands: 
I looked at him in surprise. He repeated the movement-a grotesque 
one. 
"You do not comprehend?" he said. 
"Not 1," I replied. 
"Then you are not of the brotherhood." 
"How?" 
"You are not of the masons." [CPS II, 669] 
The speaker is troubled by his victim's continued independence. How 
can the author of a text or scheme respond to such a rebellion? At 
this provocation, which is like that of an elusive reader, the narrator 
turns the situation around: 
"You are not of the masons." 
"Yes, yes," I said; "yes, yes." 
"You? Impossible! A mason?" 
" A mason," I replied. 
"A sign," he said. 
"It is this," I answered, producing a trowel from beneath the folds 
of my roquelaire. 
"You jest," he exclaimed, recoiling a few paces. [Ibid.] 
At first, "mason" refers to the secret order of Masons, an order that 
separates itself by means of arcane signs. Yet the narrator quells his 
reader's rebellion by demonstrating that his signs escape him; we 
now understand the opening line of the story: "The thousand injuries 
of Fortunato I had borne as I best could, but when he ventured upon 
insult, I vowed revenge" (CPS II, 666). Poe's persona takes revenge 
on his critics, showing their inability to understand what they say by 
literalizing their figures of speech and demonstrating that their error 
entombs them. Fortunato believes that the Masonic order controls its 
secret language, but he learns that its language can control him. The 
pun on "mason" turns a trowel into an ominously literal sign of the 
Mason's demise, and Fortunato can only lean heavily on the narrator's 
arm as he walks toward his death. 
"The Cask of Amontillado" suppresses the rebellious reader by 
writing him into the text and by entombing him in a subterranean 
vault. The trowel, a figure for the stylus, walls up unfortunate For-
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tunato, who tries to dismiss Montressor's action as a joke. But the 
act of writing is utterly serious: as "I forced the last stone into its 
position; I plastered it up" (CPS II, 671), and the story ends. The 
Mason, unable to control his trope, finds himself victimized by the 
perverse action of masonry. The narrator becomes confused with what 
is narrated, the container with the contained, as if urging us to disbe-
lieve the mimetic conventions that pretend to present the voice of a 
speaking subject. The reader, too, should be unable to savor his wine, 
confronted by a double who has become like wine decomposing within 
a bottle, the corpse within a textual tomb. 
Poe takes up the first-person form only to transgress its usual lim-
itations. The "I" no longer rests with a stable representational func-
tion, for behind the mask are only contours of the mask. Where the 
fictionally speaking voice becomes inextricably bound up with the 
events it speaks, the more solid ground of mimetic fiction crumbles . 
There remains an enhanced sensitivity to the dynamics of textual 
illusion. 
First-person narratives, from Richardson to Poe, enact the unifi-
cation of narrator and narrated, narration and event, creator and 
created. When the mimetic framework is questioned by internal con-
tradictions, self-narrative unsettles the barrier between signifying and 
referential functions of language. To represent a self, narration reflects 
itself. 
The literary life of self perhaps corresponds to an equally fictional 
worldly self that depends on performance for its existence. The monos 
of monologue can no longer stand as a subject or monad and is rather 
a textual swerve. For monologue is not the logos of subjectivity but 
only the linguistic embodiment of isolation and deviance that reveals 
perverse origins of the fictive subject. 
8 The Genius of 
Internal Monologue 
"Internal monologue" and stream-of-consciousness techniques 
purport to represent, or even to transcribe, fictional characters' in-
ternal speech. 1 But how is it possible for written words to stand for 
unspoken language? The conventions of internal monologue appear 
most justified by the notion of thought as "speech minus sound." If 
talking to oneself is no different from talking aloud, then the in-
wardness of a subject might as well be represented in the familiar 
language of dialogue. While some authors do employ internal mon-
ologue as if to transcribe internal speech, the more radical twentieth-
century novels break literary conventions by representing internal 
speech in ways that deviate from ordinary language. Opposing the 
psychologists who maintain that subjectivity can be transcribed, writ-
ers of stream-of-consciousness technique strive to create the illusion 
of an inwardness that eludes transcription. 
According to a deceptively simple commonplace of literary history, 
modern literature strives to represent the "inner life" of subjects. This 
inwardness is, however, never as autonomous as it superficially ap-
pears to be. The innovative works by Edouard Dujardin, Arthur 
Schnitzler, and James Joyce demonstrate that the language of selfhood 
depends on otherness for its existence, because monologue always 
1Throughou t this chapter the reader should place the (perhaps unavoidable) mis-
nomer "internal monologue" in imaginary quotation marks. 
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incorporates elements of dialogue. The context of vocalized speech is 
a sub-text of internal dialogue, and the context of writing is formed 
by the pre-texts of literary history. 
Late nineteenth-century psychology suggests a distinction between 
"internal speech" and "stream of consciousness." While internal 
speech is the essentially linguistic process of thought, "stream of 
consciousness" refers to an extralinguistic level. Victor Egger opens 
his systematic discussion in La parole interieure (1881) by stating, "At 
every instant, the soul speaks its thought internally."2 Egger suggests 
that internal and external speech are substantially alike. But Henri 
Bergson's Essai sur les donnees immediates de La conscience (1888) and 
William James's Principles of Psychology (1890) emphasize the nonver-
bal character of the "stream of thought." Stream of consciousness is 
conceived as a nebulous experiential process to which language is 
foreign, while internal speech occurs in our language of everyday 
communication. 
Literary developments evidently parallel changes in psychological 
theory when they affirm these conceptions of thought. Internal mon-
ologue purports to represent internal speech directly, while stream-
of-consciousness technique creates the illusion of representing a pre-
linguistic realm. Literary critics for the most part agree on this 
distinction. 3 
One central tension within modern fiction derives from the con-
tradictory claims of internal monologue and stream-of-consciousness 
techniques. Before the rise of the novel, Shaftesbury prepares a way 
for psychological fiction by discussing soliloquy at great length. In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, then, characters' thoughts 
are often introduced as a kind of coherent talking to oneself. Such 
rationalistic conceptions begin to collapse with the rise of modern 
psychology and symbolist writing. Edouard Dujardin is among the 
first wave of writers whose fictions attempt to capture the extrarational 
workings of the mind; Arthur Schnitzler's coherent narratives of in-
ternal speech return to a more rationalistic form . James Joyce presses 
2Victor Egger, La parole in terieure: Essai de psychologie descriptive (Paris: Germer Bailliere, 
1881), 1. 
3See Lawrence Edward Bowling, " What Is the Stream of Consciousness Technique?" 
in PMLA, 65 (June 1950), 345; Francis Scarfe, The Art of Paul Valery (Melbourne: William 
Heinemann, 1954), 111; and Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Na ture of Narrative 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 177· But compare Melvin Freedman, Stream 
of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method (London: Oxford University Press, 1955). 
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further into the textual unconscious that is inaccessible to ordinary 
language but that finds a possible expression in diverse forms of 
stream-of-consciousness technique. In no case can there be a direct 
correspondence of a literary passage to a represented process of 
thought: the relationship always depends on elaborate conventions 
of mimesis. The problem is not to evaluate these conventions, then, 
but to discern a competition between different formal devices and 
their structural differences in relation to thought. 
The history of literary monologue is a story of the rhetorical pro-
cesses that transform codes, literary devices that purport to corre-
spond to phenomena of internal speech. The relationship between 
lived internal speech and literary internal monologue is, like the re-
lationship Nietzsche describes between object and subject, "an in-
dicative carry-over, a stammering translation into a completely foreign 
language. " 4 
The Consciousness of Internal Monologue 
According to Edouard Dujardin, one of the central goals of literary 
internal monologue is to eliminate the apparent discrepancy between 
represented thought and the technique of representation. In his own 
terms, internal monologue suppresses the appearance of narrative 
intrusions: "The first object of internal monologue is, remaining within 
the conditions and the framework of the novel, to suppress the in-
tervention, at least the apparent intervention, of the author, and to 
permit the character to express himself directly, as does the traditional 
monologue at the theatre."5 The monologue aims to "express thoughts" 
and achieve the unmediated illusion by allowing a fictional character 
"to express himself directly" (MJ 215) . According to Dujardin, there 
are essential differences between monologue in drama and in the 
novel, since narrative monologue can accompany continued action, 
whereas the action of a play stops when a monologue begins. In fact, 
the essential difference between internal monologue and first-person 
narration is that the internal monologue can follow a character in the 
4Friedrich Nietzsche, "Uber Wahrheit und Liige im aussermoralischen Sinne." 
5Edouard Dujardin, "Les lauriers sont coupes" and " Le monologue interieur," ed . Carmen 
Licari (Rome: Bulzoni, 1977), 214. I shall henceforth cite the former as LC and the latter 
as MI. 
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present tense while he moves through a fictional world, but as Field-
ing's Shamela demonstrates, first-person narrative easily becomes ri-
diculous when it describes a present action other than the scene of 
writing. 
Internal monologue in fiction is supposed to correspond to a scene 
and moment of thought. Simultaneity is essential, as Valery Larbaud 
observes when he writes that internal monologue seizes thought "dose 
to its conception."6 If we conceive internal speech as a linguistic phe-
nomenon that can be transcribed, then internal monologue is a pre-
tended record of the linguistic stream of thought. But if internal speech 
is already a kind of writing in code/ then the relationship between 
internal speech and internal monologue is closer to a translation from 
one code to another. The different types of internal monologue tech-
nique imply different conceptions of internal speech and of its rhe-
torical accessibility to narrative. The thoughts of a fictional character 
do not first exist in order to be secondarily represented, however, so 
that only the primary illusion is of a correspondence between writing 
and the scene of internal speech. 8 
Les lauriers sont coupes (1887) opens impersonally, with a description 
that contains no trace of personal pronoun or verb: "An evening of 
setting sun, of distant air, of profound skies; and of confused crowds; 
of noises, of shadows, of multitudes; spaces infinitely extended; a 
vague evening."9 This disjointed sentence produces a double effect 
of mystery. The evening is modified by a sequence of genitive con-
structions; the twilight scene is replete with ambiguous distances in 
the air, sky, and space. To whom does the scene belong? "Of" con-
fuses subjective and objective genitive to suggest that the evening 
belongs to the sun, air, confused crowds. Or is the scene only a 
6In his preface to the second edition of LC (Paris: Albert Messein, 1924), 6. 
7See L. S. Wygotski, Denken und Sprechen, trans. Gerhard Sewekov (Stuttgart: S. 
Fischer, 1969), chap. 7· 
"Internal monologue clearly differs from Coleridge's conversational pretense to the 
extent that internal speech is not conscious of itself as a writing. Naturalistic internal 
monologue contrasts with Shakespearean dramatic soliloquy, because internal speech 
does not obviously occur in the eloquent diction of Shakespeare' s verse. Internal mon-
ologue further differs from Poe's first-person narrations in which a character appears 
to address the reader, because a character' s internal speech is addressed to himself or 
is addressed only imaginatively to another individual. Yet internal monologue shares, 
with all other forms of monologue, complex conventions that create illusions of 
subjectivity. 
9LC 93· In English, see Edouard Dujardin, We'll to the Woods No More, trans. Stuart 
Gilbert (New York: New Directions, 1938). 
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mysterious "infinitely extended" literary space? After the sequence 
of modifications, the only progress is from "an evening" to "a vague 
evening" until the continuation produces "a clear evening." The text 
revels in an invocation of elusive objects. 
The second sentence-paragraph suggests the language of causal 
explanation when it introduces the narrative "I": "For under the chaos 
of appearances, among the durations and sites, in the illusion of 
things that engender and beget themselves, one among the others, 
one like the others, one the same and one more, of the infinitude of 
possible existences, I arise; and observe how time and place become 
precise; it is the today; it is the here; the hour that tolls; and, around 
me, life; the hour, the place, an evening in April, Paris, a clear evening 
of setting sun" (LC 93). The apparently unmotivated "For'' (Car) points 
toward a new presence, the first-person consciousness. An "illusion 
of things that engender and beget themselves," the temporal and 
spatial chaos, is also a narrative illusion. The initial two sentences 
confront each other as two distinct narrative pretenses: impersonal 
and personal voice. Things only appear to "engender themselves" to 
the extent that the consciousness of the "I" is concealed. The text 
narrates a discovery of its own voice of internal monologue. Despite 
the fragmentary character of descriptive clauses, however, this voice 
sounds less like a transcription than like a written transformation of 
internal speech. 
The evening remains "vague" until the "I" specifies, in Hegelian 
fashion, its particular moment and place: "it is the today; it is the 
here." The moment becomes "sweeter" by being reflected in a con-
sciousness. The narrative takes pleasure in this turn, observing "a 
joy of being someone, of walking." Previously bound to impersonal 
description, the voice admits to a pleasure at becoming "someone," 
a center of consciousness and a body within the fictive world. 
Echoing the opening section, chapter 8 speaks from the now es-
tablished voice. Daniel Prince rides through Paris in a carriage with 
Lea: "In the streets the car in motion . .. . One in the crowd of unlim-
ited existences, thus I henceforth take my course, one definitively 
among the others; thus the today and the here, the hour, life are 
created in me" (LC 163; ellipses in original). The "I" creates itself by 
representing the moment in itself. The "I" is an illusory point source, 
an "internal" generator of language that invents its place as the phys-
ical companion of Lea and as the narrative companion of the reader. 
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At the start of the novel, Daniel Prince is lost in a crowd; now he reaches 
the height of self-attainment, as his narrative vehicle carries him and 
Lea together: "It is a feminine dream, the today; it is a touched femi-
nine flesh, my here; my hour; it is a woman whom I approach; and 
observe the dream towards which my life goes, this girl on this night" 
(ibid.). The evening has been redefined by the "I" that invokes and 
desires a feminine presence. "Observe the dream": fusing with the text, 
the voice is and tells its dream. The world of the fiction is "in me," 
where the "I" is both Daniel Prince's inner text and the text itself as 
origin of the illusion . Ultimately, there is no inner/outer dichotomy 
within the language of the narrative. No apparent intervention sepa-
rates narrator from narrated because the narrative unifies this double 
illusion of the personal and impersonal. 
One moment of internal language is especially riddled by paradox. 
Daniel Prince hears a slow waltz, and the narrative reproduces several 
measures of musical notation (LC 148). 10 What rhetorical device pro-
duces this effect? There is an obvious discrepancy between written 
notation and inner experience. How can a musical language be part 
of internal monologue? On first consideration, one might believe that 
the musical staff stands for the experience of hearing the transcribed 
sounds. Or one might say that Daniel Prince imagines the notes, hums 
them to himself, perhaps even visualizes their notation. But these 
approaches take the mimetic pretense for granted . Musical notation 
is a written code that, by virtue of unstated conventions, forms part 
of a feigned presentation of the code of internal speech. According 
to the pretense, literary internal monologue stands in a relation to 
speech as musical notation to musical sound. Elaborate conventions 
make possible the fictive correspondences between writing and in-
ternal speech (or between musical notation and musical experience). 
Although Dujardin names his stylistic device "monologue inter-
ieur," his narrative rarely appears to transcribe coherent inner thought. 
Instead, along the lines of what is now called stream-of-consciousness 
technique, Dujardin represents disjointed associations and inchoate 
fantasies. The distinctly modern character of his project lies in its close 
linkage of narration with silent consciousness. 
10Compare Arthur Schnitzler's more extensive use of musical notation in the closing 
pages of Fraulein Else, and that of James Joyce in Ulysses. 
The Genius of Internal Monologue 1 75 
Interiority Turns Outward 
The fiction of Arthur Schnitzler, a Viennese physician working in 
psychiatry, introduces new conventions in the representation of 
thought. Unlike Dujardin's narrative, Schnitzler's l.eutnant Gust[ (19<:n) 
and Fraulein Else (1924) often appear as transcriptions of internal speech. 
Despite the borderline states of consciousness they express, these 
characters' internal monologues give an overriding impression of ra-
tional contemplation. This does not necessarily imply, however, that 
the represented internal speech is as coherent as the internal mon-
ologue that represents it; the problem is that we cannot confidently 
establish the difference. 
Schnitzler acknowledges his formal debt to Dujardin in a letter to 
Georg Brandes: "I am pleased that the novella of Lieutenant Gustl 
amused you. A novella of Dostoyevsky, Krotkaya, which I do not 
know, is supposed to exhibit the same technique of thought-mono-
logue. But the first inducement to the form was given to me by a story 
of Dujardin, entitled les lauriers sont coupes. Only that this author 
did not know how to find the right material for his form." 11 While 
Les lauriers sont coupes crucially influences the form of Leutnant Gustl, 
several differences are immediately obvious. Dujardin anticipates the 
later stream-of-consciousness technique by hinting at a representation 
of Daniel Prince's incoherent, vaguely formulated impressions; 
Schnitzler writes an internal monologue that appears to transcribe 
only the rational processes of Lieutenant Gustl's thoughts. Dujardin 
implies that his narrative captures the prelinguistic stream of con-
sciousness, but Schnitzler restricts himself to the fictive internal speech. 
Leutnant Gust/ is, in fact, one of the earliest works of fiction to be 
entirely structured around the represented internal speech of a pro-
tagonist. Apart from modifying the meaning of internal monologue, 
Schnitzler chooses a peculiar, though in some ways typical, center of 
consciousness. In contrast to Daniel Prince, who flows with his aes-
theticized world, Lieutenant Gustl bristles with animosity. Schnit-
llOated June 11, 1901, this letter appears in Georg Brandes und Arthur Schnitzler: Ein 
Briefwechsel, ed. Kurt Berge! (Bern: A. Francke, 1956), 87-88. Compare the letter to 
Marie Reinhard, dated October 3, 1898: "Read . .. a very peculiar story (novel) of Du-
jardin, 'les lauriers sont coupes' "(in Arthur Schnitzler's Briefe, 1875-1912, ed. Therese 
Nicki and Heinrich Schnitzler [Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1981], 354). 
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zler's character strives to follow the military code in every respect, 
yet he constantly confronts "situations where inwardly he is not at 
one with the demands of his social persona."12 The contradictions 
within him serve as the starting point for Schnitzler's attack on the 
military order Gustl represents . Whereas Daniel Prince is at worst a 
naive and affected aesthete, Lieutenant Gustl is a despicable type . 
We may uneasily recognize aspects of ourselves in him, but we can 
hardly identify with Gustl. A dialogue of conflicting values is thus 
written into Schnitzler's story. 
Dialogue is explicit even in the language of Gustl's internal speech. 
Imagining conversations with the doctor he has challenged to a duel, 
he thinks: "Just wait, Herr Doktor, you will lose the ·habit of making 
such remarks!"13 Later, when he contemplates suicide, he holds an 
imaginary dialogue: "Yes, you'll never see me again, Klara-finished! 
What, little sister, when you accompanied me to the train on New 
Year's, you didn't think that you would never see me again?"(LG 23). 
Dialogical tensions also characterize a sequence of Gustl' s addresses 
to himself. 14 Resolved momentarily to commit suicide in consequence 
of a baker's insult, Gustl thinks: "All right, you've heard, Gustl: fin-
ished, finished, your life is over!" (LG 17). Gustl appears to contain 
the critical author or reader in himself when he exclaims, "No, it 
won't be made so easy for you, Herr Lieutenant" (LG 21) . At one 
moment, Gustl tries to gain rational control of his thoughts: "Look, 
Gustl, you've come here specially ... , in the middle of the night, 
where not a soul disturbs you-now you can calmly think over every-
thing for yourself" (LG 25). But control is elusive, morbid ideas un-
settle him, and he desperately seeks to calm himself: "Gustl, be good: 
as it is, things are bad enough" (LG 35). 
The narrative, as if situated inside Gustl's mind, nevertheless im-
plies an ironic distance. We ultimately feel "closer" to Daniel Prince 
although bored by him. Schnitzler's use of internal monologue pro-
duces a powerful effect; Gustl stands for the established military code 
and at the same time undoes this code by discovering inconsistencies 
'
2Martin Swales, Arthur Schnitzler: A Critical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 
10?:-4· 
3Arthur Schnitzler, Leutnant Gust! (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1967), 4 (henceforth cited as 
LG). 
"See also William H. Rey, Arthur Schnitzler: Die spate Prosa als Gipfel seines Schaffens 
(Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1968), 73-74. 
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within himself. Gust) falls asleep in the park, too irresolute to decide 
on suicide, and awakens in the despairing fashion of Richard III: 
"What is it then?-Hey, Johann, bring me a glass of fresh water . . . 
What is it? ... Where ... Yes, am I dreaming? ... My skull ... o blast 
it. ... I can't open my eyes!" (LG 26-27; ellipses in original). Like 
Richard, Gustl finds that "no creature loves me": "It really is sad to 
have absolutely no one" (LG 28). If they do not approach madness, 
the characteristic form of literary monologists often leads them to be 
loners and extreme individualists. 
While internal monologue purports to represent internal speech 
with complete accuracy, this apparent proximity can be riddled with 
ironic distances. At the moment of solitary crisis on the night before 
his duel, Gustl achieves no convincing individuality but only reveals 
the inability of a social type to escape or master its governing cliches. 
Schnitzler thus reveals that internal speech may constitute only an 
illusory form of autonomy: dominated by military codes of honor, 
Lieutenant Gustl finds himself incapable of independent thinking. In 
his irresolute decision to die, Gustl merely responds to a petty insult, 
and his continued life is an equally arbitrary result of the baker's 
sudden death. Lieutenant Gustl is a puppet of the society that authors 
him, or of the author who, within the fiction, pretends to let him 
speak for himself. 
Fraulein Else, Schnitzler's major work of fiction based on internal 
monologue, also demonstrates that despite appearances of autonomy, 
internal speech is controlled by outside forces. This demonstration 
operates on both the mimetic and narrative levels. Manipulated by 
her parents, Else is also the puppet of the narrative; suicide is her 
individual response to this double bind. 
An economic model governs the plot. Else's parents have sent her 
to an expensive resort, on vacation with her aunt and cousin. Else 
realizes that their money buys extreme solitude: "How alone I am 
here!"15 But an urgent letter intrudes. Her mother asks her to request 
a loan from another vacationer, which forces her into a system of 
exchange. Throughout, Else is identified with her reflective internal 
speech; according to the convention, she exists for us only by virtue 
of the fictional words that she purportedly speaks inwardly. But her 
15Arthur Schnitzler, Fraulein Else, in Erzahlungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1968), 159 (henceforth cited as FE). In English, see Arthur Schnitzler, Fraulein Else, 
trans. Robert A. Simon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1925). 
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father's debt and mother's plea demand that she enter into a new 
mode of language, a request . Monologue, a Marxist critic might say, 
is a luxury-or a delusion-of the rich. 16 As soon as Else must pay 
for her dependence on others, she also loses her linguistic freedom. 
Language and flesh become the media of exchange. To the extent that 
human existence is based on interdependence, of course, the use of 
language is characterized by a threatened fall from freedom; the con-
flicting tendencies of the internal monologue impose this threat that 
can never be evaded unless a speaker gives up all efforts to assert 
individual identity. 
Dorsday, a wealthy art dealer, agrees to satisfy the financial need 
that has been transferred from Else's father to Else, on the condition 
that she reveal herself to him naked. As a specialist in buying and 
selling beautiful objects, Dorsday wishes to buy Else's denuded im-
age. Because she is essentially a character of inwardness, the situation 
of mercenary exchange destroys her: for Else to expose her nudity is 
like giving up the privacy of her thoughts. In a sense-and this is 
one of the paradoxes of the story-she always does give up her in-
ternal speech, to the reader. 
Else's predicament parallels a literary dilemma. The internal mon-
ologist appears to present herself, yet she is obviously manipulated 
by the author, her father . The language of the internal monologist is 
supposedly private and yet exposed to the reader, Dorsday. If Schnitz-
ler is Else's true father, the reader is her insidious seducer, a patron 
who buys her text as Dorsday buys a glimpse of her nudity. When 
the narrative ends, we have all finished with her, and she dies. Within 
her predicament, Else is painfully self-conscious: not only aware that 
men manipulate her, she understands that she has been asked to sell 
herself (FE 157, 185). Furthermore, she recognizes that she is being 
asked to perform; at the same time her internal monologue is the 
totality of her performance. 
Else has in fact always wanted to become an actress, but her family 
will hear nothing of this disreputable trade. As the story opens, she 
has just stopped playing tennis, and her cousin asks: "You really 
don't want to play any more, Else?" (FE 145). The story both opens 
and closes with an impulse to break off the performance, in conformity 
16See Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans . and ed . Caryl Emerson 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984), 288. 
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with Else's strong urge to keep her expressions private. Formally, the 
speech of other characters, printed in italics, disrupts the flow of Else's 
internal speech. As a result of her father's addiction to financial gam-
bling, a Spielleidenschaft (FE 180), Else must also become a passionate 
player, or a player of passions. When Else has prepared herself for 
self-exposure, she thinks: "The show can begin" (Die Vorstellung kann 
beginnen) (FE 200) . Despite her parents' wish that she avoid an im-
proper profession, then, Else makes her debut in what she ironically 
calls a "grand performance" (FE 202). She observes the justice of this 
return of the repressed: because stage acting has been made impos-
sible, her peculiar performance will "serve them right, all of them," 
who "only raised me up in order to sell myself, one way or another" 
(FE 185). Else longs for a theatrical role, but she gives herself up in 
a live drama instead . Like all who sell themselves in love or marriage, 
Else may also stand for mercenary inclinations of the writer. 
After uncovering her body and poisoning herself, Else falls inward 
and becomes all internal speech, all internal monologue, completely 
isolated from the world that exploits her. Escape is perhaps impos-
sible. Psychologically, she has already determined that she must iso-
late herself: "I don't want to see anyone more" (ibid.) . Despite the 
system of exchange that controls her, Else realizes that no one has 
been truly concerned for her inwardness. While we read what passes 
through her mind, Else condemns us along with those who think 
they know her: "But what goes on in me, what churns in me and 
agonizes me, have you ever been concerned for that?" (FE 186). 
Like Dorsday, we pay to see Else naked; what do we really care 
what agitates her? We want to possess her private world, as does her 
cousin when he complains, "You are somewhere else with your 
thoughts" (FE 164). Absorbed in hidden language, Else is "secretive, 
daemonic, seductive" (ibid.). Her consciousness has been appropri-
ated by the narrative, captured in or made identical with the text, so 
that suicide becomes her only option. For a moment she views her 
own image in a mirror, and enjoys a narcissistic fan tasy: "Ah, come 
nearer, you beautiful girl. I want to kiss your blood-red lips. I want 
to press your breasts against mine . What a shame that the glass is 
between us, the cold glass. How well we would get along with each 
other. Isn't it so? We would need no one else" (FE 198). Else's exis-
tence hovers between the incompatible poles of autonomy and de-
pendence, autoeroticism and rape, private and public language. When 
180 LITERATURE OF MONOLO G UE 
her consciousness fades out with the fiction, she disappears behind 
the text. In a somewhat incestuous fantasy, Else imagines joining 
hands with her father, her author. Ultimately, no one can call her 
back to the represented world: 
"Else! Else!" 
They call from so far away! What do you want, anyway? Don' t wake 
me. I'm sleeping so well. Tomorrow morning. I'm dreaming and flying . 
I'm flying .. . flying ... flying ... sleep and dream ... and fly . .. don't 
wake .. . tomorrow morning .. . 
"El . .. " 
I'm flying .. . I'm dreaming ... I'm sleeping ... I dre ... dre-I'm fly 
.. .... [FE 219; ellipses in original] 
The death of consciousness corresponds to textual closure. 
Dujardin's and Schnitzler's monologues bring a narrative paradox 
into sharp focus. From a formal standpoint, Lieutenant Gustl and 
Fraulein Else appear to speak more autonomously than does Daniel 
Prince; yet their internal speech only reveals an inability to control 
their lives. Internal speech is threatened by diverse absences. 
The Genius of Modern Narrative 
"Penelope," the final chapter of Ulysses, is the culmination of the 
literary tradition of internal monologue begun by Dujardin. Joyce was 
familiar with Les lauriers sont coupes and suggested that Valery Larbaud 
read this novel in which "the reader finds himself installed, from the 
first lines, in the thought of the principal character."17 Although Joyce 
is often said to write stream-of-consciousness technique, "Penelope" 
appears more as a representation of internal speech than of preverbal 
consciousness. We may thus refer to this section as Molly's internal 
monologue, which has, for various reasons, dominated the general 
reception of Joyce's work. 18 In eight paragraphs without punctuation, 
Joyce closes his novel as if striving to complete Western literary history 
since Homer. 
17 As attested by Valery Larbaud in his preface to the second, 1924 edition of LC (p. 
7). 
' 8Compare Therese Fischer-Seidel's essay in her critical anthology, James Joyces "Ulys-
ses": Neuere deutsche Aufsiitze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 309. 
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After Molly's Odysseus returns home, they exchange questions and 
(somewhat deceptive) answers . On another level, the narrator has 
returned to Athena, the guardian spirit, or muse . If the penultimate 
chapter is "the ceremonious exchange between narrator and Muse," 
then the final pages constitute a language of "Muse without narra-
tor."19 From the standpoint of mystical genius, the language of Molly's 
internal monologue appears to "show us how the Muse behaves 
without Homer"; in terms of authorial genius, the final chapter is 
"the voice of the pure composing faculty" (ibid ., pp. 98-99). Bloom's 
return is simultaneously the return of narrator to listener and of author 
to muse and the awakening of narrative to inner potentials . 
One of Joyce's letters supports the view that the concluding chapter 
is "the clou [sic] of the book."20 Joyce describes "Penelope" as if it 
were based on a kind of linguistic, erotic kabbala: "It begins and ends 
with the female word, yes . It turns like the huge earth ball slowly 
surely and evenly round and round spinning, its four cardinal points 
being the female breasts, arse, womb and .. . expressed by the words 
because, bottom (in all senses bottom button, bottom of the class, bottom 
of the sea, bottom of his heart), woman, yes" (ibid.). This image draws 
attention to the merging of mimetic illusion with sheer linguistic play. 
If the entire section turns "like the huge earth ball" around "female 
breasts, arse, womb and ... ," this world finds bizarre expression in 
the unlikely words, "because, bottom, woman, yes." While the arse-
bottom and womb-woman connections seem natural enough, Joyce 
pushes beyond the simple identification by expositing "bottom" as-
sociatively as "in all senses bottom button, bottom of the class, bottom 
of the sea, bottom of his heart"; the pairing of "womb" and "woman" 
is only motivated by Joyce's choice of this synecdoche and homonymic 
play. Between "breasts" and "because", "yes" and" ... " there is no 
obvious relationship of even a conventional kind. Joyce generates a 
linguistic mythology that creates a set of unexpected parallels. 
Joyce's letter continues beyond the linguistic mythology, suggesting 
a comic revision of Goethe: "Though probably more obscene than 
any preceding episode," Joyce adds, "it seems to me to be perfectly 
19Hugh Kenner, Joyce's Voices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 98. 
20Letters of James Joyce, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Viking, 1966), 170. In the 
following quotation, the ellipsis is introduced by Gilbert. Compare Shakespeare's The 
Comedy of Errors, Act 2 , Scene 2: "She is spherical, like a globe. I could find out countries 
in her. " 
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sane full amoral fertilisable untrustworthy engaging shrewd limited 
prudent indifferent Weib . Ich bin der [sic] Fleisch der stets bejaht [ . .. 
Woman . I am the flesh that constantly affirms]" (ibid .). Molly Bloom 
is the womb-woman who says Yes and the flesh that constantly af-
firms. Placing himself once again in the position of writing Molly's 
words for her, Joyce has Molly speak her essence by reversing Meph-
istopheles' lines: "I am the spirit that constantly denies" (Ich bin der 
Geist, der stets verneint). 21 Instead of being the spirit that negates, Molly 
is the body that affirms. Supernatural agency is once again introjected. 
Paradoxically, however, Molly is no body but only a text that refers 
endlessly to other texts; on the most profound level, Molly can exist 
only as a reversal of Mephistopheles. By negation of a negator, she 
affirms. This produces, in the "depths" of Molly's consciousness, a 
language of affirmation, an acceptance of her textual past as individ-
ual, muse, genius. 22 Because Stuart Gilbert's edition of Joyce's letters 
omits the word that corresponds to "yes," the censored signifier re-
mains an absence through which all human life is affirmed and sus-
tained . Molly is all Woman, carrying on the life of humanity by saying 
Yes to the flesh. She also says Yes to a textual past, as she refigures 
Penelope, Athena, Mephistopheles, Daniel Prince, and Lieutenant 
Gustl. Like her successor Fraulein Else, Molly concludes with sleep, 
a textual death. 
Echoing an entire personal and impersonal past, Molly's internal 
monologue eludes commentary as it eludes punctuation. But Joyce 
offers a means of access by mentioning her "four cardinal points." 
Joyce's image is literally overdetermined, however, because a sphere 
spins on an axis that is sufficiently defined by two points. One reading 
would define these two points as the opening and closing words, 
"Yes ... Yes."23 But an early passage links "yes" and "sex" : "Mr 
Bloom reached Essex bridge. Yes, Mr Bloom crossed bridge of Yes-
sex."24 "Yessex" is the axis around which Molly's thoughts turn. 
21Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Fa ust, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich : C. H. Beck, 1972), 
I. 1338. 
22ln The Stream of Consciousness and Beyond in Ulysses (Pittsburgh: University of Pi tts-
burgh Press, 1973), Erwin R. Steinberg unconvincingly disputes Joyce's interpretation 
of Molly as an affirmer. 
23Compare the final monologue of Faulkner' s Dar!, in As I Lily Dying, where the 
repeated "yes" works as an affirmation, not of life, but of madness, an inabili ty to 
make sense . Perhaps there is a connection . 
24James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Random House, 1961), 261 (page numbers appear 
in text below). The association of "yes" with Eros is especially clear in the light of the 
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In the final chapter of Ulysses, Molly Bloom's internal monologue 
is not obviously controlled by outside forces. At two points a train 
whistle blows, but otherwise her language appears to follow from the 
train of her uninterrupted associations. Daniel Prince, Lieutenant Gustl, 
and Fraulein Else all live through experiences during their internal 
monologues, but no simultaneous events impinge on Molly. The dis-
tinction between external and internal events breaks down, finally, 
to the extent that Molly's internal monologue is its own performance, 
a union of narrative process with narrated world . 
An interaction of narrative modes is evident in the uses of the word 
"yes. " On one level, "yes" appears to transcribe Molly's inner speech; 
but on another level, "yes" is a sheer connective that stands for an 
elusive, prelinguistic moment. The section opens with a transition 
from the dialogue Bloom and Molly have shared: "Yes because he 
never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed 
with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be 
pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make 
himself interesting" (p. 738). Apparently without regard for what 
would be a logical starting point, the narrative slips into a stream of 
language . Bloom's request to have breakfast in bed takes Molly back 
to a past time, but neither "yes" nor "because" follows any obvious 
antecedent. Rather than form part of a worldly logic, Molly's words 
are connectives in the verbal stream. 25 Schnitzler employs ellipses and 
dashes to indicate what Coleridge calls "the interspersed vacancies I 
And momentary pauses of the thought."26 Molly's "yes because" 
works in much the same way (pp. 738, 739, 744), as a textual pause, 
no longer standing for an unvoiced phone. In part, then, the words 
new Ulysses: A Critical and Synoptic Edition, 3 vols., ed . Hans Walter Gabler, Wolfhard 
Steppe, and Claus Melchior (New York: Garland, 1984), I, 418- 19 (henceforth cited as 
CSE) . In the corrected "Scylla and Charybdis" episode, Stephen thinks: "Do you know 
what you are talking about? Love, yes. " 
25In at least one passage, "yes because" does function as a logical connective. This 
phrase is an affirmation of both sexuality and the narrative itself, assenting to a human 
coupling while carrying the text fu rther in its stream: "Of course some men can be 
dreadfully aggravating drive you mad and always the worst word in the world what 
do they ask us to marry them for if were so bad as all that comes to yes because they 
cant get on without us" (p. 744). Men speak " the worst word," a " no" of criticism, 
and yet always ask women to say," yes. " Like Molly's stream of words, men cannot 
get along without the female "yes." 
26"Frost at Midnight," II . 46-47. 
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of internal monologue relinquish the pretense of transcribing internal 
speech or stream of consciousness . 
As Molly falls asleep and her internal monologue draws to its close, 
"yes because" turns toward the single "yes." In the early days of 
their relationship, Bloom "pestered me to say yes" (p. 746). 27 The 
"yes" to sexuality always joins with a narrative "yes": "I had to say 
Im a fright yes but he was a real old gent" (p. 747). "Yes" remains 
profoundly sexual: "theyre all mad to get in there where they come 
out of youd think they could never get far enough up and then theyre 
done with you in a way till the next time yes because theres a won-
derful feeling there all the time so tender how did we finish it off yes 
0 yes I pulled him off into my handkerchief" (p. 760). The muse says 
"yes" to the poet, to the narrative. For Bloom, like Odysseus, is a 
great "Deceiver" (p. 746). On occasion, where she does not stand 
opposite her own kind, she must say "no": "I hate an unlucky man 
and if I knew what it meant of course I had to say no for form sake 
dont understand you" (p. 747). 
Molly's affirmation reaches a climax in the final pages. She recalls 
the day "I gave him all the pleasure I could leading him on till he 
asked me to say yes." In this primal scene of election, "yes" flows 
between the languages of past and present: "The day I got him to 
propose to me yes first I gave him the bit of seedcake out of my mouth 
and it was leapyear like now yes 16 years ago my God after that long 
kiss I near lost my breath yes he said I was a flower of the mountain 
yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes" (p. 782). Molly the 
muse passes her breath to Bloom the poet, who then voices the most 
cliched of images. No matter, he is right; yes, by synecdoche a wom-
an's body is like a flower. The poet speaks an image that convinces 
the muse that he knows her: "yes that was why I liked him because 
I saw he understood or felt what a woman is." 
The "yes" of Molly's internal monologue builds toward the "yes" 
by which she affirms his selection of her, and they are to be wedded 
for life. Molly does not answer Bloom's question but interrupts their 
dialogue as she looks "out over the sea and the sky I was thinking 
of so many things he didnt know of." How can the muse limit herself 
to one poet? After an imaginative flight around "all the ends of Eu-
27This "yes" can also function within the recalled scenes or reasoning logic: "does 
that suit me yes take that" (p . 752); " didnt I cry yes I believe I did" (p. 756). 
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rope," Molly returns to their scene through the connective agency of 
a "yes," when "I thought well as well him as another" (p. 783). Aware 
of this arbitrariness, the muse comically undermines the poetic myth 
of a fated choice. Bloom wants to claim Molly as his own, but even 
Athena spreads her favors among several heroes . The narrative strives 
to appropriate her language, but language is always common prop-
erty. Again, "yes" hovers between meaningful affirmation and mean-
ingless connective, rising to a crescendo: "then I asked him with my 
eyes to ask again yes and then he asked me would I yes to say yes 
my mountain flower and first I put my arms around him yes and 
drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes 
and his heart was going like mad" (p. 783) . Grammatical structures 
compete. The implied phrase, "he asked me ... to say yes" is dis-
rupted by a "would I yes." She must both say and perform "yes." 
The "would I yes" is Molly's connective, almost a verb of affirmation. 
Molly says and does "yes" by embracing Bloom, "and yes I said yes 
I will Yes." Where is punctuation implied, and what are the words 
of Molly's response? At first we may read her answer as being, "Yes, 
yes I will, Yes ." But according to another reading Molly reports, "I 
said . .. . I will," punctuated by a thrice-repeated "yes" of narration 
that affirms the narrative of affirmation. In fact, a previous draft of 
the final words reads, "I said I will yes."28 Superimposed in the 
published edition, several possibilities stand together, as 
"Yes," I said, "Yes, I will. Yes" 
and 
(Yes) I said, (yes) "I will" (yes). 
The affirmation of poetic desire corresponds to an affirmation of the 
process of language that creates Ulysses. In the final monologue, or 
Mollylogue, key words function both symbolically and by contiguity, 
metaphorically and metonymically. 
28CSE III, 1726. This edition substantially illuminates the processes of Joyce' s verbal 
art . While the recurrent, sexually charged "yes" in the original edition of Ulysses (p. 
76o) is present at an early stage (see CSE III, 168o), Joyce inserts many of the connective 
instances later (CSE lll, 1724- 26); "yes because" already acts as a connective in the 
earlier versions. Particularly in the closing lines of the book, successive drafts multiply 
the rhythmic "yes," building toward the climax of the final "Yes," as Joyce holds a 
dialogue with Molly and encourages her yes to merge with the stream of textual 
affirmation. 
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"Monologue" names several types of solitary speech that deviate 
from dialogical norms. By a sequence of innovations, the literary 
tradition corresponds to human solitude through the forms of syn-
tactic and semantic solitude. First-person monologues draw attention 
to the present of the monological act of speech, whether represented 
by staged soliloquy, conversational poetry, narrative, or internal mon-
ologue. As the psychological novel cedes to more radical writing as 
monologue, the moment of thought becomes inseparable from the 
act of writing. Internal monologue is, finally, not a representation of 
internal speech but its enactment; internal speech is already a kind 
of code. European literature does not develop exclusively toward 
dramatized scenes of writing, but this movement in the direction of 
internal monologue does parallel the transformations of genius. 
Internal monologue and stream-of-consciousness techniques, when 
they question psychological assumptions and accept themselves as 
writing, hold a privileged place in modern literature. One critic refers 
to the breakdown of mimetic monologue, ascertaining that in the 
internal monologue "there is in general no authentic speaking, but 
rather there whispers [es raunt] a sequence of associations."29 An 
unspoken "whispering" moves away from representation of con-
sciousness, toward hints at "a differentiation in the illusion." At first, 
the narrator appears to enter the monologist's thought, but their prox-
imity actually dissolves the distinction between narrator and narrated 
and enhances a self-reflective awareness of the narrative illusion. 
Other literary critics have, while according a privileged place to in-
ternal monologue, sought more exact terminology. Taking the final 
chapter of Ulysses as "the most famous and the most perfectly exe-
cuted specimen of its species," one critic discusses the genre of "au-
tonomous monologue."30 Analyses of Schnitzler and Joyce show, 
however, that monologists are incapable of attaining the autonomy 
they superficially seek. 
In his Critique et verite, Roland Barthes opposes classical criticism, 
with its naive belief in the "fullness" of the subject. In contrast, Barthes' 
criticism holds that "the subject is not an individual plenitude . .. , 
but on the contrary an emptiness around which the writer weaves 
29Gerhard Storz, " Uber den 'Monologue interieur' oder die 'Erlebte Rede,' " in Der 
Deutschunterricht, vol. 7, no. 1 (1955), 50. 
30Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narra tive Modes fo r Presenting Consciousness in Fiction 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 217. 
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an infinitely transformed speech (inserted into a chain of transfor-
mation), such that every writing which does not lie designates, not the 
internal attributes of the subject, but its absence."31 The absence of 
the traditional subject turns out to mean that, from another stand-
point, language is itself the subject. 
Gerard Genette, in a parallel discussion, refers to Paul Valery, Maur-
ice Blanchot, and Albert Thibaudet. Valery suggests that the author 
"is positively no one-or better, that one of the functions of language, 
and of literature as language, is to destroy its interlocutor and to 
designate it as absent."32 As cited by Genette, Blanchot proposes that 
the writer "belongs to a language which no one speaks, which is 
addressed to no one, which has no center, which reveals nothing." 
Genette closes his discussion of the abolition of the subject by ref-
erence to Thibaudet and the figure of the genie. Genette paraphrases: 
"Genius . . . is at once the superlative of the individual and the breakup 
[l' eclatement] of individuality" (Fig. 13). Thibaudet further explains that 
"genius" can refer to an individual, a genre, an epoch, or a religion .33 
The secret of genius reminds us of the power of language to designate 
the absence of the subject at the same time that it brings this subject 
into apparent existence. Like the language of modern literature that 
collapses the narrating with the narrated, genius points to the stream 
of invention beyond the flow of invented objects and subjects . Proust 
discovered his genie, Genette comments, "at the moment when he 
found in his work the place of language where his individuality would 
be able to break up and dissolve itself in the Idea" (Fig. 14). 
The final "Yes" of Ulysses circles back to Greek myth, slips away 
from its cognitive function, and unites with a narrative stream that 
re-presents the stream of consciousness. By affirming itself as lan-
guage, even as language that corresponds to an absence of coherent 
language, the emerging literature of internal monologue discovers 
" Roland Barthes, Critique et verite (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), 70. Compare Paul 
Ricoeur, "The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology,'' in The Conflict 
of Interpretations, ed . Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 236-
66. 
32Gerard Genette, Figures II (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969), 13 (henceforth cited as 
Fig.) . 
33Aibert Thibaudet, Physiologie de Ia Critique (Paris: Nouvelle Revue CI;itique, 1930), 
125. In his own words, genius is " Ia plus haute figure de l' individu, le ·superla tif de 
l' individuel, e t cependent le secret du genie c'est de faire ecla ter l'individualite, d 'e tre 
Idee, de representer, par-deJa !'invention, le courant d ' invention" (pp. 139-40). 
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limits of the philosophical monad . The monological genius is neither 
object nor subject, neither an externally conceived Socratic daimonion, 
nor a psychologically conceived Romantic genius, but the figure that 
disrupts this opposition in the peculiar literary modes that dissolve 
individuality, efface personae by taking the part of the muse, and 
become identified with the guardian genius, an intertextual force, a 
stream of literary work in progress, riverrun .... 
Conclusions 
An exploration of philosophic genius and literary monologue re-
traces shifting intertextual pathways, for as meaning is in general 
created through differential relations, "criticism is the art of knowing 
the hidden roads that go from poem to poem."1 A master trope in 
the development of "genius" and "monologue" at first appears to be 
introjection: myths of external divinity are internalized and trans-
formed into the spirit of an individual. Rhetorical awareness unsettles 
the assumed inner-outer distinction, however, for it demonstrates 
that these categories depend on types of figuration; genius and mon-
ologue accumulate and transform meanings within linguistic systems, 
and the disjunction between ancient and modern beliefs finds expres-
sion in rhetorical differences. Theological and philosophical expres-
sions of genius are replaced by the literary forms of monologue in a 
movement that is not accessible to traditional intellectual history. 
In the context of polytheistic Greek daimones, Homer and Plato move 
toward more abstract theological language. Alongside theos, the Ho-
meric daimon is a mysterious term that suggests divinity; Plato refers 
to the Socratic daimonion, an even more radical synecdoche that re-
'Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 96. 
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places the Olympian gods by "something divine" only negatively 
experienced by Socrates. Against the background of monotheistic He-
brew YHWH, Philo and rabbinic commentators drift toward esoteric 
teachings of multiple divine presences, represented by angels. The 
daemonic gradually takes on evil connotations, as legends of satan 
multiply. 
Modern aesthetics displaces or introjects the divinity associated 
with creativity. To the extent that eighteenth-century genius retains 
a theological dimension, it becomes "that god within," linked to con-
science. Shaftesbury writes of soliloquy as the force of subjective 
genius, while Kant unsuccessfully strives to purge genius of its mys-
tical associations. Kant's transcendental philosophy and Husser!' s 
phenomenology attempt to secure the island of pure reason or im-
manent sphere of consciousness, but Heidegger turns their tropes 
inside out, transforms the philosophic monad into a literary nomad 
by redirecting Dasein to metaphysical transcendence, and affirms that 
"language speaks" beyond the deliberate intentions controlled by 
speakers. 
"Monologue," as a collective term for counternormative swerves, 
might be viewed as a master trope of intertextuality. While solitary 
speech is not necessarily deviant, individual speech turns away from 
unified systems of language. In one sense, then, monologue names 
the most general phenomenon of literary revisionism. Yet monologue 
has both formal and material, tropological and topological manifes-
tations. The intertextual development of monologue is a process of 
revisionary swerves and re-presentations of solitary speech. 
From medieval drama to modern narrative, the potential for solil-
oquy expands in the space cleared by distance from God's revelation. 
Only demonic spirits remain when Shakespeare's villains find them-
selves at the mercy of dark powers that appear to emanate from their 
own hallucinations and dreams. Coleridge carries the conversational 
mode further, yet his potentially controlled poetic personae repeat-
edly drift toward "phantom magic" or madness and encounter the 
monological subversion of norms. Poe makes narrative monologue 
the focal point of disorienting perspectival illusions. One text swal-
lows itself, another turns itself inside out, and as mad narrators tell 
cogent tales, the representational pretense erodes. Modernist internal 
monologue responds to the genius of language, as when Joyce's stream 
of consciousness becomes a stream of textuality. Antiquity returns in 
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modem colors when Molly, a literary reincarnation of Athena and 
Penelope, speaks alone as muse in a language of divine affirmation. 
II 
Lev Vygotsky writes Thought and Language soon after James Joyce 
and Arthur Schnitzler publish their major works of internal mono-
logue, and he responds explicitly to Jean Pia get's Le Ian gage et la pensee 
chez l'enfant (1923) .2 According to Piaget, the earliest autistic thinking 
becomes childhood egocentric thinking, which in tum gives way to 
mature rational thinking. Vygotsky questions Piaget's assumptions 
by showing that egocentric language is more fundamentally linked 
to adult internal speech than to autistic inarticulateness; and where 
Piaget conceives child development as a process of socialization, Vy-
gotsky conceives it as a process of individuation. Vygotsky in some 
ways reverses the movement Piaget traces from autism to social lan-
guage and from fantasy to logic. Rather than being reduced to a 
deficient mode, internal speech that creates anew by turning inward 
and away from the social becomes the epitome of linguistic 
development. 
Vygotsky increasingly rejects the established external forms of lan-
guage as he probes deeper into "the inner side of language ." Against 
the unquestioned supremacy of socialization, he posits different lin-
guistic functions such as internal speech, which (unlike external speech) 
receives its character as language for the speaker alone. In contrast 
to Piaget, Vygotsky conceives linguistic development as one of grad-
ual individuation, in which the death of egocentric language corre-
sponds to the birth of internal speech. Vygotsky's discussion of internal 
speech as a special linguistic function includes literary examples. Not 
only does his analysis touch on phenomena of madness, deviance, 
and the unconscious, which dominate the expressions of monologue 
in literature; Vygotsky shows an unexpected link between internal 
speech and writing. 3 
2L. S. Wygotski, Denken und Sprechen, trans. Gerhard Sewekow (Stuttgart: S. Fischer, 
1969). The author's name is transliterated "Vygotsky" on the title page of the English 
edition, Thought and Language, trans. and ed . Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962), which abridges the Russian text. I cite the German 
edition; all translations from the German are my own . 
3Vygotsky believes that nei ther writing nor internal speech conforms to ordinary 
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Whereas psychology has tended to view human development as a 
process of bondage to social norms, Vygotsky focuses on a possible 
liberation. Not intended for voiced communication, internal speech 
is closely allied with subjectivity and may give rise to a kind of inner 
dialect. Vygotsky writes that "in our language there is always a hidden 
thought," the abbreviated internal speech, analogous to writing in 
code. Vygotsky's Thought and Language was suppressed during the 
Soviet purges of 1936, only two years after publication, for it set out 
on an unpopular path toward theories of individuality in language. 
III 
Mikhail Bakhtin is the sharpest critic of monologue, which he in-
terprets primarily as the striving for single-voiced philosophical ar-
gumentation or literary representation. The monological novel is, 
according to Bakhtin, dominated by a univocal ideology or worldview 
that fails to interact with conflicting voices. Although Bakhtin attacks 
monological forms, his Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics shares with 
Vygotsky' s Thought and Language a special interest in the subjectivity 
of fictional characters and shows that self-consciousness does not exist 
as autonomous introspection. Observing that "faith in the self-suf-
ficiency of a single consciousness" characterizes post-Enlightenment 
literature, Bakhtin argues that this faith is illusory.4 The forces of 
"internal" signification are actually external to the subject. 5 
Bakhtin' s approach to dialogue thus makes possible the discovery 
of an inwardness that is inseparable from relations with others. Echo-
ing Hegel's conception of self-consciousness, Bakhtin points to in-
ternal dialogues "in which the other's discourse has seized control" 
(PDP 219) . Bakhtin's manuscript notes reconfirm that the supposedly 
social speech (Denken und Sprechen, 224); his description of internal speech reflects its 
essential constitution as a kind of writing. Like the language of dreams, according to 
Freud's analyses, the internal language is characterized by condensation (Verdichtung). 
The two poles of Vygotsky's opposition, abbreviated internal speech and highly de-
veloped written language, come together if internal speech is structured like a form 
of writing in code. 
4Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. and ed. Caryl Emerson (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984), 74, 88, henceforth cited as PDP. 
5Mikhail Bakhtine, Le Marxisme et Ia philosophie du langage, trans . Marina Yaguello 
(Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1977), 122-23. 
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monological "I" depends on dialogical interactions. Bakhtin values 
Dostoevsky's novels, not because they invent a dialogical type of 
language, but because they uncover the dissimulated dialogical ele-
ment that inheres in the word; Dostoevsky represents the individual 
consciousness dialogically. Had he written on English literature, 
Bakhtin might have demonstrated that in European traditions from 
pre-Shakespearean soliloquy to twentieth-century internal mono-
logue, solitary speech depends on a concealed relation to otherness. 
Like Hegelian sense certainty, monologue discovers that it mistakes 
itself to be something that is in fact unattainable. If monologue is a 
misconception of thought and language, however, it is a delusion 
that has determined the progress of Western existence and literary 
art. Commitment to monologue is linked to the "death of God," after 
which man asserts the legitimacy of monological reason. Bakhtin's 
work contains an implicit metaphysical impetus, a theology of dia-
logue: "the very being of man (both external and internal) is the 
deepest communion" (PDP 287). After encountering the most extreme 
forms of solitary consciousness, we are impelled to recognize the 
failure of our monological exertions. The division or decentering of 
the subject is already implicit in Hegel's master-slave dialectic, the 
Freudian unconscious, and Heidegger's ec-static Dasein-prophetic 
voices of a new transcendence. 
IV 
The intertextual pathways from genius to monologue pass through 
theological, philosophical, psychological, and literary domains . Clas-
sical traditions emphasize the place of divine guidance that becomes 
unacceptable to enlightened rationalism. In the eighteenth century 
theology and psychology confront each other, and art chooses the 
genius of soliloquy as its muse . Yet even the imagination of Kant's 
"genius" tends to deviate, to wander beyond its innate capacity for 
exemplary originality. For twentieth-century thought, psychological 
genius becomes as questionable as was theological genius in the eigh-
teenth century. When contemporary critics demonstrate the inescap-
able difference from oneself within monologue, deviation becomes a 
new, errant genius . 
From Greek monos + logos, "monologue" derives the meaning of 
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solitary speech. But the physical solitude of internal speech is phil-
osophically the least significant form of linguistic isolation. When 
"monologue" is linked to modes of language that swerve from or-
dinary dialogical speech, the new deviant monologue makes its ap-
pearance. Linguistic deviance turns away from norms of speech as 
genius turns away from norms of artistic creation. 6 But deviation from 
convention always threatens meaning, for how can an individual 
invent new forms and still be understood? By asserting an individual 
style or deviant form of expression, monologue borders on meaning-
lessness. Literary monologues provide the basis for inquiry into se-
mantic solitude, associated with idiolects that strive to preserve their 
autonomy while reaching for an elusive otherness . 
Introjection makes genius into monologue, and projection reclaims 
monologue as transcendent genius of language. There is no way to 
transcend human language and attain the language of God, because 
"divine speech" is always a trope. Turn away, Moses, and inscribe 
for yourself two tablets of stone. The ineffable daimonion and YHWH 
do not permit direct revelation: to see God is to transcend human 
experience, to die. But to exclude all languages of transcendence, if 
this were possible, would only be to imprison ourselves in a repetitive 
world without even the creative sublime of rhetorical play. 
Genius and Monologue, to the extent that it reads the palimpsests of 
genius and monologue, necessarily superimposes several layers of 
textuality . On the surface, then, this book resembles a mosaic of 
citations. The originality myth has died, and only a prospect of endless 
swerves remains. We cling to a mythological Logos that justifies belief 
in poetry as the site of authenticity, but we know that all writing 
grafts itself onto preexisting textuality. If the divine Logos is an in-
accessible source of inspiration, we can only lose ourselves by error, 
deviation from the mazes of overtrodden paths. 
The new transcendence is a transference, a metapherein that sur-
passes the present, transforms past figures through imaginative ob-
sessions, and constitutes the self in endless dialogues. 
-Everything is always different. 
-We repeat. 
6Compare PDP 138, where dialogism is linked to experiences of a person who " has 
deviated from the general norm" and stands "on the th reshold of insanity." As in Hegel's 
interpretation of Socrates' daimonion, a theological moment is bound up with aberrant 
psychology. 
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